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## U.S. MILITARY ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE TO PERU: DOING THINGS RIGHT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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
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
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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College nor any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement with the reference.)



# ABSTRACT

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This thesis reviews US national security strategy (NSS) and US military engineering assistance (MEA) to Perú to see if MEA is employed consistent with NSS. It identifies and classifies US strategic interests in Perú. Finding US interests at stake, the thesis addresses whether and how the US should use MEA programs to secure those interests as part of nation assistance or security assistance.

The investigation draws several conclusions. First, the US has important, non-vital interests in Perú. Second, the US has used its military component of national power to advance those interests, but not efficiently. Third, the US Country Team is increasing MEA as part of an "enlightened" approach to Perú. Fourth, MEA planning, coordination and execution can be further improved.

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The changes can enhance MEA and military planning in Perú. The thesis provides a framework for reviewing US interests and MEA in Perú with changing conditions over time.

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*Essayons!*, or, like they say in *Chorrillos* ...

*¡Déjanos intentarlo!*

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
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
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**Figure 1: South America (Inset - Perú)**



**Figure 2: Perú**

[1991 Data]

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### SECTION 1: Problem, Scope, and Objectives

The Research Question: Whether and, if so, when and how should the United States government (USG) use American military engineering (ME) capabilities in Perú? The basic framework used to answer the "whether, when and how" dilemma may serve others who review these complex questions in the future. Key to this effort is an understanding of and answers to the following:

- a) What US national security interests, if any, are at stake in the country of Perú and how should they be characterized (vital/non-vital, important, peripheral)?
- b) Assuming that the US has national security interests in Perú, what are the potential applications of, or roles for, military engineering assistance (MEA) there?
- c) What ME experience does the US have in Perú, and with what results or lessons learned?
- d) Are any of the potential applications or roles viable or appropriate candidates for ME missions and, if so,



how should the US accomplish these missions?

This thesis has several objectives. It serves as a primer on Perú today and gives a brief report on the major circumstances which impinge on any program's chances for success there. With an eye on National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS), the thesis looks at whether the US presently has national security interests in Perú. Finding these, it reviews US NMS and the military role in protecting and advancing those US interests.

This study also looks at these interests from Perú's point of view. After taking a snapshot of US present and past MEA to Perú, it identifies where US ME commitments and programs might be appropriate. It prescribes how and when the US can use MEA effectively to help achieve US national goals. Finally, it serves as a model for future analysis.

Recent regional and global changes make these unique times.<sup>1</sup> Surprisingly, Peruvians elected Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, an obscure, agricultural engineer of Japanese descent, to be their new president in 1990.<sup>2</sup> US military

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<sup>1</sup> As early as 1976, William W. Whitson, the Director of Policy Research for the BDM Corporation, foresaw changing events and the need for a "new American vision" with three components: "manifest environmental concern, creative internationalism, and a strength to share." His prescience and ideas are very relevant in the "new world order." See generally, Foreign Policy and U.S. National Security (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), chapter V.

<sup>2</sup> After the first round of elections, Fujimori emerged as a real threat to the previously-favored Vargas Llosa. Ambassador Quainton allegedly sent a message to Washington: "The unthinkable has happened. Fujimori will be Perú's next President." Recalled by Ambassador Quainton in his "Newcomers Orientation Briefing," USAID Building, Lima, Perú, 20 August 1990. *Daily Journal* note.

aid in 1990 and 1991 all but vanished when the US and Perú could not produce a mutually acceptable bilateral accord.<sup>3</sup> Fujimori's autogolpe, or self-coup, in April 1992 caused national and international repercussions which have not fully settled. Discussed below, Perú's Fujimori stands on the edge of an abyss. Terrorists and insurgents press in on every side. Other nations increasingly fault his methods, but offer little real long-term assistance. Democracy, to date, has not provided relief to Perú's masses.

Security concerns (some reactionary and others precautionary) led the State Department to reduce the size of the US mission in Perú in 1991. Many on the staff, including all of the US military Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) officers at the Centros Academicos, or Peruvian Army Academic Center, left voluntarily or were "sent packing" by the American mission.<sup>4</sup> Still, in this environment of

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<sup>3</sup> Until the May 14, 1991 agreement discussed below, Perú's leadership viewed terrorism as a security problem (military) and drug trafficking as a law enforcement problem (police). They were hesitant or unwilling to commit the military to counterdrug operations despite the interwoven nature of these threats. See, "Food, Military: \$145 mn in US aid," *Lima Times*, 2 August 1991, 1: "The US demand that the army become involved in the narcotics war was not well received." The US is focusing principally in supporting Perú's police, who are under the control of the *Ministro del Interior*, or Interior Ministry. See, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, (hereinafter *Narcotics Control Strategy*) March 1991, 118: "The U.S. Embassy believes that the Peruvian police will continue to be the lead agency in counter-narcotics ...".

<sup>4</sup> Ambassador Quainton placed the US mission in a voluntary evacuation state on 11 February 1991. The Country Team identified mission-essential personnel who were permitted to remain in country. Other mission members left immediately; or, if they stayed, they did so knowing that virtually any departure from Perú meant automatic termination of their assignment. Of the five PEPs, one left immediately, two left as scheduled in July 1991, and two left early when the program was suspended by Ambassador Quainton in consultation with then-Chief, USMAAG-Lima, COL McCasslin,

heightened security concerns, changes continue -- some for good, others for bad. Perú is anything but idle.

Perú has taken steps to reenter the world financial community, to improve its economy and internal security, and to participate in the fight against drug traffickers. It has done these things with varying degrees of success and under difficult conditions. Terrorism and misery continue and they are, in some cases and respects, worse than ever. No doubt, Perú needs a tremendous transformation, and, there are signs and forces working toward such revolutionary change -- some peacefully, some violently. The caution of a former US President strikes a resonant chord: "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable."<sup>5</sup>

Because of changes in Perú and in the world at large, the US continuously reviews its NSS and assistance programs, including MEA. When appropriate, the US acts to protect its interests in Perú. That is what this thesis is all about: regarding MEA to Perú, should the US do anything; if so, what and how?

---

USAF. The Ambassador lifted the Voluntary Evacuation status in May 1991. To date, PEPs have not returned to Perú. See, Administrative Notice No. 049/91, US Mission-Lima, Perú, 11 February 1991.

<sup>5</sup> James Charleton, ed., The Military Quotation Book (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990): 43, quoting John F. Kennedy.

## SECTION 2: Thesis Structure

The inherent complexities of this topic necessitate some ordered format -- this thesis approaches the problem in the following structured way. First, this chapter introduces the topic, and it addresses the mechanics of the thesis: its structure, limitations, delimitations, and assumptions.

Second, Chapter II looks at Perú and determines what US interests might exist there and how one should characterize them. After looking at Perú both as a sovereign country and as a member of the international community, the thesis looks for US interests and any resulting strategy to protect or advance them. It also scrutinizes US interests from a Peruvian vantage point, and it discusses Perú's national interests. Thus, the second chapter establishes and characterizes US interests at stake in Perú and provides an opportunity for the reader to juxtapose them against Peruvian interests.

Third, Chapter III looks at the possible applications of US MEA to help secure US objectives. This includes a review of previous US MEA to Perú. It considers the gamut of forms and combinations of MEA.

Fourth, Chapter IV proposes a method for integrating various military engineering capabilities. This chapter answers the "whether" question as well as the "when" and "how". In addition, it looks at the likely consequences of

various MEA options.

Finally, Chapter V presents a summary of findings, recommendations, and conclusions.

The approach I use in this thesis may serve as a model for the future. The thesis offers an action plan consistent with the interests of US national security strategy and US national military strategy. And, it offers an integrated, comprehensive mechanism for military engineering planning over time.

### **SECTION 3: Limitations, Delimitations and Assumptions**

This manuscript is limited by several factors. One, counterdrug efforts and the inherent concern for US personnel and their security in Perú makes inaccessible what might, in another situation, be available information. Still, there is sufficient published data which, in combination with personal experience and contacts, provides enough information to address the issues.

Two, data proffered as fact from the government of Perú (GOP) and other sources often reflect biases, gross inaccuracies, or selectivity which render them highly unreliable. Such data do not appear unless they are consistent with other reliable or widely accepted sources. In every case, the source of data appears.

Three, the thesis analyzes MEA in its "preventive" role and not at its role during combat (low, mid-, or high

intensity). This does not reflect a belief that there are no parallels between MEA and engineer operations during possible contingency operations in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Nor does it deny that MEA plays a role during combat operations and transition to peace following combat.<sup>6</sup> However, for practical reasons of time and scope, the thesis looks at MEA as it advances US interests during peacetime and before combat operations commence.<sup>7</sup>

This thesis is primarily delimited to the period after 1980, except for some significant historical events or considerations which are necessary to a comprehensive analysis. It is also delimited to unclassified subjects and materials. In addition, military engineering efforts in the Emergency Zone<sup>8</sup> may involve classified construction projects for which details may not be included in this unclassified thesis (eg. those in the Alta or Upper Huallaga, often called the UHV). Still, some general, unclassified information will be presented and one might fairly consider the MEA aspects of covert, counterdrug, or counterterrorism

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<sup>6</sup> Army doctrine related to these roles and functions is not fully formulated. See, *Airland Operations Nation Assistance Enabling Concept* (draft), (Fort Leavenworth: US Army Combined Arms Center, 26 September 1991): 32-38 and A-7 to A-11.

<sup>7</sup> See, generally, US Army Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington D.C.: Department of Army, 5 December 1990).

<sup>8</sup> Boundaries of the Emergency Zone change frequently. It is the zone in Perú under martial law. See Appendix E, Glossary.

efforts in the context of larger, overall programs. Nevertheless, these delimitations do not significantly diminish the value of this thesis.

This thesis has several underlying assumptions. First, I assume that rapidly changing global conditions will not wholly eliminate US military involvement in Perú. I make this assumption even though the political situation has rapidly deteriorated in Perú leading to a reduction in US involvement there, including military assistance. I also assume that the US will use the military component of national power where important and vital national interests are at stake around the world. The US has done so historically,<sup>9</sup> and I assume that it will continue to do so.

Still, US military strategy must help secure national objectives efficiently and effectively. This means that the US will most likely consider the short- and long-range consequences of involvement or non-involvement. It also means that the US will address its national security interests and apply resources where vital or important US

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<sup>9</sup> Some wrongly think that the US rarely deploys forces in response to threats to US interests. The Brookings Institute found at least 215 such incidents since World War II in a study that predates very notable and more-recent examples: Grenada (1983), Libya (1986), Persian Gulf (1987-88), Panamá (1989), Persian Gulf (1990-91, including Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Provide Comfort). See, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1978). Other deployments and overseas assignments of personnel for security assistance and other purposes push the figure much higher.

interests are at significant risk, or, where US interests may be advanced significantly.

I also assume that the US Army will increasingly focus on Peacetime Engagement (PE) and operations in the realm of low intensity conflict (LIC). This is logical for two reasons. One, US leaders increasingly acknowledge the merit of an old adage: "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." This attitude suggests that the US might use military engineering resources in peacetime to help alleviate the conditions which foment unrest, instability, and conflict. Thus, the US might "win the peace", or, "keep the peace" - in part, through the thoughtful application of MEA.

Two, operations in low intensity conflict (unlike large-scale, conventional contingency operations) are typically not characterized by widespread, armed conflict. "The principal US military instrument in LIC is security assistance in the form of training, equipment, services and combat support."<sup>10</sup> Although combat forces may be employed in LIC, the US must use these in combination with other military and non-military capabilities to achieve success. Hence, I will not consider the role of MEA when conventional (including military engineers) are committed by the US as

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<sup>10</sup> FM 100-20: 1-2.



part of contingency operations. Still, I assume that MEA has broad continuing applicability before, during, and after contingency operations.

Obviously, future conventional conflicts may involve the US military. In many, if not most cases, one would expect a form of coalition warfare like that seen in Operation Desert Storm, especially in cases of mid- to high-intensity conflict. Conversely, regional instability and operations in a LIC environment serve as likely situations where the US might use its military power unilaterally, or, bilaterally in coordination with the host nation. As indicated, I do not consider the role of the military engineer or MEA in detail in the context of any conventional conflict or contingency operation in Perú.

Still, despite the military's affinity for precise terminology, the reality is that conflict intensity levels defy precise definition -- some might even say that terms like low, mid-, and high intensity have limited or no relevance:

The term low intensity conflict reflects an American perspective. Indeed, the term is a misnomer. To peoples more directly affected, the threat is immediate and vital. To us, it is subtle, indirect, and long-term; but it is potentially just as serious. The actions which take place in low intensity conflict are distinguishable from those in conventional war, more by differences in kind, than by degree of intensity."

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" *Ibid.*, iv. The inherent paradox is that one man's vital interest may be another man's passing interest. The real test is whether both share a common long-range interest worthy of mutual effort.

Any analysis of MEA should be performed in the broader context of military engineering generally. As a corollary issue, I will look at that assistance which fosters conventional military preparedness inasmuch as it helps to diffuse conditions which lead to armed aggression and a higher likelihood of US troop involvement.

As a last assumption, I posit that the US will more likely be involved in numerous low intensity conflict settings before participating in another Desert Storm. This implies that planners will likely give increasing scrutiny to the role of MEA and the doctrinal relationship of peacetime MEA to possible subsequent combat operations. Hence, this thesis should establish some useful framework which considers MEA in a manner that enables transition to combat operations. In other words, if MEA fails in combination with other efforts, this thesis will present an approach which is useful in identifying MEA options and integrating them into an overall campaign plan.

In LIC and PE, non-military<sup>12</sup> objectives predominate; but military resources are employed with other elements of national power to advance political, social and economic objectives. The assumption that military forces will more often be involved in low intensity conflict or in operations

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 1-5. The manual says that "political objectives drive military decisions at every level" but also says, "Military planners must consider how their actions contribute to initiatives which are also political, economic, and psychological in nature."

short of war emphasizes two important and related notions:  
1) the less frequent situations which put US forces in mid-  
or high intensity conflict leave no room for failure, and 2)  
the more common situations in operations short of war  
present equally important opportunities for success in  
"peacetime." As a result of this combination of factors, I  
assume that military engineering assistance in other-than-  
combat operations will likely receive increasing  
attention.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> In fact, Colonel Steven M. Butler, director of the US Army LIC Proponency Directorate, believes that a revised version of US Army *Field Manual 100-5, Operations*, "will likely include new concepts, such as 'nation assistance' and 'peacetime engagement' as they are defined and accepted." See, "Refocusing Army Doctrine in a Changing World," *Military Review*, vol. LXXII, no. 4 (April 1992): 1.

# CHAPTER II

## NATIONAL INTERESTS

### SECTION 1: Chapter Introduction

Mankind and nations view the world, in a way, as a place that should yield much of its bounty to humans pursuing fortune, comfort, and enjoyment. More directly, nations and people mostly want to be happy, free, safe, and prosperous. Recognizing that US goals, in most cases, are not unlike those of other nations, one must still allow for a diverse world in which interests, goals and objectives do not always align -- tension and conflict can result ... what about Perú?

Perú is aptly described as a land of tremendous contrasts: breathtaking beauty and life-taking violence; a few wealthy and many unimaginably poor; steamy jungle, sky-high mountains and a long, golden coastline, all with little in common; a centuries-old culture intact despite technological and social changes through the 20th century.

To understand Perú and how it has become what it is,

a review is in order. First, one should examine Perú within its boundaries. Then, one should look at Perú as a member of the international community. This scrutiny aids the proper identification of US national interests. Moreover, it allows one to review US interests from the point of view of Peruvians. Finally, one should consider Perú's national interests: especially, where they align or conflict with those of the US.

## SECTION 2: Perú - A Land of Contrasts<sup>14</sup>

### Part A - A Poor People with a Rich Culture

Perú's population is approximately 22 million, but census figures represent, at best, "ball-park" estimates. Almost 70% live in urban areas like Lima (between 5 and 6 million inhabitants);<sup>15</sup> Arequipa and Callao (each about 600,000); Trujillo (about 500,000); Chiclayo (about 400,000); Piura (about 300,000); Chimbote (about 280,000); Cuzco (about 260,000); Iquitos (about 250,000), Huancayo

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<sup>14</sup> The data in sections 2 and 3 of Chapter II come primarily from three sources: Gregory R. Copley, ed., Defense Foreign Affairs Handbook 1990-1991, Gregory R. Copley, (Alexandria, VA: International Media Corporation, 1991): 775-781; PCGLOBE Software, Tempe, AZ: PCGLOBE Inc. (1990); and, Peru: Country Profile 1991-92, (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, July 1991) 3-40. Population figures reflect about a 2.1% growth rate. Figs. 1, 2, and 5 give 1991 data on PCGLOBE software.

<sup>15</sup> Estimates of Lima's population can run much higher; no exact figure is available. See, e.g., "Violence by leftist rebel poses threat," Kansas City Star, 16 February 1992: A-22: "... Lima, a city of 7 million people."

Cuzco (about 260,000); Iquitos (about 250,000), Huancayo (about 200,000), Sullana and Pucallpa (about 150,000 each) and other smaller towns. In the year 2000, the population of Perú will likely be about twenty-seven million -- more urbanized and poorer still.

Many of those lucky enough to find work still face a formidable struggle. The ravages of inflation have forced huge numbers into poverty. Families need several wage-earners, many working more than one job, just to meet normal expenses. Rather than planning a future, most spend their effort surviving the present. In Lima, in recent years, vestiges of an identifiable middle class have all but disappeared. *The Economist* reported some startling data about Lima:

Table 1: Economically Active Population in Lima (%)<sup>16</sup>

	1984	1986	1987	1989
Adequately Employed	54.3	51.9	60.3	18.6
Underemployed	36.8	42.7	34.9	73.5
Unemployed	8.9	5.4	.8	7.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This table reflects the collapse of the working, middle-class in Lima, by far Perú's largest city. In mid-1991, the situation was worse still with only "nine percent of Lima's

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<sup>16</sup> *Perú Country Profile 1991-92*: 12-13. One might note that this data comes from the Peruvian Ministerio de Trabajo, or Employment Ministry.

economically active population ... 'adequately employed.'<sup>17</sup> One should consider the near-term and long-term consequences of such widespread personal hardship -- alienation, discontentment, deprivation. These conditions provide fertile ground for social unrest and instability.

Ethnically, the population breaks out as follows: 47% Quechua; 32% mestizo; 12% white; 5% Aymara; and, 4% other. About 80% of Peruvians are literate. Predominantly spoken languages are Spanish (68%), Quechua (27%) and Aymara (3%), with about 2% speaking other languages.

The population is 92% Roman Catholic with small, but active Evangelical, Methodist, Protestant, Mormon, and Jewish communities. The Roman Catholic Church's influence on daily life and its importance to the great majority of Peruvians is evident even to casual observers.<sup>18</sup>

Culturally, few places offer such an amazing and marvelous ancestry.<sup>19</sup> Known worldwide, Machu Picchu,

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<sup>17</sup> Defined as earning at least the official GOP minimum wage. Carol Graham, "Sendero's Law in Peru's Shantytowns," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 June 1991: A13.

<sup>18</sup> Peruvian Catholics celebrate Mass as an integral part of their daily personal and professional lives. Peruvian counterparts often expect US military personnel to attend Mass in an official capacity as US mission representatives. Notes in *Daily Journal* maintained by author.

<sup>19</sup> For a very brief discussion of the history of Peruvian culture (from the Huari influence to the Inca legends), see, Geoffrey Barraclough, ed., The Times Atlas of World History (Maplewood, NJ: Hammond Inc., 1985), 46-47, 158 and 226.



**Figure 3:** *Machu Picchu*

the mysterious *Nasca* lines and drawings, *Chan Chan*, *Sipán*, and *Pachácamac* remind modern man of what is known as one of the most advanced cultures (for its time) in human history. Vast expanses of Perú are still largely unsettled and undisturbed. Wondrous depths of rainforests, magnificent Lake Titicaca, awesome Andean peaks, and magic cities like Cuzco, Trujillo, and Arequipa have few peers. For tourists and Peruvians alike, Perú is a human and natural treasure.



**Figure 4:** Examples of Ceremonial Dress



## Part B - Geography and Its Effects

Perú's borders circumscribe nearly 500,000 square miles of territory. Of this total, about two percent are cropland, fourteen percent are wetland meadows, fifty-five percent are forested to some extent, and twenty-nine percent are urban or unusable "wasteland". Perú enjoys an oceanic coastline of about 1400 miles. Peruvians recognize three distinct geographic zones or regions, calling them "*la costa, la sierra y la selva*," or, the coast, the highlands and the jungle. These regions are as distinct culturally and economically as they are different geographically.

A thin  
ribbon  
of  
coast-  
line  
runs the  
length  
of  
Perú's  
long  
western  
flank.  
Not too  
far  
inland,





Figure 5: Perú's dramatic relief preserves the culture but impedes development.

the ground sweeps up quickly into the Andes. Altitudes over 12,000 feet above sea level are not uncommon in the Peruvian Andes. On the reverse slope of the Andes, one finds the steamy, jungle rainforests in the north and east, with the



**Figure 6: Perú's Landscape - Big Differences Over Small Distances**

high flat *Altiplano*, or high plateau, in the southeast. Perú's dramatic and diverse topography (with man's inability or unwillingness to surmount these natural hurdles) has had two major consequences. First, in the Andes and beyond to the east, Perú's highland and selvatic cultures remain largely intact as they have been for hundreds of years. Second, Perú has vast untapped or under-exploited natural resources. Developing these sensibly, Perú could enjoy economic wealth, prosperity, and progress. Solutions which contribute to such development merit careful consideration.

### Part C - Government and Politics in Perú

Perú is a republic with an elected president, Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, whose five-year term of office began in 1990. He succeeded President Alan García Pérez. Perú returned to an elected government in 1980 after having had military governments since 1968.<sup>20</sup> On 5 April 1992, with military backing, Fujimori banished the Peruvian Congress and suspended the country's constitution. He cited the need to remove congressional and judicial impediments to his reforms, and said that he would take steps to restore a functioning democracy at an unspecified future date.<sup>21</sup>

Under the now-suspended Constitution,<sup>22</sup> the President appointed a Council of Ministers to assist him. It also provided for a bicameral legislature.<sup>23</sup> The upper chamber consisted of a 60-member, directly-elected Senate. The

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<sup>20</sup> See, Eduardo A. Leyva, *The Contribution of the Peruvian Armed Forces to the Socio-Economic Development of the Country*, DTIC AD-A168 840 (Naval Post Graduate School: Monterrey, CA, March 1986): 59-62, for an analysis of Perú's recent military regimes, their objectives, their successes, and their failures. Leyva, a Peruvian colonel who attended US Naval Post Graduate School, also discusses Peruvian military intervention in Perú's affairs over its history.

<sup>21</sup> "Peru's Leader Dissolves Congress," New York Times, 6 April 1992: A8. "President Fujimori announced Sunday night [5 April 1992] that he was dissolving congress and suspending the constitution." He did this with the support of military leaders because of dissatisfaction with the legislature's grudging support for or their dilution of his economic and political reforms.

<sup>22</sup> Perú is now at the crossroads. One might reasonably expect Fujimori to restore the characteristic branches of government and Constitution in the near future. As Alexis de Toqueville said eloquently, "For a bad government, the worst time is when it begins to reform itself."

<sup>23</sup> A Peruvian Army officer informed me on 2 May 1992 that Fujimori is considering a one-house legislature, possibly elected in thirds, and much smaller in size than the now-suspended Congress. *Daily Journal* note.

lower chamber was a 180-member *Cámara de Diputados*, or Chamber of Deputies -- elected based on political party proportional representation in the Senate. Fujimori had Constitutional power to dissolve the elected, lower house of the Congress.<sup>24</sup>

President Fujimori's *Cambio '90*, or Change 1990, party won a stunning victory<sup>25</sup> in 1990.<sup>26</sup> Principal opposition parties to Fujimori's administration are: the left-of-center *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA, or American Popular Revolution Alliance) party<sup>27</sup>; and, the more conservative *Libertad*, or Liberty, party<sup>28</sup> which succeeded the *Fredemo* party. *Libertad* failed to place Mario Vargas Llosa, an internationally-renowned author but political

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<sup>24</sup> Fujimori's *autogolpe*, or self-coup, exceeded this authority by dissolving the entire legislature. Former President García, first thought to be under house arrest, escaped and participated in organized opposition to Fujimori's extra-legal maneuvers. "Peru's president tightens state of emergency," *Kansas City Star*, 7 April 1992: A-3, reported that García was in hiding and said that Mr. Bernard Aronson, the senior State Department official for Latin American affairs, had arrived in Perú right before Fujimori's actions and after urging, only days before the self-coup, US Congressional support for Perú.

<sup>25</sup> See, e.g., the comment by Tom Vogel, Jr. in "The Karate Kid Meets the Shining Path": "The outcome of Fujimori's [*Cambio 90*] campaign was an astonishment. ... Until a week before the first round ... elections ... he was a virtual unknown ...", *Commonweal*, 11 January 1991: 9.

<sup>26</sup> 14 Senate seats, 29 Deputy seats - two of the original 31 seats held in the Chamber of Deputies were relinquished in July 1991.

<sup>27</sup> 13 Senate seats, 42 Deputy seats.

<sup>28</sup> 23 Senate seats, 72 Deputy seats.

neophyte, into power in the 1990 election.<sup>29</sup>

Lastly, the legal system is best characterized as a civil law, Napoleonic-code-style system<sup>30</sup> with a soon-to-be rewritten constitution. Perú's legal system, despite allegations of state-sponsored or state-condoned murder in the Emergency Zone,<sup>31</sup> does not provide for the death penalty.

#### Part D - Perú's Economic Landscape

Perú has both industrial and agricultural sectors. Major Peruvian exports include fish and fish products, raw and processed metals (iron, copper, steel, silver, zinc, lead), agricultural products (cotton, sugar, and coffee) and, at times, petroleum. Perú has several major ports and about twenty-five minor ones; and it has over 225 useable airports -- twenty-five with runways longer than 8,000 feet. Perú has about 35,000 total miles of roadways, but less than 4,000 miles are paved. Main crops include wheat, potatoes,

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<sup>29</sup> Vargas Llosa, interviewed from Berlin on National Public Radio on 8 April 1992, 7PM CST, called Fujimori's autogolpe undemocratic and he encouraged international condemnation. Simultaneously, though, he acknowledged widespread corruption in the Peruvian legislature and judiciary and he said that "these democratic institutions in Perú are inefficient and unresponsive."

<sup>30</sup> See, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, March 1991: 118, which notes that Perú's "Napoleonic Code legal system does not have statutes for undercover operations, civil forfeiture or conspiracy."

<sup>31</sup> See, e.g., "Bad Human Rights Record: Peru worries Amnesty International," *Lima Times*, 12 July 1991: 1, "the government has consistently turned a blind eye to abuses by police and armed forces ... it is clear that Peru has a serious pattern of human rights violations and has the highest number of missing person cases on the continent."

beans, barley, coffee, cotton, and sugarcane. Principle industries are mining, petroleum, fishing, textiles, clothing, food processing, cement production, car assembly, steel production, ship-building, and metal fabrication. Until recently, the state operated most major industries.

Macroeconomic policy and microeconomic indicators show positive signs despite Perú's near-vegetative economic state. In 1990, Perú's gross national product of about \$19 billion shrank roughly 12%,<sup>32</sup> but Perú maintained a positive trade balance. Still, wealth is very unevenly distributed. Poor macroeconomic policies and terrorism<sup>33</sup> have caused macroeconomic havoc. But, under Fujimori, Perú has launched important economic reforms.<sup>34</sup>

In response to the call for, and the need for economic reform, President Fujimori has privatized many industries and utilities;<sup>35</sup> more privatization is on the way.<sup>36</sup> Perú

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<sup>32</sup> *The Economist* estimates that Peru's GDP shrank 10.4% in 1989 and 3.9% in 1990. *Economist International Unit: Perú Country Profile 3Q91*: 3.

<sup>33</sup> "Economic damage caused by ten years of political violence exceeds \$17 billion, nearly equal to Perú's foreign debt." Vogel: 10. Jane's puts the figure at \$18 billion. See, "An enemy within: Peru's Shining Path war," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 8 February 1992: 197. And, see, "Senator Explains Decrease in Terrorist Violence," *FBIS-LAT-92-012*, 17 January 1992: 42, "11 years of terrorist violence have cost Peru more than \$20 billion."

<sup>34</sup> One writer says that Fujimori has "suddenly worked Latin America's most radical free-market revolution." See, James Brooke, "Fujimori Aims for a Head-on Collision With 'Shining Path'," *New York Times*, 8 December 1991: E3.

<sup>35</sup> "[E]ven the cholera-infested sewage works are for sale." See, "Looking to Authority," *The Economist*, 23 November 1991: 52.

has taken steps to manage its debt more responsibly, and to lower import tariffs. These measures are part of a bold program to revive a comatose economy and reenter the world financial arena. Indeed, they have begun winning back international investment.<sup>37</sup> Still, sound economic measures need improved internal security to win foreign investment at desired levels.<sup>38</sup>

Perú has a long way to go before its economic change of direction should be declared a turning point.<sup>39</sup> In some respects, the GOP has yet to gain full control of the Peruvian economy. The government has taken a *laissez faire* attitude toward the *ambulantes*, or street vendors, who sell almost anything, and who pay little or no taxes. Legitimate businesses often hire *informales*, or informal salesmen, who sell stores' inventories in competition with the *ambulantes*.

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<sup>36</sup> "Peru to Accelerate Privatization," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 February 1992: A8, "Perú will speed up selling off 100 profitable state companies as part of its program to open up the economy." Fujimori appointed Jaime Yoshiyama as his energy minister. Yoshiyama became known as a "privatizer" as Minister of Transportation when he lifted port administration monopolies, ended government control of shipping and postal services, and initiated the privatization of Aeroperú. He will likely spearhead privatization of Perú's oil industry. See, "New cabinet to press reforms," *Latin American Weekly Report*, WR-91-45, 21 November 1991: 8.

<sup>37</sup> "Money comes back as confidence grows," *Lima Times*, 5 July 1991: 1.

<sup>38</sup> Fujimori acknowledged as much when he "called terrorism the last obstacle to the country's development and said that it hinders local and foreign private investment." "Fujimori on Terrorism as Obstacle to Development," *FBIS-LAT-91-192*, 3 October 1991: 43.

<sup>39</sup> "According to [Peru's] National Institute of Statistics and Informatics [sic] (INEI), after decreasing for three years, the Peruvian Gross Domestic Product increased by 2.4 percent in 1991." "Roundup of Tax Collections, Inflation, Loans," *FBIS-LAT-92-012*, 17 January 1992: 42.

Once again, the result is no taxes to the government.<sup>40</sup> The people win and lose at the same time: lower consumer goods prices and meager employment accompany a diminished tax base<sup>41</sup> to support the functions of government.<sup>42</sup>

As mentioned, inflation has ravaged the wages of Perú's work force, even those in government. Remarkably, Fujimori has slashed inflation from almost 8000 percent in 1990 to under 140 percent in 1991.<sup>43</sup> Still, Perú's minimum wage hovers near \$50 per month.<sup>44</sup> Most individuals cannot find adequate employment. Government workers are extremely underpaid; bribes, corruption and inefficiency are common, if not inevitable.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> The best analysis of this informal economy (causes and ramifications) is found in Hernando de Soto, El Otro Sendero [The Other Path: The invisible revolution in the Third World] (New York: Harper & Rowe, 1989).

<sup>41</sup> Manuel Estela, who heads SUNAT, Perú's version of the IRS, launched a crackdown in 1991 to improve the GOP's 4% of GDP tax collection rate. In some cases, Perú's military and police forces have been employed to help with the collection efforts. See, "Peru's Top Tax Collector Goes Rambo," *Wall Street Journal*, 8 January 1992: A4.

<sup>42</sup> Tax collections have doubled under Fujimori; the target collection rate is at least 15% of GDP by 1995. *Id.*

<sup>43</sup> "Peru's Inflation Drops Sharply," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 January 1992: A4.

<sup>44</sup> Vogel puts Perú's monthly minimum wage at less than \$50 per month in November 1990: 10, cf, *The Economist*, "Perú: Looking to authority," 23 November 1991: 52, putting it at \$35 per month, and Carol Graham "Sendero's Law in Peru's Shantytowns," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 June 1991: A13, putting the 1990 monthly minimum wage at \$19.75. The \$50 figure is likely accurate, *Daily Journal* note.

<sup>45</sup> These are widely documented, and, almost a cultural phenomena. During my year in Perú, I witnessed and recorded many instances of obvious corruption involving Peruvian bureaucrats, police and other officials. *Daily Journal* notes.



**Part E - The Peruvian Military and Peruvian Army Engineers**

At present, the Peruvian military has a primary role of internal security since the country faces two potent domestic guerrilla movements. Still, Perú is not wholly at peace with its neighbors, and its armed forces have been poised to repel outside aggression. Perú's forces generally are more comfortable with conventional operations than with the more subtle and insidious nature of other missions: counterinsurgency (CI), counterterrorism (CT), and counterdrug (CD) operations.

Perú's President is the Commander-in-Chief and command runs to the military Commanders-in-Chief of the respective services. There are also administrative positions for the Minister of War, of Aviation, and of the Marine Department. Service Chiefs swear allegiance to the president-elect during his inauguration, and they form the *Comando Conjunto*, or Joint Command, whose chief rotates among them annually.<sup>46</sup>

Perú has five military regions: Piura, Lima, Arequipa, Cuzco, and Iquitos. Units are deployed to posts around the country. Perú's armed forces total about 125,000: about 85,000 are in the Army - and, of these, 35,000 are two-year conscripts.<sup>47</sup>


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<sup>46</sup> Copley, 781. When President Fujimori assumed office in July 1990, Peruvian national television telecast the service chiefs' "allegiance-swearing" ceremony live; not everyone felt it would be a "rubber-stamp" ceremony.

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* Overall end-strength is down from 135,000 in 1986, with the Army's share up from 75,000. See, Leyva: 22.

Perú's armed forces have hardware from many countries. Perú purchased large numbers of artillery and tanks from countries of the former Warsaw Pact during the Velasco regime. Perú's air forces have French and Russian<sup>48</sup> fighter-aircraft<sup>49</sup> and helicopters; and, the Peruvian navy is equipped with West German and US submarines.<sup>50</sup> Peruvian Army Engineers have a low priority and are ill-equipped.

Unserviceable American construction equipment is scattered around the country.<sup>51</sup> Peruvian Army officials



**Figure 7: Aerial view of Peruvian Army engineer equipment - not a single functioning piece in the entire bunch.**

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<sup>48</sup> Perú has shown interest in Chinese aircraft. *Daily Journal* note.

<sup>49</sup> In fact, it was a Sukhoi-19 fighter-bomber that fired on an errant US C-130 on 24 April 1992 when the plane strayed from its approved CD mission flight plan and allegedly failed to respond to radio and visual warnings, including warning shots. One US crew-member died and others were injured. "Search begins for U.S. airman missing in Peru," *Kansas City Star*, 26 April 1992: A3.

<sup>50</sup> Copley, 780-1.

<sup>51</sup> *Daily Journal* entries; photos maintained by author.

have not disposed of this old, unserviceable equipment which was received during the 1960s. When asked why, one general said he could not get permission to dispose of the equipment shown here (Figure 7, above, and Figure 8, below).<sup>32</sup> These



Figure 8: This CATERPILLAR metamorphosed into an eyesore.

are the remnants of what Peruvians refer to as the *Plan de Ayuda Militar* (PAM), or Military Assistance Program (MAP), of the Kennedy Administration.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Upon inquiry, it appeared that formal requests were delayed in Peruvian channels for unknown reasons. *Daily Journal* note.

<sup>33</sup> The Peruvian Army still writes of the achievements realized from this program. See, e.g., *EL ZAPADOR*, Boletín Informativo No. 8, "Batallón de Ingeniería de Combate "Sacsayhuaman" No. 6 Motz.," (Chorrillos, Perú: Escuela de Ingeniería, April-June 1991): 29.

Life for the average Peruvian soldier is spartan.<sup>54</sup> With rare exception, life for his non-commissioned and commissioned officers is equally austere. Conscripts and volunteers make up the enlisted and non-commissioned officer ranks.<sup>55</sup> Also, except for a few professionals or specialists (e.g., doctors, lawyers, dentists) who are "assimilated" into Perú's armed forces, all Army officers receive commissioning through the *Escuela Militar de Chorrillos*, Perú's Military Academy in Chorrillos.<sup>56</sup> Officer pay is less than \$300 monthly.<sup>57</sup> It is wholly insufficient to support a family, and, as mentioned earlier, contributes to the incidence of graft and corruption.

Perú's Army increasingly fights insurgents and drug traffickers. On 28 July 1989, President Alan García Pérez announced that he would commit Perú's military against the terrorist insurgency. Thereby, García placed judicial and

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<sup>54</sup> One enlisted soldier reported that he earned the equivalent of less than ten dollars monthly. *Daily Journal* note.

<sup>55</sup> Leyva: 22-24. He also discusses the social and cultural consequences of conscription in a unique setting like Perú: 27-30.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 23, 25. About 1,000 graduates enter the army annually; last year there were less than 30 engineer officers. *Daily Journal* entry.

<sup>57</sup> See, *Jane's*: 198, "Foreign military attachés despair at the low professional commitment in the armed forces, the abysmal wages and morale and lack of organization and resources." A Peruvian major with about 13 years of service who is married and has children might have, after normal deductions, less than \$10 to cover monthly expenses. This is not uncommon in Perú's armed forces. A brigadier general in the Peruvian Army told the author, with obvious dissatisfaction, that his monthly pay was less than \$250. *Daily Journal* entries. And see, James Brooke, "A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could Not Stamp Out," *New York Times*, 7 April 92: A16, "Peru's officers are demoralized by salaries so low that they invite corruption - \$250 a month for a general."

police power in military hands under martial law in the Emergency Zone (EZ). With this power and with inadequate training, security forces often abused of the basic human rights of the campesinos.<sup>3</sup> Having lost some credibility during military regimes from 1968 to 1980, the image of the military and police suffered further with news of such abuses. As a result, some fear or mistrust the military.

One might also consider, more specifically, the role of the military engineer in the Perú's Army or, more generally, in the nation's history. Starting with President Kennedy's Administration, young Peruvian engineer officers participated in a wide range of construction projects opening up and improving parts of Perú.<sup>4</sup>

The "young Peruvian engineer officers" who participated in those programs are now senior Army officers. Many occupy or are in line to hold key posts in the Peruvian Army. For example, Pedro Villanueva Valdivia, the former Commanding General of the Peruvian Army, and several others in the likely chain of succession are engineer officers.

Perú's *Escuela de Ingeniería*, or Engineer School, is studying the possibility of equipping *Batallones de*

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<sup>3</sup> Copley, 779.

<sup>4</sup> Leyva: 32-42, traces the history of "civic action" which started in Perú during the Kennedy Administration. He mentions President Belaunde's *Cooperación Popular* program which started in 1963 - it was a 1960s vintage version of *Apoya Cívica*, the current term in favor. Under the umbrella of civic action, national programs included road development, rural settlement, riverine civic action, air transportation, and other regional and local programs.

*Desarrollo Nacional*, or National Development Battalions.<sup>60</sup>

In addition, the US Military Assistance and Advisory Group (USMAAG) in Lima recently reviewed US support to *Batallones de Apoya Cívica*, or Civic Assistance Battalions. The Army, generally, and the Peruvian military engineer, specifically, provide a unique means by which Perú can meld its many cultures.<sup>61</sup> Given present conditions in Perú (terrorism, remoteness, limited developmental resources and high operating costs, chilled foreign and domestic investment, etc.) many of Perú's "nation building" or "nation assistance" projects are likely to be realized only upon the commitment of domestic or foreign military engineers.<sup>62</sup>

Perú's military engineers recognize the unique, potential contributions of their branch -- partly due to the experience of senior engineer officers. They were the junior officers who participated in the 1960s and 1970s in Army engineer units that supported Perú's development efforts. Given the present state of affairs in the country of Perú, these organizations are taking on ever-increasing importance.

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<sup>60</sup> *EL ZAPADOR*, #8 and #9 (August 1991): 15-16 and 15-21, respectively.

<sup>61</sup> *Leyva*: 67. He says that the Peruvian armed forces can: integrate people from different races, languages, regions, and customs ... [instill a sense] of nationhood and integrate the nation['s] people ... This nation building function could hardly be performed by institutions other than the armed forces, especially ... [where] resources are scarce.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, 69-70.

Still, even if these units were adequately equipped (they are not), the underlying education of Peruvian military engineers is wholly inadequate to prepare them as construction managers. Academy cadets receive little more than basic math or science in their formal education. The Peruvian Army Engineer School trains junior officers in the fundamentals of military engineering. It cannot adequately teach army conventional operations, counterinsurgency operations, construction engineering and management, combat diving, and administrative subjects -- time and resources do not allow for all of this. The Peruvian Army Engineer School is woefully under-resourced and under-equipped. It craves current engineering texts and references. It lacks sufficient computer equipment, manuals, supplies, and many other necessities essential to adequate instruction.<sup>63</sup>

**Part F - The Ugly Side of Perú: Drugs and Violence**

Perú is widely known as the world leader in coca leaf production.<sup>64</sup> Growing and harvesting the coca leaf has been a part of Perú's culture since Inca workers allegedly masticated it to help them work longer hours and drank *mate de coca*, or coca tea, to relieve the effects of what

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<sup>63</sup> The Peruvian Army Engineer School has a normal annual budget of less than \$3,000. In 1991, however, the school received about \$250,000, specially arranged by General Villanueva, senior army engineer, and, then-Commanding General of the Army. See, *EL ZAPADOR* #8: 32.

<sup>64</sup> *Narcotics Strategy Report*: 114, "Peru remains the world's leading producer of coca with an estimated 121,300 hectares of licit and illicit cultivation."

Peruvians call *soroche*, or altitude sickness. Hence, most Peruvians recognize coca as both a licit and illicit crop.

Coca flourishes in Perú's harsh environs. In Perú, initial processing converts the leaf to *pasta básica de coca*, or PBC, the coca base used to produce cocaine.



**Figure 9:** Aerial view of a slash-and-burn coca tract in Perú - the drug business hurts man and nature.

Cocaine traffickers send most Peruvian PBC to Bolivia or Columbia to be manufactured into cocaine for transshipment to markets around the world. While Peruvian coca ends up in



many places, its main destination is the United States.

For many Peruvians, a simple but harsh, agrarian lifestyle and Indian culture are not part of some bygone era -- they are today's reality. The vestiges of that ancient agrarian lifestyle and Indian culture predominate in rural Perú. Terrorist and insurgent groups operate against this backdrop.

There are several such groups.<sup>66</sup> Best-known among these are the *Sendero Luminoso*,<sup>66</sup> or Shining Path, and the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA)*, also called the *Tupac Amaru*.<sup>67</sup> Abmael Guzmán Reynoso founded the quasi-Maoist *Sendero*, which announced its campaign of armed violence in the early 1980s. MRTA first appeared in 1984.

According to Bernard W. Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, "To confront drug trafficking in Peru is to confront *Sendero*. ... *Sendero Luminoso* is in a category by itself."<sup>68</sup> Terror and drugs

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<sup>66</sup> Michael Radu and Vladimir Tismaneanu, Latin American Revolutionaries: Groups, Goals, Methods (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1990), 307-45. The authors devote thirty-eight pages to identifying and analyzing terrorist or revolutionary groups in Perú.

<sup>66</sup> The name is an abridged version of *Partido Comunista del Perú en el Sendero Luminoso de Mariátegui*, or the Peruvian Communist Party in the Shining Path of [José] Mariátegui.

<sup>67</sup> Named for José Gabriel Tupac Amaru, who led a 1780 peasant revolt and declared an independent Incan state in Spain's South American monarchy. See, "In Defense of Columbus," *The Economist*, 21 December 1991: 74.

<sup>68</sup> See, Barbara Crossette, "In Peru's Shining Path, U.S. Sees Road to Ruin," *New York Times*, (hereinafter "Road to Ruin") 22 March 1992: E-2. An interesting note, Aronson was in Perú during Fujimori's autogolpe.

and money and insurgency: these have a polygamous relationship in Perú.<sup>66</sup>

Sendero plays to a mass, peasant culture with a message which basically says: anglos enslaved the native masses;<sup>67</sup> the present government cannot or will not provide for or protect those masses; and, they must therefore free themselves from their oppressors -- even if by violence. Sendero synthesized Maoist fundamentals and flavored them with distinct Peruvian societal considerations expressed by José Carlos Mariátegui in the 1930s. Mariátegui said that legitimate political order would have to meet the needs of the native masses.<sup>68</sup> Sendero ideology seeks to return Indians to power -- a vision with great appeal among rural peasants and urban mestizos.<sup>69</sup>

Without trying to oversimplify the nexus between coca growers, drug traffickers and terrorist organizations, the

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<sup>66</sup> At least one writer seriously challenges the alleged, and widely believed tie between Sendero and drug-traffickers. Simon Strong, author of the forthcoming book Shining Path: The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force, alleges that drug traffickers look to government civilians, police, and military forces, but not to Sendero. He alleges military interference with CD efforts and says that Senderistas display none of the "trappings" of drug money, nor do they possess advanced arms which such money could buy. Further, he says that "Shining Path's bloody puritanism makes it cocaine's greatest enemy." See "Peru Is Losing More Than the Drug War," *New York Times*, 17 February 1992: A17.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* "Many of [Sendero's] adherents are descendants of indigenous Indian people who have for centuries nurtured a resentment of the mestizo descendants of Spanish conquerors."

<sup>68</sup> James V. Huston, *Insurgency in Perú: The Shining Path*, DTIC AD-B132 589L, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Staff College, May 1988): 29. Mariátegui envisioned an ancient Indian culture restored to preeminence.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 31. Sendero's Inca messianism fits Maoist ideology well.

relationship is presently one of mutual necessity and convenience. But things did not start that way.

Ideologically, *Sendero Luminoso* (and most other terrorist groups in Perú) wanted nothing to do with the drug traders. Over time however, drug money provided insurgents and terrorists a tempting source of funds;<sup>73</sup> likewise, the insurgents' and terrorists' armed cadres offered protection to the drug trade "businessmen". Drug runners wanted a shield from Peruvian authorities. The insurgents or terrorists provided this shield and, while so doing, provided what for many *campesinos* was the only entity resembling an organized government.

Peasants in some areas look to *Sendero* as a quasi-governmental entity.<sup>74</sup> One frequent writer about Perú, David Scott Palmer, summarized this phenomena:

... Shining Path acts as the de facto authority in many areas, exercising police functions and maintaining courts, schools and health facilities. It has increasingly assumed the role of protector of the interests of the coca growers against the government's efforts to reduce production and the Columbian coca paste buyers' efforts to maximize their own profits.<sup>75</sup>

*Sendero* has protected them from over-reaching drug traffickers who would otherwise pay almost nothing for the

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<sup>73</sup> "Road to Ruin.": "Experts agree that Shining Path is self-sustaining, earning the money it needs through the narcotics trade. [Thus,] Washington has no leverage through third countries."

<sup>74</sup> "*Sendero's* Law in Lima's Shantytowns."

<sup>75</sup> "Peru's Persistent Problems," *Current History*, January 1990: 32.

coca crop. Moreover, it has been somewhat of a buffer to abusive military and police forces. Sendero is in the countryside with the peasants; the government, many times, is not.

Over time, Sendero seems to have learned to tolerate drug activities to bankroll its operations by levying "taxes" on traffickers and drug operations, at least when needed.<sup>76</sup> The result is violence, corruption and social breakdown:

Some insurgent and terrorist groups finance their activities through illicit narcotics sales or through funds provided by drug dealers for protection of their trade. ... Poor economic performance, challenges from insurgents, and the problem of staying in power in a volatile political environment compete for the attention of national leaders ... [who] may place a low priority on suppression of drug trafficking. In some cases, they may hesitate to introduce eradication programs that will eliminate a lucrative, if illegal, cash crop. ... At the same time, drug traffickers use their profits to undermine government actions against them by corrupting or intimidating civilian and military officials. They also protect their interests by acts of terrorism and subversion. Thus, these criminals or groups of criminals obtain and hold political power far beyond the strength of their numbers.<sup>77</sup>

Oddly, competing terrorist groups have apparently "carved out" areas of Perú where they dominate nearly all facets of daily life. In the Emergency Zone, MRTA controls

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<sup>76</sup> Drug money taints police and, probably to a lesser extent, some military forces as well. "Peru Is Losing More Than the Drug War."

<sup>77</sup> FM 100-20: 1-4.

the north and Sendero Luminoso the south, as a general rule.<sup>7</sup>

Besides threatening, if not killing,<sup>8</sup> government personnel and local leaders, terrorist groups eliminate or threaten virtually all sources of outside relief. "[This is] part of a new campaign by the Sendero Luminoso to terrify people into abandoning their participation in ... relief projects."<sup>9</sup> Priests, engineers, social and relief workers -- anybody trying to help who does not cooperate with the terrorists and work consistent with terrorist or insurgent terms, literally risks his or her life.<sup>10,12</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> *Daily Journal* notes taken at US embassy's 20 August 1990 "Newcomers Orientation Briefing" -- comment by the Regional Security Office representative. Furthermore, Mr. John Woods, who worked in Perú for the International Red Cross (IRC), September-October 1990, reported to the author that drivers he sent to MRTA-controlled Oxapampa (northeast of Lima) "had to allow" MRTA "escorts" aboard on their arrival to ensure delivery of IRC shipments of corrugated sheet metal. The "escorts" also helped distribute the material, influencing who got what and how much. Such an arrangement provides relief, but tends to legitimize terrorists in the eyes of the recipients and reduce recognition of agencies behind the relief. *Daily Journal* note.

<sup>8</sup> "Shining Path Deemed Main Human Rights Violator," *FBIS-LAT-91-156*, 13 August 1991: 42, reports that the majority of the 3,206 people killed in Perú in 1990 as a result of terrorist violence died at the hands of Sendero. After Sendero, violent attacks most frequently were perpetrated by MRTA and drug traffickers, in order.

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., "Rebel Reign of Terror in Peru: Guerrillas target 'imperialist' charity workers in poor villages," *The Chronicle*, 3 October 1991: A14.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* The article also mentions: the murder of three priests, a nun, the interim director of Perú World Vision, a community leader, and a neighbor who went to his defense; the bombing of a community warehouse which served 92 soup kitchens; the bombing of a textile factory; and, the killing of an army general involved in the *Mi Salud* (or, My Health) program whereby Peruvian army units provide basic support and services to rural communities.

In this strange cast of players, many in government succumb to one of three classic problems. One, they become passive and ignore the drug trade -- non-involvement keeps violence in the third person. Simply put, many legitimately fear for their safety or they see no compelling reason to participate in counterdrug efforts. Two, others actively foster the drug trade by accepting bribes<sup>2</sup> which provide desperately needed cash. Three, some, untainted by bribery and in zealous pursuit of an elusive and deadly foe, often make human rights their first casualty."

Though not a universal view, Peruvians increasingly recognize the insidious nature of the coca trade.<sup>3</sup> More each day, Peruvians see the ills caused by the drug trade: it corrupts Perú's democratic processes and institutions; it brings violence; and, its dumped waste chemicals spoil the

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<sup>2</sup> Sendero's "tactics include ... the public 'executions' of moderate local leaders and others ... who are seen as rivals for the allegiance of the poor." "Road to Ruin."

<sup>3</sup> Newsweek cited a 48-page Pentagon memo which called Perú a "quagmire of deceit and corruption" and said "attainment of U.S. [counterdrug] objectives is impossible." See, "A Bad Report Card," Newsweek, 27 January 1992: 4.

<sup>4</sup> "Commission on Increased Number of Missing People," FBIS-LAT-91-156, 13 August 1991: 43, which reported that during Fujimori's first year in office, 142 people arrested by security forces in the presence of eye-witnesses were later "missing" and that the Human Rights Department of the General Prosecutor's Office reported the disappearance of over 300 people. See also, Vogel: 10, "From 1987-1989, Peru occupied first place in the world for detained and disappeared people. More than 300 were detained and 'disappeared' by security and terrorist groups in 1989; through July of 1990, the number was 144."

<sup>5</sup> Hernando de Soto, "Peru's Ex-Drug Czar on Cocaine: The Supply Side," *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 February 1992: A11.

environment."

The insurgent violence and terrorism have led the Peruvian government to place areas of Perú under martial law. In the 1980s, terrorists launched significant offensives.

Presumably to try to upset plans for general elections in 1985, a wave of new guerrilla attacks was launched in June and July of 1984 involving 500 guerrillas and peasants. Peru's central railroad was cut, a key railroad bridge was disabled, and electric towers in the countryside and some supplying [power to] Lima were toppled. The capital suffered a blackout, and a month later the army took over all operations in the "emergency zone."

In the Emergency Zone, only the acronym is EZ -- everything else is hard. The shape and reach of the Emergency Zone change very frequently. At times "the Zone" has encompassed well over fifty percent of Perú's land mass -- including, at times, the nation's capitol."

One constant within this changing boundary is apparent: the police and military security forces wield

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\* See, e.g., *Narcotics Strategy Report*: 119, "The disastrous ecological effects of coca cultivation are evident. Slash and burn jungle practices are leading to severe erosion of the land, while dumping precursor chemicals into the streams and rivers is killing aquatic life." See also, the excerpts of the Second Andean-American Anti-Drug meeting in "Anti-drug Meeting calls for Global Effort" and "More on Antidrug Meeting", in *FBIS*, 16 January 1992: 1. And, "The Supply Side": "Our business friends were originally interested in Peru because of the environmental damage that coca production and processing wreaks in the headwaters of the Amazon."

" Copley, 777.

\* See, e.g., "Lima Under Military Control," *FBIS-LAM-84-167*, 27 August 1984: J2.

tremendous authority." In the EZ, under martial law, the GOP has greatly empowered these security forces, principally hoping that they can quell terrorism.<sup>90</sup> Initially, President Alan García Pérez announced on July 28, 1989 that he would formally commit the Peruvian military against the *Sendero Luminoso* insurgency -- thus, placing judicial and police power in the hands of the military.<sup>91</sup> Soon after untying the hands of the military, indications of abuse appeared:

... the military ... siezed upon its greater freedom to return to its earlier, more dramatic, more violent, and certainly more successful "return terrorism" tactics in addressing Peru's guerrillas. Reports began to emerge of the Army having wiped out entire villages in areas of known insurgent activity.<sup>92</sup>

Recently, the GOP has embarked on a "new" tactic: arming

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<sup>90</sup> Specific powers expand and contract with sequential presidential decrees. See, e.g., "Journalists face multifaceted violence in Peru," *Times of the Americas*, 22 January 1992: 9; and, "Peru's Military is Granted Broad Powers in Rebel War," in which *The New York Times* on December 3, 1991, reported Fujimori's plan to empower the military in the EZ: to requisition private property, to draft local individuals into the counterterrorism war effort, and to control all aspects of government activities in the EZ (which then covered about two-thirds of Peru's land mass). Fujimori simultaneously reserved for himself the power to name all military commanders, thus giving himself the ultimate say as to who would hold the reins.

<sup>91</sup> Even as early as March 1981, President Belaunde, in Decree 046, enacted an antiterrorist law to be enforced by the police with military logistical support. It broadly defined who could be considered a terrorist (including persons who destroy public or private buildings; persons who make, acquire, or store firearms, explosives or their ingredients; persons who commit acts which endanger the life, health or possessions; etc.) and punishment could be severe: 25 years in jail and a fine of about \$8000.

<sup>92</sup> Copley, 779.

<sup>92</sup> *Id.*



peasant<sup>99</sup> self-defense patrols<sup>94</sup> -- with mixed results.<sup>93,96</sup>

Violence and death continue.<sup>97,98,99</sup> In a little over ten years<sup>100</sup> since SL declared its campaign of violence, over 24,000 deaths have resulted -- many at the hands of the

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<sup>93</sup> One account details the "surrender" of former SL leaders, their use in identifying other insurgents, and their resettlement and rearming by the GOP in *rondas campesinas*. "Shining Path Leaders Surrender to Army," *FBIS-LAT-91-192*, 3 October 1991: 43.

<sup>94</sup> Earlier references allege government arming of peasant patrols. See e.g., "GEN HUAMAN DENIES MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN KILLING", *FBIS*, 27 August 1984: J 4: "the chief of ... the emergency zone ... denied that the Armed Forces have ... [organized] the 'peasant patrols' or *montoneros*."

<sup>95</sup> See, "Senator Explains Decrease in Violence," *FBIS-LAT-92-012*, 17 January 1992: 42, "[T]he statistics also show that the presence of the peasant defense patrols has been effective in protecting their territories and in part recovering them, but at a high cost. ... Fewer peasants were killed in 1991, but more members of the peasant defense patrols have been killed." See also, "An enemy within: Peru's Shining Path war," 198, which states, "The greatest threat to the guerrillas rests with the peasant self-defense militia, or *rondas*, who are trained and are gradually being armed with rifles by the army and marines."

<sup>96</sup> For a brief review of the effectiveness of peasant patrols armed by the GOP since April 1991, see *FBIS-LAT-91-180*, 17 September 1991: 31.

<sup>97</sup> "200 Dead in Less Than 15 Days: Death toll highest since 11-year war began," *Lima Times*, 16 August 1991: 1.

<sup>98</sup> For example, three guards died 12 February 1992 outside Ambassador Quainton's residence when a car bomb detonated and destroyed a section of the perimeter wall. That week marked a surge in terrorist bombings and killings in Lima. See, "Bombing at envoy's home kills three police guards," *Kansas City Star*, 13 February 1992: A-5. See also, "Policemen killed in rebel offensive," *ibid.*, A-10: during a *paro armado*, or armed strike, on 14 February 1992, Sendero killed three policemen in Lima and left millions struggling to find public transportation to and from work. Sendero continues to shift its campaign focus from the remote Peruvian highlands to Lima. The *Latin American Weekly Report* counts about 24,000 terrorist-related deaths from 1980-1991, with about 3,000 of them happening in 1990-91. See *LAWR*, WR-91-45, 21 November 1991: 9.

<sup>99</sup> US CD forces are also at risk. Besides the April 1992 incident, three Americans died in a crash on 12 January 1992 in the *Alta Huallaga*. They were supporting CD efforts out of Santa Lucia; Sendero claimed responsibility for downing the aircraft. See, "U.S. Role In Peru On Hold," *The Washington Post*, 25 January 1992: 17.

<sup>100</sup> Radu and Tismaneanu, 334. Sendero's campaign of armed violence began officially on 19 April 1980.

military and police.<sup>101</sup>

One clear conclusion emanates from the consequences of drug and insurgent related terrorism: the violence, corruption and social ills place an inordinate strain on any regime's ability to govern effectively. Analysts differ in their belief whether Sendero does, in fact, threaten Perú's government,<sup>102</sup> but nearly every analyst concludes that Perú's best hope lies in efforts to improve its economy and address the fundamental needs of its people.

### SECTION 3: Perú in the International Community

Besides having a long Pacific coastline, Perú borders Ecuador, Columbia, Brazil, Bolivia and Chile. Historically, Perú has had problems with some of its neighbors. Tensions linger with Chile to the south<sup>103</sup> and with Ecuador to the

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<sup>101</sup> One journalist observed, "... Washington and Lima continue to ignore evidence that the military [and the police] may be responsible for more human rights violations than the rebels and drug traffickers combined." *Id.* The withholding of US funds reflects that the US is concerned about human rights. Ambassador Quainton wrote: "our emphasis ... is on human rights" and that US MEA will and other US assistance will not be emphasized "unless there is a radical improvement in the human rights situation or in Perú's [CD] performance." Letter from Ambassador Quainton to author, dated 10 February 1992.

<sup>102</sup> Radu and Tiemaneanu, 339, "Sendero's chances of conquering state power in Perú seem negligible in the long term." See also, "Lima, Peru: Violence by leftist rebels poses threat", *Kansas City Star*, 16 February 1992: A-22.

<sup>103</sup> Copley, 776, "In addition, relations with Chile remain strained, largely for historical reasons, but the latter was also suspicious of the large build-up of the Peruvian military in ... recent years."

north.<sup>104</sup> Following the Great War of the Pacific,<sup>105</sup> Perú and Bolivia both ceded territory to Chile. As a result, Perú lost valuable natural resources and Bolivia has been land-locked for its recent history.

To its north, Perú has feuded with Ecuador on occasion over the *Cordillera de Condor* region to which Ecuador still claims sovereignty.

In January 1981, border clashes with Ecuador erupted over the disputed *Cordillera de Condor* region. Although Peruvian forces gained the upper hand, the dispute was not resolved, and instigated increased military budgets and preparedness in both countries.<sup>106</sup>

Again in September 1991, tensions rose when a platoon of Ecuadorian commandos invaded the contested region. While the dispute with Ecuador remains unsettled, progress will likely continue. Further negotiations between Perú and Ecuador are planned.<sup>107</sup>

Recently, President Fujimori and Bolivia's President Jaime Paz Zamora signed an agreement providing coastal

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<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 779. Recently, President Fujimori pressed to end the dispute over the *Cordillera de Condor* region, but without success. He has invited Ecuadorian President Borja and Borja's successor (who will be elected as this is published in May 1992) to visit Perú in June 1992. Both countries are deliberating over the possible appointment of a papal envoy or special master to help settle the matter. See, "Further Reaction to Ecuadorean Border Request," *FBIS-LAT-92-013*, 21 January 1992: 54.

<sup>105</sup> During 1879-1883, Perú lost the nitrate rich region of the Atacama Desert, and, Bolivia, its only ocean access. See, *Atlas*, 228.

<sup>106</sup> *Copley*, 776.

<sup>107</sup> "Ecuadorian Proposal for Pope's Mediation Viewed," *FBIS-LAT-91-191*, 2 October 1991: 37. See also, "Foreign Minister Rules Out Conflict With Ecuador," *FBIS-LAT-91-165*, 26 August 1991: 40.

access to Bolivian shipping at Ilo, in southern Perú.<sup>108</sup> This holds potentially significant economic benefits for the region, and is likely to benefit both Perú and Bolivia measurably. In addition, the agreement is another indication that President Fujimori desires to settle long-standing disputes, where possible, as part of his administration's campaign to restore Perú to good standing internationally.<sup>109</sup>

The international financial community isolated Perú when the García Administration suspended foreign debt<sup>110</sup> repayment. Indeed, Fujimori has renounced the economic irresponsibility of recent administrations.<sup>111</sup>

Partly as a result of Fujimori's severe,<sup>112</sup> but

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<sup>108</sup> *Univisión*, the Spanish language cable channel, reported the story, with filmed coverage of the event, on January 28, 1992. Until recent initiatives, the situation showed little reason for hope: Copley said efforts "to resolve the sea-outlet issue between Peru, Chile and Bolivia [were] stalled": 776.

<sup>109</sup> Also, in the last year, Perú announced that it would open embassies in Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and a consulate in New Zealand. See, *FBIS-LAT-91-156*, "New Embassies, Foreign Posts Announced," 13 August 1991: 43.

<sup>110</sup> John Fleming, "The Lion at Latin America's Door," *Christian Science Monitor*, 17 January 1992, 19. With large arrearages in interest and outstanding obligations, Perú's foreign debt now exceeds 20 billion. See e.g., *Perú, Country Profile 1991-92*: 33-6.

<sup>111</sup> "Fujimori Seeks to Strengthen Ties With U.S.," *FBIS-LAT-91-179*, 16 September 1991: 40.

<sup>112</sup> Peruvians refer to the economic measures of the current administration as *Fujishok*, reflecting the economic impact felt by most in Perú. Even Fujimori himself described his programs as "a harsh, but orderly economic policy ... [to] reinsert Peru in the international finance system." See, "Fujimori Seeks to Strengthen Ties With U.S." and "Peruvian despotism," *Kansas City Star*, 8 April 1992: C-8, which referred to Fujimori's drastic political measures as "Fujishock: The Sequel."

necessary domestic economic measures, international economic support<sup>113</sup> and International Monetary Fund backing are returning to Perú.<sup>114</sup> Recently Perú received a \$1.1 billion international loan<sup>115</sup> -- almost unthinkable in July of 1990 when Fujimori took office. Fujimori's success will depend, principally, on his ability to continue economic reform and to thwart drug traffickers and insurgents. But, he must do these in an acceptable manner to receive outside support.<sup>116</sup>

Still, the climate for investment in Perú is poor, because of the uncertainties of terrorism<sup>117</sup> and Perú's unclear commitment to CD<sup>118</sup> efforts. Diminished US support

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<sup>113</sup> "Money, especially from Chile, is pouring into the [Peruvian] stock exchange." See, "Looking to authority."

<sup>114</sup> "Addresses Nation," *FBIS-LAT-91-179*, 16 September 1991: 41, "Fujimori noted ... IMF approval of the Peruvian economic program."

<sup>115</sup> "Support Group Approves \$1.1 Billion for Peru," *FBIS-LAT-91-165*, 26 August 1991: 40.

<sup>116</sup> "Peruvian troops mass at 2 prisons," *Kansas City Star*, 8 April 1992: A-3, reported that after the *autogolpe*, the US immediately cut all aid except humanitarian assistance, but that Japan and Germany had not frozen their assistance packages of \$127 million and \$161 million, respectively.

<sup>117</sup> *The Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Perú Bolivia Country Report No. 3, 1991," London: Business International Limited, September 1991: "The political scene. Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA have become still more vicious, killing three Japanese experts and attacking religious organizations as well." In July 1991, terrorists murdered three Japanese agronomists working in Huaral, north of Lima. See "Japanese engineers killed," *Lima Times*, 19 July 1991: 2. Japan issued stern warnings about the need for security for technical advisors. *The Economist* rated Perú's investment climate as among the worst in the entire world for international investment.

<sup>118</sup> The US lists as its first international initiative for national funding priorities, fiscal years 1992-1994, to "[p]rovide military and law enforcement assistance to the Andean Initiative countries; and, to increase economic assistance (conditioned on effective counternarcotics performance, sound economic policies, and respect for human rights) to those countries for balance of payments support and alternative income

for Perú will limit Perú's ability to participate in CD and CI efforts, thus reducing the likelihood that others will invest there. The White House stated that the US:

supports [GOP] efforts to reform the country's economy, but is concerned about its lack of commitment to combat cocaine processing and distribution, and coca cultivation ...<sup>119</sup>

The GOP must lead in addressing these fundamental problems if it expects the US and other nations to participate in efforts to improve conditions there. As stated, Perú must address the problems of drugs, terrorism and instability in a manner which the US will find politically correct and acceptable -- one which promotes human rights and democracy.

#### **SECTION 4: US Interests, Objectives and National Strategy in Perú**

Our strategy failed the ultimate test, for, as Clausewitz said, the ends of strategy ... are those objectives that will finally lead to peace.<sup>120</sup>

##### **Part A: Interests and Objectives**

The presence of vital or important US strategic interests<sup>121</sup> in Perú will likely determine the nature and

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programs". See, *National Drug Control Strategy* (hereinafter *NDCS*), (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1991): 77-91 and Appendix B, 138.

<sup>119</sup> *NDCS*: 81.

<sup>120</sup> Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1981), 3.

<sup>121</sup> This use of the concept of national strategic interests, their characterization and the notion of objectives which flow from them is consistent with terms as used by the US Army Command & General Staff Officers Course, "Military Power and National Interests", in *C500 Joint*

degree of unilateral US action or bilateral cooperation there. This thesis identifies relevant US interests and objectives and US strategy to secure them. And, it reviews these US interests and objectives by considering what key US and Peruvian figures have said or written about them.<sup>122</sup>

In his August 1991 statement of *National Security Strategy*,<sup>123</sup> President Bush indicates that the US will support the government of Perú:

The nations most severely threatened by guerrilla forces or narco-terrorists - El Salvador, Colombia and Perú - will receive appropriate support from the United States.<sup>124</sup>

The relevant query is: what strategy leads to "appropriate support" in light of relevant US interests and objectives?

Most important among specific US strategic interests or objectives are those which fall into two general areas: 1) drug-related interests or objectives, and 2) interests and objectives in promoting regional stability, economic

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and Combined Environments [hereinafter C500] (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USA CGSOC, 1 August 1991): 8-11.

<sup>122</sup> US interests and objectives are identified in this chapter. In Chapter IV, in order to arrive at a recommended course of action, the thesis will further review these interests and objectives using a "Strategic Analysis Model" approach employed by the US Army Command and General Staff College. That model has several distinct steps: identify the problem and essential assumptions; identify US interests and elements of national power; identify other relevant actors, their interests and elements of power; develop and test options based on the most likely scenario; develop and test options on feasible scenarios; develop recommendations and caveats. See, C500: ii.

<sup>123</sup> *National Security Strategy of the United States* (hereinafter NSS) (The White House, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1991).

<sup>124</sup> NSS: 8.

growth, and democracy. Even more generally, the US evidences a basic concern for the plight of people like those in Perú and the consequences those conditions hold for the region and the hemisphere as well.

In the wake of the implosion of the Soviet-empire, some Americans express obvious disapproval of efforts to employ elements of US national power abroad. They feel that domestic energies should address domestic problems.<sup>125</sup> Such isolationism is rejected outright by the President.<sup>126</sup> The President says that "there can be no retreat from the world's problems".<sup>127</sup> The US must be an international "leader":

[I]f there is a[n] historical analogy for today's strategic environment, it is ... the 1920s ... [when] the Nation turned inward. That course had near disastrous consequences then and it would be even more dangerous now. ... [The] world is far more interdependent - economically, technologically, environmentally - any attempt to isolate ourselves

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<sup>125</sup> See, e.g., The Management of Security Assistance (Wright-Patterson AFB: Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management: 10th Ed., 1990) (hereinafter DISAM), chapter 1, for a discussion of the ebb and flow of US foreign assistance. Newspapers and periodicals are replete with articles on isolationist and protectionist pressure: see e.g., "US needs world's trade," *Kansas City Star*, 23 March 1992: B-6, "Isolationism and trade protectionism, last seen as political forces in the 1920s and 30s, are coming back like Gershwin tunes." Or, "Bush pressed on Soviet aid," *Kansas City Star*, 16 March 1992: A-3, "Bush's backing is necessary to assure support in Congress and to reduce the political heat that lawmakers face in an election year over backing more foreign aid ..."

<sup>126</sup> President Bush has said, "The fact is, this country has enjoyed its most lasting growth and security when we rejected isolationism -- both political and economic -- in favor of engagement and leadership." See, Michael P. W. Stone and Gordon R. Sullivan, *Strategic Force, Strategic Vision For the 1990s and Beyond, A Statement on the Posture of The United States Army - Fiscal Year 1993*, presented to the 102nd Cong., 2nd Session: 4.

<sup>127</sup> NSS: 2.



militarily and politically would be folly. ... [W]e face ... a new kind of agenda of new kinds of security issues. Our ... security would be badly served if we ... erode our ability to protect our interests abroad, to aid new democracies or to help find solutions to other global problems. The scourge of illegal drugs saps our vitality as a free people, diverts our energies from more positive pursuits and threatens friendly democratic governments now plagued by drug traffickers. The ... global ecology is a top priority on the agenda of international cooperation ... The upheavals of this era are also giving rise to human migrations on an unprecedented scale, raising a host of social, economic, political and moral challenges to the world's nations. A security strategy that takes the Republic safely into the next century will tend to these as well as to more traditional threats to our safety and well-being.<sup>128</sup>

The President leaves little doubt that US interests will be served through a policy of engagement. First, he says that:

The international trade in drugs is a major threat to our national security. No threat does more damage to our national values and institutions<sup>129</sup>

And, as an objective in confronting this threat:

The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies, to reduce the flow of illegal drugs ... by encouraging reduction in foreign production, combatting international traffickers and reducing demand at home.<sup>130</sup>

Clearly then, Mr. Bush sees important (a few might say vital) interests at stake in Perú, where over half of the world's coca and most US cocaine originates.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> *Id.*

<sup>129</sup> *NSS*: 17.

<sup>130</sup> *NSS*: 3.

<sup>131</sup> "Peru produces an estimated 60 percent of the world's coca crop." See, "U.S. drug war money is ineffective, say government auditors," *Kansas City Star*, 24 October 1991: A4.

Besides what the US has at stake, the President sees this as a time of great opportunity, albeit with some reason for caution:

If the end of the Cold War lives up to its promise ... U.S. policy should be able to concentrate more on enhancing security ... through means that are more political, social and economic than military. ... Malnutrition, illiteracy and poverty put dangerous pressures on democratic institutions as hungry, uneducated or poorly housed citizens are ripe for radicalization ... [We must] emphasize the strengthening of democracy, and a long-term investment in the development of human resources and the structures of free markets and free governments. Such measures are an investment in our own security as well as a response to the demands of simple justice.<sup>132</sup>

In summary then, there are numerous important US interests and objectives at stake in Perú. First, most of the cocaine entering the US originates in Perú; mutual efforts between the US and Perú's national leadership will be essential to attack this scourge.

Second, Perú seemed headed generally in the right direction under President Fujimori, at least until his 5 April 1992 extra-legal actions. He and his party, which won by popular vote but which lacked an effective constituency in the legislature, presently have an authoritarian, but tenuous hold on power. His administration is under attack by insurgents and terrorists; now, too, by opposition parties. US interests lie in helping to put into effect a functioning democracy in Perú.

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<sup>132</sup> NSS: 8.

Presently, regardless of the gains made by Fujimori in almost two years in office, the US and other countries have pulled back assistance until the present post-coup situation is satisfactorily resolved. The very democracy outsiders seek is each day less likely unless reforms like Fujimori's pre-coup efforts continue.<sup>133</sup>

Third, Perú's untapped wealth, but accompanying economic horror, suggest that efforts may produce fundamental and beneficial change. Economic prosperity in Perú will enhance stability; and, Perú may provide both an expanded market and a greater source of resources for US manufacturing. Both countries' interests are served by efforts to increase trade and to improve Perú's economy.

Fourth, many Peruvians seek to emigrate and escape a daily existence which offers low expectations of improvement -- most in flight are educated and skilled. Successful efforts to enhance stability in Perú and to improve the economy will likely better the lot of the average Peruvian and reduce Perú's *fugo de cerebros*, or brain-drain.<sup>134,135</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> "U.S., Peru prepare for talks," *Kansas City Star*, 2 May 1992: A4, cited talks between Bernard Aronson, other US officials, and post-coup Peruvian officials. The talks purported "to urge Fujimori to restore democracy promptly." Fujimori "proposed a one-year plan to revive democratic institutions in phases," and is planning for October elections.

<sup>134</sup> See, Palmer: 5, "Emigration [in 1988] skyrocketed to 120,000 legal departures, four times the figure of two years earlier."

<sup>135</sup> Developed nations generally admit professionals and exclude the poor thus creating a framework which exacerbates the situation. See, "Why the poor don't catch up," *The Economist*, 25 April 1992: 48.

Fifth, Perú's ecosystem (mainly its expanses of rainforest) is very important to the regional and global environment. Perú's poverty and the drug trade threaten this delicate ecology.<sup>136</sup>

Sixth, the US and Perú have generally positive relations which should be cultivated.

**Part B:** US National Security Strategy

In Congress, the State Department, the Organization of American States and private research and human rights organizations, the sense is growing that the astonishing momentum being shown by the Shining Path rebellion in Peru is the toughest post-cold war policy test on the horizon for the Western Hemisphere.<sup>137</sup>

US NSS serves broad national purposes. From time to time, the President of the US revises and articulates his NSS; it is then interpreted and implemented by various federal agencies and departments. The Administration balances and prioritizes many competing interests in order to develop broad national security strategy. National leaders establish agency goals and they lead federal civilians and military personnel in planning and executing that strategy.

The President identified several components of a strategy to ensure the "survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values

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<sup>136</sup> *Id.*

<sup>137</sup> "Road to Ruin."

intact and its institutions and people secure."<sup>138</sup>

Reviewing US NSS, the President Bush has revealed his sensing of the new military challenges created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and by emerging regional uncertainties:

In the realm of *military* strategy, we confront dangers more ambiguous than those we previously faced. What type and distribution of forces are needed to combat not a particular, poised enemy but the nascent threats of power vacuums and regional instabilities?<sup>139</sup> (*italics in original*)

Presently, the US is cooperating in a friendly manner with Perú and the Andean nations to stem the tide of illicit drugs. One may look to the *National Drug Control Strategy* (NDCS) for a comprehensive analysis and statement of US counterdrug strategy. Drugs from Latin America feed the scourge of drug-use in America. The US counterdrug program considers both supply and demand components. Efforts to reduce or eliminate the supply of Peruvian cocaine have enjoyed little progress, but data indicate that demand-reduction efforts are achieving measurable success.<sup>140</sup> As shown earlier, beyond this most important interest, the US would like to work with the GOP to promote democracy and economic prosperity in Perú -- these being essential to stability there. And, the US seeks to do this in mutually

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<sup>138</sup> NSS: 3.

<sup>139</sup> NSS: 1.

<sup>140</sup> See generally NDCS: 1-59.

acceptable ways -- meaning, with regard to human rights and the environment. A strategy to achieve this offers the best way to impede unrest and to guarantee international stability.

Regarding the interwoven problems posed by international drug trafficking, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney identified three roles for military in attacking drug supplies at the source:

The Department of Defense can assist in the three elements of an effective attack on the supply of drugs in source countries: (1) assistance for nation-building, (2) operational support to host-country forces, and (3) cooperation with host-country forces to prevent drug exports.<sup>141</sup>

By specifying a military role in "nation-building" as the first of three applications of DOD resources, Secretary Cheney has raised the specter of using of DOD military engineering, among other capabilities, in advancing US strategic interests in "source countries," including Perú.

In summary, the best statement of US national security strategy in Perú is: through bilateral and international efforts, the US seeks to stem the supply of coca at its source; to bolster Peruvian democracy and democratic institutions; to promote economic and social progress; and, to protect the environment.

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<sup>141</sup> Richard B. Cheney, Department of Defense Guidance for Implementation of the President's National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 18 September 1989): 2. Evidence in Perú indicates that nation-building, though listed first, has historically received less attention and commitment than the other two elements.

### Part C: US National Military Strategy

US military resources and related capabilities constitute one element of national power. To be employed most effectively, these must be used consistently with other elements of US national power. They must reinforce and be reinforced by other non-military efforts. Thus, coordination and synchronization of military strategy with other US efforts is imperative.

With this mandate, strategists and planners determine how best to employ the various military capabilities which the US possesses in a fluid strategic environment.<sup>142</sup> Historically, the Army has protected US security interests. In its 216 years of service, the US Army has earned over 170 battle streamers.<sup>143</sup> But,

[as] the Nation grew, so did the role of the Army as the servant of the people of the United States. As the country developed, the Army helped settle the West, developed the nation's infrastructure, and responded wherever needed . . . America's soldiers also have participated in the war on drugs and terrorism, disaster relief at home and abroad, and have provided humanitarian aid and nation assistance around the globe.<sup>144</sup>

The Department of Defense, under the leadership of the Secretary of Defense and the heads of the service

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<sup>142</sup> In noting the changing nature of the international arena and important trends which are influencing US military strategy, *Stone and Sullivan* say, "The first of these important trends is the increased influence that social and economic factors will have on the world." (emphasis in original): 4.

<sup>143</sup> *Stone and Sullivan*: 3-4.

<sup>144</sup> *Id.*

departments, offers various capabilities to achieve national security objectives and to protect national interests. The historical mission of US military forces has been and continues to be "to deter aggression, and, should deterrence fail, to defend the nation's vital interests against any potential foe."<sup>145</sup> In their role of deterrence, US military forces perform two key functions: 1) they discourage aggression through strength, and 2) they participate in efforts to diffuse the conditions which lead to instability and insurgency. Each reduces the likelihood of conflict.

The military, under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), develops a National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS identifies how the US will employ its military component of national power to advance national security interests and objectives. Noted earlier, where vital (or possibly important) US interests are at stake, the US military functions to deter, and, should deterrence fail, to fight in order to protect those interests. Even in times of relative peace, deterrence is not a passive process, but rather an active one. That is, the US deters, in part, through a process of engagement, not isolation.

Within this over-arching purpose, and in the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration, the 1992 NMS notes a US

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<sup>145</sup> *The National Military Strategy 1992* (hereinafter 1992 NMS) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 28 January 1992): 6. The precise language may vary: see eg. "repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests and its allies", NSS: 3, or, 1992 NMS: 5.



shift:

... from containing the spread of communism and deterring Soviet aggression to a more diverse, flexible strategy which is regionally oriented and capable of responding to the challenges of the decade.<sup>146</sup>

Hence, the 1992 NMS recognizes recent global changes and the corresponding threats which compel an adjustment in US strategy to reflect those changing considerations.

Among the four general categories of military operations outlined by the 1992 NMS, only one appears to be a diurnal undertaking:

Actively employ resources on a day to day basis to build military and alliance readiness; promote peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; protect lives and property; help our friends, allies, and those in need of humanitarian aid.<sup>147</sup>

Even so, within the scope of "forward presence operations", the 1992 NMS also mentions a wide range of activities wherein military engineering might fit: exercises, deployments, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, counterterrorism (CT) or counterdrug (CD) operations, and, humanitarian assistance (HA).<sup>148</sup> Clearly then, the 1992 NMS contemplates regional military operations and planning to hit drugs at the source, to address the causes of instability, and to remove threats to US strategic security interests -- including threats to democracy in Perú.

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<sup>146</sup> 1992 NMS: 1.

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

On "regional focus", General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in his 1992 NMS that:

regional CINCs develop plans for the employment of military assets (as well as examining the complementary economic, diplomatic, and political options). These options, used singly or in various combinations, can be carried out with the intent of deterring or averting crisis. They vary widely from large joint and combined operations and deployments to small mobile training teams and low level military to military contacts.<sup>149</sup>

Other Army leaders have focused increasing attention on a shifting strategy generally,<sup>150</sup> and Perú specifically.<sup>151</sup> The US is addressing new threats and seeking ways to avert crises through active international means. General Vuono, former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), wrote in 1990:

While some threats to US security appear to be abating, other complex and dangerous challenges are emerging. These include terrorism, trafficking in illicit drugs ... and regional instability that threatens democratic regimes. ... At this critical juncture, therefore, the Army's strategic roles are

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<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>150</sup> Stone and Sullivan list the characteristics of a US Army poised to meet new strategic demands and they identify the mechanisms to meet these challenges: "*Trained to Fight as a Joint or Combined Force*: ... enhance relationships, army-to-army contacts, the development of infrastructure ...; *Versatile*: ... engaged in nationally-directed peacetime activities overseas to protect basic human rights and democratic institutions and will promote economic and political stability as insurance policies against conflict ...; *Deployable*; *Expansible*: ... reserve participation ... across the continuum of military operations from nation assistance to global war"; *Capable of Decisive Victory*." 13-15.

<sup>151</sup> Among high-level Army contacts, US Secretary of the Army Michael Stone visited Perú in July 1991, "The Week in Peru," *Lima Times*, 19 July 1991: 3. Stone has recently said, "Due to traditional interests in stability in the Western Hemisphere, the Army can expect to undertake major counter-drug, counterterrorism, and nation assistance missions in Latin America during this decade. See, Stone and Sullivan: 22.

increasingly important element of our national military strategy.<sup>152</sup>

He next listed the following as three of the five strategic roles for the army:

Maintain ... [CONUS] forces able to reinforce forward-deployed and contingency forces  
Participate in disaster relief, emergency assistance, and interdiction of illicit drug traffic, [and]  
Provide support ... through peacekeeping, security assistance, and army-to-army initiatives.<sup>153</sup>

Reinforcing units include various kinds of engineer units which get valuable training and deployment experience by peacetime deployments for construction missions. The simultaneous benefits of army-to-army contacts and nation or security assistance flow clearly from MEA roles of the sort suggested by General Vuono. In addition, Vuono said:

Support to allies ... around the world, in the form of ... security assistance, and nation-building activities has acquired new meaning in view of the challenges to, and opportunities for, democracy seen in the developing world.<sup>154</sup>

And,

We must not forget, however, that ... the solutions to low-intensity conflict go far beyond the military dimension. ... Recent history demonstrates that military might cannot substitute for effective

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<sup>152</sup> Carl E. Vuono, in *ST 20-15, Selected Readings, A Strategic Force for the 1990s and Beyond*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991): 154.

<sup>153</sup> *Vuono*: 153. The other two are: provide forward-deployed ground forces for deterrence, sustained land combat, and conflict termination in areas of vital interest; and, maintain combat-ready ground forces - heavy, light, and special operations - in CONUS for immediate contingencies worldwide.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, 155-6.

nation building and legitimate political institutions that meet citizens' needs.<sup>155</sup>

Finally, in his article, *The Strategic Value of Conventional Forces*,<sup>156</sup> General Vuono reflected that our pre-WWII policies of disengagement led to "the largest war in history and ... 50 million dead," and that the "contributions of conventional forces in peacetime go far beyond deterrence." Further, he said that the US Army can help provide stability and can advance US interests in peacetime -- far preferable to fighting wars to protect US interests jeopardized by neglect. Vuono called this use of the military "a sound investment." More specifically, Vuono noted US MEA and its contribution to nation assistance efforts which aim to "address common sources of internal conflict and instability." He urged that this be done "alongside host armies" in order "to develop their abilities to build national infrastructures"<sup>157</sup> which are "fundamental to alleviating human misery worldwide."

Hence, Vuono envisioned a clear peacetime military strategy: use military resources and forces -- one, to relieve the underlying causes of instability; two, to share democratic values with foreign militaries through US

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<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, 162.

<sup>156</sup> Carl E. Vuono, in *ST 20-15, Selected Readings, The Strategic Value Conventional Forces*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1991): 175.

<sup>157</sup> Here, Vuono specifically identified, as examples, bridges, highways, schools, and clinics. *Id.*

contacts; and, three, to share and transfer technical and military skills through nation assistance or security assistance programs.

As strategists and planners look at possible roles for the military in Perú, they inevitably must address the participation of the US military in counterdrug efforts. The challenge of insurgency coupled with the need for development creates great difficulties. The situation in Perú poses obvious and unique challenges. While there is disagreement, many consider CD operations as the most important application of military power in Perú. Assessing progress to date, a US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) report criticizes US performance, suggesting that the United States needs a comprehensive strategy review.

A counternarcotics strategy that focuses its effort solely on tactical actions against illicit drugs laboratories and narcotraffickers stands little chance of success.<sup>158</sup>

While the Andean Strategy acknowledges the importance of economic growth and strong democratic institutions,<sup>159</sup> its implementation has failed to provide for these equally.<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>158</sup> See, Booz Allen and Hamilton Inc., *USSOUTHCOM COUNTERNARCOTICS: Military Involvement in Andean Ridge Counternarcotics Efforts (draft)*, (Panama: USSOUTHCOM, 21 December 1990): B-2. The study also notes that Perú "is the most difficult Andean ridge country in which to initiate a CD program."

<sup>159</sup> See, *The Andean Strategy: The Andean Implementation Plan*, unpublished NSC Working Paper, (25 July 1990), part I, n.p.

<sup>160</sup> "The Supply Side." Hernando de Soto says that regardless of the "enlightenment" reflected in the recent 14 May 1991 agreement, CD officials "on both sides of the negotiating table ... have many imaginative ideas for bigger and better busts - but no clue about

Some argue that the main CD strategy should embrace efforts to reduce domestic drug demand.<sup>161</sup> In most categories tracked by the National Institute on Drug Addiction (NIDA), demand seems headed down.<sup>162</sup> Meanwhile, the US military is principally involved in activities which most directly focus on drug cultivation reduction and trafficking interdiction. Whereas the US military has assumed a leadership role in interdiction, an expanded tactical or direct action role<sup>163</sup> in CD activities seems both ill-conceived<sup>164</sup> and ill-received.<sup>165</sup>

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peacefully pulling off what is essentially a business deal."

<sup>161</sup> See e.g., *Assessment of America's Strategy in the War on Drugs* (Newport Rhode Island: Naval War College, February 1990) DTIC AD-A B144 198: 26-27. The author, while analyzing the conditions for tactical action, sees demand as the center of gravity of the US drug problem.

<sup>162</sup> In every category measured by the National Institute on Drug Abuse's (NIDA) National Household Survey on Drug Abuse for which data are available, actual demand reduction has surpassed national objectives. See, *National Drug Control Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 1991): 3-18.

<sup>163</sup> *Kansas City Star*, 27 January 1992: A-1, A-8, reported that the "Department of Defense has rejected a White House plan for the military to take a new leadership role in the war on illegal drugs...". This allegedly "reflect[s] a Pentagon wariness about becoming identified with a failure to make inroads against a potentially intractable problem", and quotes an internal Pentagon memo stating that "attainment of US objectives is impossible" in Perú.

<sup>164</sup> See, "Drug war failing, U.S. agency says," *Kansas City Star*, 27 September 1991: A4.

<sup>165</sup> *The Washington Post* alleged that Ambassador Quainton suspended CD activities in Perú after the 12 January 1992 helicopter incident cited earlier. *The Washington Post*, 24 January 1992: 15. Expectedly, US and Peruvian authorities are concerned about the ramifications flowing from the death of or injury to any US military personnel - especially in the EZ. The airmen and civilians lost in CD operations this year are examples. Several PEP orientation trips into the EZ were canceled with little or no explanation during the period January - May 1991. *Daily Journal* note.

Most see at least some need for a supply-reduction strategy, at least as part of a comprehensive US strategy. To eliminate the scourge of drugs (especially their availability), the US likely needs source countries to cooperate, or at least not to interfere, with US efforts.<sup>166</sup> Nonetheless, the US uses elements of national power to encourage this partnership. The US preconditions other economic support on counterdrug "performance". In addition, efforts to provide security and development must be politically acceptable: that is, human rights<sup>167</sup> and individual civil liberties must be observed.

Presently, the Fujimori administration seems unwilling to commit to specific production reduction targets without US commitments to crop substitution and economic development guarantees.<sup>168</sup> Discussed in detail below, the new, "enlightened"<sup>169</sup> strategy provides the backdrop for a likely

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<sup>166</sup> One might argue that under international law the US could legally make a preemptive strike against coca production areas IF such production were viewed as a direct threat to vital US security interests or to US survival. Such severe action is very unlikely -- more the subject of fiction than fact, see e.g. Tom Clancey, Clear and Present Danger (New York: Putnam, 1988).

<sup>167</sup> "US aid on hold till [sic] government shows intent to improve human rights record," *Lima Times*, 9 August 1991: 3.

<sup>168</sup> "Multination drug summit wraps up," *Kansas City Star*, 28 February 1992: A5. "Summit participants shelved a proposal by Colombia and backed by the United States to reduce the supply of drugs ... by 50 percent by 2000. The proposal stalled after objections from Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori."

<sup>169</sup> Hernando de Soto refers to this enlightenment in "The Supply Side". Also, correspondence to the author from LTC Michael G. Ritchie, Chief, Army Section USMAAG - Lima, uses the term "enlightened leadership" in noting a philosophical change from lethal to non-lethal tactics. Correspondence maintained by author.

expansion of the non-lethal applications of military power consistent with a comprehensive CD strategy. Still, the GOP is increasingly aware of the nexus between its performance in the areas of counterdrug cooperation, democratic reforms, human rights, and, its receiving US assistance.

Heretofore, this thesis has addressed US umbrella strategy from a US or a US Country Team perspective. Another significant actor in this arena is the Commander-in-Chief USSOUTHCOM (CINCSOUTH). Within the theater that includes Perú, CINCSOUTH is responsible for contingency planning, including peacetime military operations.<sup>170</sup>

CINCSOUTH has included in his priorities: conduct counterdrug operations; bolster professional militaries; promote democracies; and, provide humanitarian assistance. And, USSOUTHCOM has conducted exercises and sent military trainers and supplies to foreign countries, including Perú. CINCSOUTH focuses principally on SOUTHCOM force readiness and regional security concerns. At times, the host nation may only be an incidental beneficiary. Also, CINCSOUTH calls on the design and construction services of the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for a variety of reasons.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Reflecting heightened Army awareness of the importance of Civil Military Operations (CMO), Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), a newly designated annex, Annex O, to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) addresses these aspects of military planning. These are increasingly seen as influencing host nation popular support for or rejection of US military strategy.

<sup>171</sup> See, Henry J. Hatch, "Meeting the Challenges of Global Change": 43.



While there are USACE engineers in several Latin countries, there is none in Perú.

In Perú, US military capabilities will supplant other non-military efforts to promote stability, democracy and economic growth, and, to interdict coca production. The logical components of a US military action plan in Perú include: equipment and training; joint projects; expanded military-to-military contacts; efforts to bolster Peruvian military professionalism and "democratization;" assistance toward foreign internal defense efforts; and, actions to bolster Peruvian democratic institutions, including the Army. In short, probable roles might include: actions to diffuse conditions which might otherwise lead to conflict; counterdrug operations; actions to bolster the stability of Perú's government and/or to strengthen its economy; and, actions to safeguard important environmental resources.

Any coherent military strategy must consider the existing situation and progress to date in the region. In an internal review, SOUTHCOM draws numerous general conclusions about Latin American military experience in the region:<sup>172</sup> 1) Latin America has a long history of militarily controlled government, 2) The military in Latin America has been socially isolated from general society, and, 3) Martial law in Latin America has led to human rights abuses. Despite these observations, SOUTHCOM notes that:

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<sup>172</sup> USSOUTHCOM Report: 7.

The military role in defeating insurgency and dealing with instability is well documented. ... Likewise, nation building efforts such as providing security to rural development projects, providing engineer support for infrastructure building, and medical support to remote areas are essential programs to integrated efforts to arrest declining economies and ... instability in the Andean Ridge.<sup>173</sup>

Lastly, the SOUTHCOM study opines that:

a military institution adequately trained, equipped and with appropriate political orientation, can be a valuable participant in guaranteeing free elections, protecting individual rights, and building strong democratic institutions.<sup>174</sup>

Despite US CD efforts and the millions spent therefor, SOUTHCOM concludes that "the strategic counternarcotics situation remains unaffected."<sup>175</sup> US failure stems mostly from efforts which more often address symptoms (drug trafficking<sup>176</sup> and violence) rather than problems (privation and governmental failure to remedy it). Prudence compels scrutiny of the likely reason(s) for such failure. Looking for barriers to success, SOUTHCOM concluded:

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<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, 9. The study recommends "bilateral and multilateral [assistance] to build infrastructure and produce an alternative economic order" to remove a "fundamental obstacle to the democratic process and US [CD] efforts": 14.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>175</sup> The study continues: "In fact, some estimate that more land is under illicit drug cultivation and more people are involved in all aspects of the narcoindustry [sic] than ever." *Ibid.*, 9. "The Supply Side" indicates that over 720,000 acres of coca are being cultivated.

<sup>176</sup> Many consider "drug trafficking" more problem than symptom. See, e.g. Stone and Sullivan: 22, "Latin America is another region bearing witness to the spread of democracy. Yet this region faces a three-fold challenge to the gains so recently achieved: the problems generated from imposing debt, resilient insurgencies, and drug trafficking." It is probably best characterized part symptom, part problem.

A fundamental obstacle to the democratic process and U.S. counternarcotics efforts in the Andean Ridge is endemic economic deprivation. Congress should consider legislation that provides a long-term, substantial commitment of fiscal assistance, both bilateral and multilateral, to build infrastructure and produce an alternative economic order to coca production and processing.<sup>177</sup>

Military engineering might fit into a comprehensive plan which simultaneously: provides technical expertise, builds or improves infrastructure, trains Peruvian or US units, bolsters host-nation democratic institutions, weans a nation off drug-production through skill and technology transfer, and, helps to provide part of the infrastructure essential to alternative economies.

The US military faces increasingly austere times,<sup>178</sup> with declining support for large military forces and competing demands for fiscal resources. Military planners will be charged with employing each asset and expending each dollar in a manner that gives a good return on the investment.<sup>179</sup> Though people may differ on what constitutes a "good return," most would favor an investment of resources which promotes US national security objectives at generally acceptable cost, or which avoids a later, greater cost.

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<sup>177</sup> *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>178</sup> "Department of Defense outlays in 1997 will ... [be at] the lowest levels of Defense Spending since before World War II." *Stone and Sullivan*: 9.

<sup>179</sup> "The fiscal realities ... mean that Defense and the Army will receive significantly lower levels of funding ... [and] that we run the Army in a more cost-efficient manner." *Ibid.*, 11.

The more important the interest, the higher the payback, if promoted at lower cost. American society places high value on individual life. Deterrence or peacetime engagement which avoids conflict and resulting death might be viewed, theoretically, as a high payback, almost regardless of cost. It is fairly easy to measure things already, or about to be, lost: lives, jobs, influence, markets. This, no doubt, causes some isolationist or protectionist sentiments or tendencies. Furthermore, it is fairly difficult to quantify things "not lost". Still, and despite the subjectivity of the "benefits" of international engagement, reality and prudence compel the US to act against the causes which belie insurgency and instability.

But the task, even if understood, is difficult. While authorities acknowledge the importance of supporting democracy and nurturing democratic institutions and processes, few specify under what conditions and in what form this should be achieved. US NMS articulates how the military component of national power fits into advancing US NSS. Above, a review of US military strategy revealed the appropriateness of using the US military in "the continuing struggle to improve the human condition ... [against d]rug trafficking ... [and in the] march toward democracy in ... Latin America."<sup>180</sup> US forces might effectively contribute in the struggle for stability, security and development. This

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<sup>180</sup> *Id.*

seems to suggest that the answer to "whether?" is yes (developed further below). The tough questions are "when?" and "in what form should the US provide MEA?"

A fundamental problem stems from the fact that while the US talks of "democratic institutions", there are very few sources which identify or define what these are.

USSOUTHCOM has put a mark on the wall:

... the principal democratic institutions worthy of guaranty are: a responsive civilian government,<sup>181</sup> including a responsible legislature and impartial judiciary; a concern for individual civil liberties and human rights; [and] free, fair and regular elections.<sup>182</sup>

Oversight or not, the list does not include civilian-controlled armed forces. In addition, in lieu of the "a concern for" language above, one might substitute phraseology more descriptive of an institution: *de facto* governmental adherence to and respect for internationally accepted human rights policies and individual civil liberties, for example. Despite possible oversights and arguable vagueness, the SOUTHCOM list is a start.<sup>183</sup>

The inquiry is significant. By defining "democratic institutions," one may better identify threats to those

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<sup>181</sup> Fujimori's extraordinary measures stemmed from his alleged belief that governmental institutions (particularly the legislature and the judiciary) were *not* responsive. USSOUTHCOM might conclude that his actions might not warrant sanction if they promote truly democratic reforms which enhance the democratic process.

<sup>182</sup> USSOUTHCOM Report: 6.

<sup>183</sup> The thesis recommends a definition for democratic institutions in the Glossary, Appendix E.

institutions. Having identified those threats, one may properly identify the "centers of gravity"<sup>184</sup> with respect to each threat. Then, one may integrate and synchronize actions to defeat those threats and to protect and advance interests. Conversely, a failure to identify "democratic institutions" or to define meaningfully the security objective "promote democracy" will mean that resulting military objectives, policies, programs, and commitments will be equally uncertain.

US strategy should work to advance simultaneously both narrow and broad US interests. The thesis proffers solutions which consider the broad aspects of US national security strategy (for example, promote stability and democracy, or encourage economic growth and alternatives) as well as the narrow ones (microeconomic progress, security force training, military-to-military contacts, skill transfer, etc.).

#### **Part D: Military Engineering Assistance (MEA)**

Simply put, MEA includes a variety of programs and resources which the US has committed and will continue to commit in various ways. US MEA, like other programs and initiatives, should be comprehensively considered and

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<sup>184</sup> Karl von Clausewitz, in his seminal work Vom Krieg, or On War (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950) properly recognized the concept of *centra gravitatis*, or center of gravity, as the characteristic, capability or locale from which a force or threat derives its freedom of action, strength or will to fight: 463-6. See also Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub. 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1990): ix.

periodically reviewed to ensure that it is, in fact, advancing national security objectives. MEA might, and likely will, be essential to achieve lasting peace and prosperity. Thus, MEA can provide capabilities which may directly promote the US objectives of countering the drug and terrorist threats that endanger both US national security and a responsive Peruvian democracy.

LTG Henry Hatch, US Army Chief of Engineers, sees a significant role for the Army Corps of Engineers. His message to US Army engineers is: Participate vigorously in nation assistance. Thereby, promote stability and transfer skills to the host nation; that is how the Army can best help to bolster democratic institutions. He writes:

One of the most intriguing opportunities for U.S. agencies may be the sharing of knowledge and skills with the developing democracies in ... Latin America [which] ... lack the basics in infrastructure, health care and communications. While recognizing that ultimate solutions must remain the responsibility of their governments, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and other agencies have abilities to help these nations develop the requisite public and private sector institutions to solve these and other problems. The Corps has worked with other governments for years. ... When called upon to support our government's international activities, the Corps will use the same technical and management capabilities to help developing countries in expanding their infrastructure - transportation, communication, and public works. We can also give them skills to maintain completed projects and organize and manage new construction.<sup>185</sup>

This "tools in the hands of the host nation" and partnership

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<sup>185</sup> Henry J. Hatch, "Meeting the Challenges of Global Change," *Military Engineer*, vol. 84, no. 547 (Jan-Feb 1992): 41-44.

philosophy echoes the Nixon Doctrine;<sup>186</sup> and, similar US policy finds precedent even earlier in history.<sup>187</sup>

In sum, US military planners must focus their sights on areas where America's important national interests are advanced. They must coordinate and commit the resources necessary to protect and advance those interests. And, they should do this in an organized, efficient, and deliberate way. Chapters III and IV look at US performance and use of MEA in this regard in Perú.

#### SECTION 4: US Interests as a Peruvian Might See Them<sup>188</sup>

Obviously, Peruvians independently assess US intent and the consequences of US actions in Perú. They often see US interests in Perú differently than those same interests are viewed from Washington, or even the US embassy in Lima.

Peruvians mostly see their country threatened by terrorists and insurgents. They widely believe that while assistance may be useful, an increase in the national debt to achieve this end would not be. Indeed, one Latin writer has defined foreign debt owed by Latin countries to the US

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<sup>186</sup> Richard M. Nixon, "Action for Progress for the Americas," in an address before the Inter-American Presidents Association, Washington D.C., 31 October 1969 (Washington, D.C.: *Department of State Bulletin*, November 17, 1969): 409-414.

<sup>187</sup> See, DISAM: 1-4 to 1-20, especially 1-18 and 1-19.

<sup>188</sup> Some generalizations in this section derive from many conversations the author had with Peruvians and foreigners living or working in Perú during the period July 1990 to July 1991.



as "Debt, contracted at birth by every Third World citizen, to finance the club to beat them with."<sup>189</sup> As a starting point then, most Peruvians hope that the US assistance in efforts to meet these threats might principally be as grants, or other debt-free forms. This hope stems from an awareness that deeper debt will further imperil improvement.

Regarding US CD strategy, some Peruvians believe that the US aggressively attacks supply<sup>190</sup> but demonstrates an unwillingness to attack demand with equal vigor.<sup>191</sup> Even assuming that they might agree that the US has a legitimate role in attacking supply, many Peruvians believe that US policy could be more effective.<sup>192</sup>

Hernando de Soto, one of the most influential people in Peruvian politics,<sup>193</sup> resigned 28 January 1991, after 16

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<sup>189</sup> Eduardo Galeano, "Dictionary of the New World Order," The New Internationalist, Number 226, December 1991: 14.

<sup>190</sup> Peruvian's note that supply reduction efforts account for about 70 percent of the counterdrug budget while demand reduction receives only 30 percent. See, "Drug war failing, U.S. agency says." *The Kansas City Star*, 27 September 1991: A4.

<sup>191</sup> Peruvians cite events like the trial of Washington, D.C. ex-Mayor Marion Barry, who escaped a felony conviction though filmed smoking crack cocaine, as evidence that the US finds an aggressive attack on foreign "supply" easier than a vigorous attack on US "demand." General Joulwan, present CINCSOUTH, said that the Barry fiasco was the first thing brought up by President Fujimori in their initial meeting. Further, Panamá's ex-President, Manuel Noriega, who studied at Perú's Command and General Staff College and who left a sizeable donation for facilities improvements, is seen as by many Peruvian officers as a scapegoat for confused US policy which appears to condone the drug when convenient. *Daily Journal* notes.

<sup>192</sup> "The Supply Side."

<sup>193</sup> This author of *El Otro Sendero* still likely wields a lot of power even though he does not hold a high-profile government job. He ranked third in the recent "annual power survey" after Fujimori and Carlos Bologna, Economy Minister; and, he was the man Fujimori sent to negotiate

months as President Fujimori's personal advisor on and architect of a CD agreement between the US and Perú.<sup>194</sup> In a simple, cogent analysis presented in a brief article printed by *The Wall Street Journal*,<sup>195</sup> de Soto notes the positive direction of US-Peruvian discussions and the 14 May 1991 bilateral agreement. Still, de Soto finds substance lacking in US programs and commitments.

A different problem arises among those Peruvians who know of the nation's untapped, natural riches. Many fear an exploitative, capitalist tactic in the long-run.<sup>196</sup> The feared ills include US economic domination and cultural assimilation.<sup>197</sup> Perú's rural citizenry rejects foreign subjugation as much as, if not more than, the oppressive domination they have endured through years of neglect.<sup>198</sup>

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the counterdrug pact with the US. See, *FBIS-LAT-91-180*, 17 September 1991: 35. Though he resigned his post, de Soto still represented the Fujimori Administration in meetings with the US Congress after the 5 April 1992 *autogolpe*.

<sup>194</sup> "The Supply Side."

<sup>195</sup> *Id.*

<sup>196</sup> Sendero plays on this sentiment. See e.g., "A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could not Stamp Out," A16: [After the 11 February 1992 bombing outside Ambassador Quainton's residence], "The movement's clandestine newspaper, 'El Diario' described the target as a 'symbol of Yankee imperialist intervention and looting of the wealth and natural resources of Perú ...'"

<sup>197</sup> For a succinct review of US-Perú relations and important aspects related to MEA, see, Leonardo Victor Flor, *U.S. Military Nation-Building in Peru*, DTIC AD-A212 542-3 (USACGSC: Fort Leavenworth, KS, June 1989): 10-53.

<sup>198</sup> Reflected most eloquently in comments by ex-Commanding General of the EZ, General de Brigada Adrián Huamán Centeno - see Section 5 below and transcribed interview excerpts included at Appendix B.

Peruvians obviously would prefer not to be a source of low-cost labor, with benefits flowing to an employer thousands of miles away. While Peruvians enjoy US products and admire US technology,<sup>199</sup> they want normal commerce that brings decent jobs and prosperity.

Another issue not well appreciated by non-third-world inhabitants arises from the traditional mistrust of the military and police by third-world citizenry.

On the one hand, the threat to democratic institutions and the general health of society presented by the unrestrained narcotrafficker is painfully clear. On the other hand, the government institutions most capable to meet the narcotrafficker challenges, the military and the police, are also the most dangerous to fragile democratic processes.<sup>200</sup>

Hence, where the US might believe that shoring up of the military and police forces will receive popular support, one must consider the need to boost simultaneously the image of these security forces in the eyes of the average Peruvian and the inculcation of democratic values among those forces.

In sum, Peruvians see US involvement with some degree of wariness. The US best chance to win Peruvian support lies in convincing Perú's leadership and the Peruvian population that US efforts reflect a comprehensive and partnership approach to problems there. These efforts should credibly seek to remedy the root causes that render

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<sup>199</sup> Trade with the US accounts for the majority of Perú's import-export activity. See, EIU 1991-92 Peru Country Profile: 32.

<sup>200</sup> USSOUTHCOM: 10.

Peruvian institutions ineffective, or that cause widespread violence, terrorism, and privation. US efforts to help remedy these ills will serve goals which most Peruvians see as being consistent with Perú's national interests.

## SECTION 5: Perú's National Interests

Perú's national interest lies in a sound economy with an active agrarian sector and the necessary development which will alleviate the root causes of terrorism and drug cultivation.<sup>201</sup> Under those conditions, effective democratic institutions will flourish as privation wanes; economic prosperity and its incident power will be enjoyed by greater numbers of middle and lower class Peruvians.

Development will not be achieved without some degree of security<sup>202</sup> to safeguard developmental efforts from terrorist attack. The bolstering of Peruvian democracy and democratic institutions will likely not occur without external support and participation. Principally then,

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<sup>201</sup> Former President García identified terrorism and the deepening economic crisis as Perú's major challenges: he declared terrorism the greater of the two threats. See, "On Peru's Future: Alan García Pérez, Mario Vargas Llosa, Rolando Ames," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 14 (Fall, 1988): 747 and 751. Huston: 99, more correctly surmises that Sendero threatens Peruvian democracy and Perú's the best hope lies with efforts to get "its economy healthy again and address the needs of its people."

<sup>202</sup> Congressman Robert G. Torricelli, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, counselled against aid to Perú's security forces. He believes that President Bush has not properly determined that the GOP has made legitimate progress in protecting human rights. Said he, "We should be generous with assistance for democracy, economic growth, and social development in Peru. But until they change their way, the security forces should not get another dime." "Human Rights Whitewash Won't Win War," *Christian Science Monitor*, 16 September 1991: 19. But, without help, Perú's forces will remain under-resourced.

Perú's national interests will be best-served by international cooperation and efforts to eliminate two fundamental threats: terrorism and a nightmarish economy.<sup>203</sup>

Many Peruvians do not consider drugs to be a threat to Peruvian interests.

Many Peruvians believe that the Shining Path is a far greater threat than cocaine and that the focus of American aid should be the defense of Peru's democracy.<sup>204</sup>

Indeed, there is "[d]eep-rooted Latin American resentment ... to fight ... an armed drug war that they do not perceive as theirs."<sup>205</sup> These common sentiments and erroneous perceptions show signs of being dispelled.

In October 1990, through the so-called Fujimori Doctrine, [President Fujimori] appealed to Peruvians to consider what drug-crop growing had done to Lebanon, Afghanistan, Burma and Laos. Peru, like those countries, risked becoming immersed in corruption, and its territory turned into a battleground for feuding drug lords. Within a month, the ... proposal ... had won the support of four-fifths of Peruvians polled.<sup>206</sup>

Regardless of any alleged shift of opinion, the US must consider that Peruvians may see Perú's national interests, and threats to those interests, in a different light.

An understanding of Perú and Peruvians will contribute to success by winning host nation participation and support,

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<sup>203</sup> Flor noted that García identified these threats in his 28 July 1988 state of the nation address: 63.

<sup>204</sup> Brooke.

<sup>205</sup> "The Supply Side."

<sup>206</sup> Id.

and, by fostering closer coordination of US and Peruvian efforts. In order to understand what the GOP and people of Perú view as national interests and objectives, one should attempt to analyze their expressed feelings.

Perú's national leadership does not share perfectly the US point of view regarding the nature of the problem(s) nor the comprehensive approach to address it/them. Simply put, the government of Perú (GOP) has established goals of defeating insurgent threats and developing the economy.<sup>207</sup>

There are not many shining examples in Perú where authorities have been successful in pursuing the joint goals of meeting the needs of the people and reducing the level of violence (the development-security duality). Nevertheless, one military writer, Major James V. Huston, in looking at ways to deal with Perú's insurgencies, revealed an interesting case study of success:

In January 1984, General Adrian Huaman [Centeno] took command of [the Ayacucho region which then included about 60,000 square kilometers of] the Emergency Zone. He was a native of the highlands, spoke Quechua, and put an end to many abuses, as well as putting together an ambitious and imaginative development program. In short order he gained the popular support of the local inhabitants and the loyalty of his troops. Ayacucho recovered much of its previous normality, there was a long period of calm, and Sendero was practically dislocated from the city. However, Huaman made himself unpopular with the higher military command

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<sup>207</sup> Perú's "president has two aims: to dismantle Peru's protectionist and statist economic policies, and to beat the blood-thirsty guerrillas of the Shining Path" "Looking to authority," *The Economist*, 23 November 1991: 52.

and with the government by sharply criticizing their policies and [their] not supporting his programs.<sup>208</sup>

General Huamán Centeno had spoken bluntly of the source of the problem, the so-called center-of-gravity. He spoke out boldly against government policies of neglect, corruption, and oppression. His interview led to severe debate in government and military circles. In that interview, Huamán stated:

The solution for Ayacucho is not military, but the reversal of 160 years<sup>209</sup> of abandonment. Here the solution is not military, because if it were, if the issue were to kill everyone in Ayacucho, I could solve it in half an hour. ... [W]e are talking about human beings, about forgotten people who have been making demands for 160 years without getting anyone's attention, and now we are reaping the results. ... A change of attitude in Peruvian society is needed, so that the exploitation of the people in the rural areas does not continue and Lima does not continue collecting all the money of Peru. If this continues, Peru will turn into another Nicaragua.<sup>210</sup>

In a telephonic interview on 13 March 1992, General Huamán Centeno addressed this subject in more depth.

He reflected on the fact that Perú's economic and political landscape is still marred by corruption and complicity, apathy and disillusionment. While maintaining that all hope is not yet lost, Huamán Centeno noted that Perú's security forces are not adequately prepared for the

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<sup>208</sup> Huston: 86-87.

<sup>209</sup> This 160 years likely refers to the period running from 1821, when General José de San Martín proclaimed independence from Spain for Perú.

<sup>210</sup> See, "General Huaman on Government Policy in Emergency Zone," FBIS-LAM-84-169, 28 August 1984: J2-J4.

challenges of counterinsurgency operations. He also noted that his 1984 predictions are becoming reality. These factors all suggest that many Peruvians, including some of Perú's leaders, do not share Perú's national interests and objectives. General Huamán stated his broad, but naked, disillusionment with Peruvian politicians:

It's not that Perú totally is [bad], but rather those in government who are dominated by immorality. Thus, interests cross between those who manage the drugs and those who govern. ... What happens is ... the majority of Peruvians don't understand these policy problems, or, they have been convinced that ... they are fighting for a better Perú, or, if they help now to kill people or attack the military, it is because they think that they are making things better for Perú, because they are going to destroy all that which impedes their progress. What these ignorant people don't understand is that they are digging their graves, creating a worse situation.<sup>211</sup>

Corruption reaches almost institutional proportions in Perú, yet one should distinguish individual action (or inaction) and Perú's national action (or inaction).<sup>212</sup>

Huamán's experience as commanding general of the EZ supports factually the notion that development and security

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<sup>211</sup> Excerpted from March 13, 1992 telephonic interview. See Appendix B.

<sup>212</sup> Corruption in Perú seems to result from three forces, usually in combination: desperation from inadequate pay or financial alternatives; coercion by other corrupt individuals, terrorists, or insurgents; and, some degree of individual weakness or vice (usually greed). There are infinite combinations and examples. See, e.g., "Silencio total en DIRCOTE sobre los 20 mil dólares [or, "Total Silence in Perú's Counter-Terror Directorate over the (disappearance of) \$20,000]," *Expreso* (Lima), 30 November 1991: A-8. This scandal, which implicated numerous high-level members of Perú's Counter-terror Directorate in the disappearance of money earmarked to pay the salaries of counter-terror agents, is one of many "inside jobs" which occur in Peruvian government. Here, though, the corruption took personal funds from counterterrorism forces and its implications (in terms of morale and dedication) are immeasurable.



together will defeat the insurgency and improve the well-being of Peruvians. On a broader scale, this duality bolsters confidence in legitimate democratic institutions (including military and police forces); and, it empowers greater numbers of people: this creates the basis for a functioning democracy.<sup>213</sup>

One might still query whether or not the nation of Perú has a real interest in fighting drug trafficking or in promoting development. Since 1980, three economic figures mentioned above align in an interesting fashion. Losses from terrorism and violence, Perú's national debt, and the estimated income from drug trafficking in Perú all hover around \$20 billion. Discussed below, the phenomena jointly represent an accelerating impoverishment of Perú as a democratic nation and the resulting transfer of wealth to drug traffickers. The cynical belief that the nation of Perú has no vested interest in fighting the drug scourge or in promoting economic development seems more a convenient myth than economic or political reality.<sup>214</sup> While corrupt

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<sup>213</sup> A Peruvian character reflecting on *Sendero Luminoso* in Arthur Hailey's recent work, set, in part, in Perú, says poignantly and appropriately, "What America naively forgets is that for democracy to function, most of a populace must have something personally that is worth preserving." The Evening News (New York: Dell Publishing, 1990): 434.

<sup>214</sup> Most careful assessments give the new Fujimori Administration higher marks than its predecessor. See, e.g., *Narcotics Control Strategy*: 115, "In comparison to the García administration, the Fujimori government has taken narcotics production and trafficking more seriously. Because of the threat it poses to legitimate economic activity and to democracy and because of the income it provides for SL guerrillas, the GOP now views drug control as a matter of national survival, not just a U.S. or European foreign policy problem."

individuals might have personal financial or political agendas, it is not likely that a democratic Perú's interests align with the status quo of disintegration.

Furthermore, with that development, most Peruvians seem prepared and willing to significantly reduce or even end illicit coca cultivation. Perú's ex-drug czar illustrated this willingness:

To demonstrate their support [for the agreement signed May 14, 1991 by the GOP and the USG] - and despite intimidation and the assassination of their principal leader, Walter Tocas - every one of 180 identifiable coca-growing organizations signed commitments to switch from coca to other crops, providing markets could be guaranteed.<sup>215</sup>

It seems then that the Peruvians have helped the US identify part of a successful strategy which will advance several mutual goals: provide "acceptable" security, facilitate development and economic prosperity, and, thereby reduce coca production and bolster democratic institutions.

Some, no doubt, would challenge the veracity of the pledge by coca organizations. Money from the drug trade seems almost a narcotic itself.<sup>216</sup> Responding to doubt expressed by a visiting Washington D.C. economist, one coca grower said,

Look ... surely a successful drug dealer earns more than you in Washington. If you don't push drugs, it's because you have decent alternatives, you know

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<sup>215</sup> "The Supply Side."

<sup>216</sup> "Most are addicted to the money and power associated with the drug trade." Draft USSOUTHCOM Strategic Assessment (Counternarcotics), Unclassified Report, 28 December 1990: 7.

drug dealing brings violence and corruption. You don't want to raise your family in hell. Why should I be different, given the chance?"<sup>217</sup>

Coca farmers make between \$400 and \$600 annually.<sup>218</sup>

Certainly with some assurance of a market, with reasonable security from terrorists, and with acceptable "transaction costs," many would pursue licit crop cultivation. While traffickers reap billions, the estimated 250,000 coca growers in Perú earn roughly \$160 million annually -- less than 1% of what the US spends each year in the counterdrug "war".<sup>219</sup> An investment in alternative crops, in market expansion, and in the supporting infrastructure appears to be a sensible option.

Arguably, since Sendero's ideology leaves no room for the possibility of a modern, democratic nation in its fundamental vision,<sup>220</sup> there can likely be no compromise between the insurgents and the GOP:<sup>221</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> *"The Supply Side."*

<sup>218</sup> *Id.*

<sup>219</sup> *Id.*

<sup>220</sup> As stated earlier, Perú faces several insurgent threats - the best known and most threatening are from Sendero Luminoso (or Shining Path) and Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (or MRTA). This thesis principally addresses the threat posed by Sendero since it is that insurgency which poses the gravest challenge and with which no compromise can likely be had. A more complete study of Perú's insurgencies is offered by Radu and Tismaneanu, 307-345.

<sup>221</sup> After the murder of Japanese agronomists, Fujimori rejected the notion of negotiation with Sendero Luminoso. See, "Fujimori Rejects Any Dialogue With Shining Path," *FBIS-LAT-91-155*, 12 August 1991: 58. ex-President García has stated, conversely, that he would talk with insurgents.

To a large extent Sendero's ... two main tenets are total destruction of the market economy ... and the creation of an exclusively rural and collectivist economy of small cooperative and collective villages, all of which are expected to be completely self-sufficient. ... Sendero's economic aims include the establishment of a totally collective national economy, based upon self-sufficient villages and the elimination of currency, banks, and financial services; reversion to a barter system; destruction of the industrial sector; and elimination of both internal and external trade.<sup>222</sup>

In its most basic analysis, the national objective of defeating the insurgent threat, then, reflects survival instinct.

Perú's counterinsurgency strategy has changed over time. In fact, initially, the GOP did not perceive the threat of the insurgency as significant.

[Initially, the attacks against] police stations, government offices, and various nationally sponsored development projects ... [were dismissed by the government] ... as an aberration, the work of a handful of either misguided or possibly demented individuals ... [or] ... the work of thieves, hooligans, or cattle rustlers, pursuing their own interests under cover of an incomprehensible political rhetoric.<sup>223</sup>

Now though, with over 24,000 dead since 1980,<sup>224</sup> after economic losses and destruction from the political violence

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<sup>222</sup> Radu and Tismaneanu, 328. One might query whether "elimination of external trade" might also include trade in cocaine. If so, a Sendero victory might advance important US interests.

<sup>223</sup> Gordon H. McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, March 1990): 15.

<sup>224</sup> LAWR, Number 91-45, 21 November 1991: 9. "A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could Not Stamp Out," A1, puts the figure at 25,000.

approaching \$20 billion,<sup>225</sup> and, with a better understanding of terrorist ideology and its ties to narcotraffickers, few doubt the "here-to-stay-until-eliminated" threat of Sendero. The clear blight of this terror on Perú's economic landscape defies GOP inaction. Necessarily, the GOP has come to view this threat as significant and paramount.

The GOP faces a difficult dilemma in formulating a strategy to defeat the insurgent threat: namely, what should be done first? Individual measures may meet piecemeal resistance and the problems are intertwined and enormous. A successful program must include several elements: balanced development, social mobilization, neutralization and security.<sup>226</sup> Orchestrating and timing these elements requires careful planning. Clear thinking reveals that these must be complementary components of a comprehensive strategy; they must be simultaneously, and not sequentially, executed.

Efforts to rebuild or develop the economy are costly and risky. The cost and risk are not likely to be borne by foreign investors or governments. Equally, the GOP is billions of dollars in the red. Construction or development projects become insurgent targets who destroy them as threats to an ancient agrarian lifestyle -- one embodied in

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<sup>225</sup> See, Vogel: 10. See also, "A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could not Stamp Out," : A1.

<sup>226</sup> FM 100-20: 2-8.

the concept of the *ayllu*, an Inca self-sufficient village.<sup>227</sup>

Meeting the threat head-on has resulted in instances of police and military brutality thought by some to equal the horror of the terrorists' acts.<sup>228</sup> State sanctioned brutality ultimately plays into the hands of the terrorists<sup>229</sup> and results in criticism of the GOP on human rights grounds.<sup>230</sup>

Mobilizing Peruvian and international social relief mechanisms is near-impossible. They become targets themselves and they have traditionally lacked sufficient financial, material and technical support. Great masses of people are disillusioned and they lack confidence in the

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<sup>227</sup> "...The *ayllu* was the [Inca's] basic social unit, beyond the family. This was the localized group or village that possessed a territory held in common by all [of] the married men ...governed by a headman, and in time of war all able-bodied males formed a village militia. This form of community has been idealized and touted as a pure form of communism by ... Sendero Luminoso." *Huston*: 12.

<sup>228</sup> "Rather than acting as a stabilizing force, however, the ill-trained *Guardia* and the all-too-often brutal ... *Sinchis* [or counterinsurgent forces] terrorized the small villages and countryside and, in doing so, increased support for the *Sendero*." See, Che Guevara, 322.

<sup>229</sup> Noted in "An enemy within: Peru's Shining Path war.": 198. Abimaél Guzmán said three years ago in *El Diario*, a pro-Sendero newspaper: "As the people's war grows stronger, the counter-subversive war will necessarily have to intensify, and its core will be genocide. That is going to bring us to strategic equilibrium."

<sup>230</sup> "From 1987-1989, Peru occupied first place in the world for detained and disappeared people, according to United Nations compilations." *Vogel*: 10. At the same time, a Peruvian, Javier Perez de Cuellar, headed the U.N. Ambassador Quainton writes, "We are under strong Congressional pressure not to assist the [Peruvian] Army at all ... I would not expect that to change unless there is a radical improvement in the human rights situation or in Peru's counternarcotics performance." Letter to author, 10 February 1992.

central government's ability to provide for their security or to meet their basic human needs.<sup>21</sup> With four out of five Peruvians unemployed or underemployed, there are too many in demand and too few providers.

In many respects, traditional tactical operations may not achieve strategic "victory" if the US does not help to deliver a tolerable peace. Peruvians know first-hand of the seeming inward spiral of Perú's economy and the resulting widespread alienation. No study or report is necessary to confirm the harsh reality of life in Perú.

Steady analysis reveals a situation which poses tremendous challenges and which offers, at best, limited reason for hope. Fujimori's successes internationally and domestically may be significant ... so, too, may be his failures. He succeeded in winning back investment support and in reforming his economy. He reached agreement with the US on a counterdrug strategy. Still, his "invalidation" of the Peruvian Constitution and his dissolution of the Peruvian legislature earned criticism<sup>22</sup> and led the US to

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<sup>21</sup> Fujimori seems to enjoy greater confidence than does the Peruvian government in general. See Vogel: 9, indicating that he had over a 50% approval rating. See, also, FBIS-LAT-91-180, "Performance of Institutions", 17 September 1991: 36-37, where Fujimori and the executive branch were given high marks in an annual survey of Perú's institutions and influential people. The military, business associations, the press and the Catholic church also received generally positive marks; the police and the judiciary received low marks and the legislative branch was felt by 61% as doing a "very poor" job.

<sup>22</sup> On 7 April 1992 at 4:40 PM CST, National Public Radio reported during its program *All Things Considered* that the Organization of American States, OAS, adopted a resolution condemning Fujimori's action. During the piece, Professor Abe Lowenthal, a noted Latin American authority at

4Peruvian legislature earned criticism<sup>222</sup> and led the US to suspend military and economic aid while allowing humanitarian aid to continue.

Still, the fact that the US and Perú reached agreement on 14 May 1991 on a CD strategy merits review. The bilateral memorandum of understanding<sup>223</sup> recognizes the need for a comprehensive bilateral strategy to address the causes of drug trafficking. These same "causes" also lend support to terrorism and widespread alienation more generally. But, despite the agreement, US funds have been held up<sup>224</sup> pending an improvement in Perú's human rights record.<sup>225</sup> And, US

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<sup>222</sup> On 7 April 1992 at 4:40 PM CST, National Public Radio reported during its program *All Things Considered* that the Organization of American States, OAS, adopted a resolution condemning Fujimori's action. During the piece, Professor Abe Lowenthal, a noted Latin American authority at the University of California, described Fujimori's alleged three-part basis for the drastic measures: 1) to stimulate economic growth, 2) to defeat widespread corruption in the legislature and judiciary, and 3) to attack Sendero vigorously. In describing Perú, Professor Lowenthal used the phrase "Low Intensity Democracy." One should seriously consider whether Fujimori's actions are likely to have impeded democracy or to have removed barriers to it by rooting out corruption and non-responsiveness. Fujimori's *autogolpe*, or self-coup (also called a *golpe blanco* or *Fujigolpe* in Perú), has similarities to events in Uruguay some years ago.

<sup>223</sup> *Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the United States and Peru Concerning Cooperation in Counternarcotics Activities*, (hereinafter *MOU*) signed by Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton and Ministro Don Carlos Torres y Torres Lara, Foreign Minister, of Perú on 14 May 1991.

<sup>224</sup> Clifford Krauss, "U.S. Will Assist Peru's Army in Fighting Cocaine and Rebels," *New York Times*, 25 January 1992: 4N, summarizes Congress' pre-*golpe* linkage of aid to progress on human rights and conditions on use of funds. Krauss said that \$10 million in military aid would be released with another \$25 million likely, and that this would be in addition to \$60 million being sent in this year for alternative crop and related efforts.

<sup>225</sup> See, "Prime Minister on Suspension of U.S. Aid," *FBIS-LAT-91-155*, 12 August 1991: 58, "Prime Minister Carlos Torres y Torres Lara said that the U.S. Congress has withheld its aid to Peru because it has received biased and inaccurate information on human rights violations in our country and this is a thing of the past."



drug traffickers."<sup>236</sup> While "upgrading" those capabilities is important, without a broad and continuing program of support, US interests will not be served effectively. The agreement attacks the problem (alternatives); US support seems, still, to focus on the symptom (trafficking). Even the USMAAG-Lima acknowledges this conclusion:

The U.S. and Peru see the problem of drug trafficking in radically different ways. Any successful strategy will have to find common ground. The U.S. continues to use the term eradication in all objectives as though a magic wand could make all coca plants go away ... The Fujimori administration has been insistent on the fact that crop substitution is the only viable method within Peru to [achieve this] ... The answer lies somewhere in the middle. An integrated international strategy of counternarcotics operations and crop substitution programs is needed.<sup>237</sup>

It seems that, without real progress on human rights, Perú is destined to go it alone. President Fujimori sends mixed signals on human rights. He has stated that human rights must be respected, but he has also broadened the powers of the military in the emergency zone<sup>238</sup> and has

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<sup>236</sup> Letter to author.

<sup>237</sup> *Ground Plan for Peru*, USMAAG-Lima (not dated). Provided to author by LTC Michael G. Ritchie, Chief, Army Section, USMAAG-Lima.

<sup>238</sup> About the GOP declaration of an Emergency Zone under martial law, General Huamán Centeno said, "I protested ... when a state of emergency is declared, it means ... that if one lives in the emergency zone, one's freedoms are worthless; one might be taken prisoner without judicial mandate; [security forces] can enter one's home, break down doors, accuse [the occupants of whatever] and detain them. One has no freedom to travel or one's right to travel is worthless. ... People can't assemble in their homes free of worry because the government prohibits that at the moment that it declares a state of emergency. Against that, what I said is that what must be done is not attack the population nor confuse the population with narco-subversion; what must be done is protect the population." See, Appendix B.

stated that human rights groups knowingly or unwittingly become fronts for the terrorists' cause.<sup>29</sup>

In theory, Perú has several options; realistically, it has one. Perú could "go it alone" in fighting insurgent threats; or, try to set the terms for foreign, international aid and participation; or Perú can participate in mutual efforts; or Perú can do nothing -- the null option.

The first of these, the "go it alone" strategy, seems unlikely and unwise. Foreign investment and support are necessary to defeat the insurgency and to rebuild the economy. Perú lacks the capital, the technology, and the near-term capability to slay the Goliath that threatens it. Thus, this option will not likely occur.

Second, Perú can seek international support, but on its terms. This, too, seems unlikely since Perú's biggest "playing cards" are 1) honoring its foreign debt; 2) providing a market and resources; and, 3) cooperating in counterdrug efforts. The first two reasons are not overly compelling in international circles. At best, Perú will not pay its debt any time soon; Fujimori is thought to be optimistic in his desire even to pay interest on that debt. Natural resources exist in unknown (but believed-to-be-significant) quantities, but their remoteness and the current threat which terrorists pose offset any near-term interest. The final reason -- Perú's cooperation in CD

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<sup>29</sup> *Jane's*: 198.

efforts -- is important, but failing to act in good faith on a broad spectrum of programs and measures is likely to signal dubious sincerity in counterdrug efforts. Thus, this does not appear to be a viable option.

Perú can fight the insurgent threat as part of its broader effort to address many interrelated problems. This course is likely so long as Peruvian leaders pursue Peruvian best-interests. Increasingly, Peruvians seem to recognize that economic disintegration, anarchy and violence stem, in part, from misguided and self-serving politicians. The course mapped by Fujimori provides some hope -- even if that hope is faint. Those who have and continue to use power to benefit themselves principally, now see that Perú's economic, social and political disintegration threaten their individual well-being. Oddly, then, they are more likely to do the right thing, if for no other reason than selfishness.

To win the struggle, Perú needs international support. It will arrive only when Perú meets foreign prerequisites or shows a good-faith attempt to do so: namely, human rights improvements, cooperation on counterdrug efforts, debt repayment or negotiation, etc.

Perú's final option is to ignore the insurgent threat, economic stresses and blight of drug-trafficking. This option denies the diametrically diverse interests of a modern, democratic Perú and the ancient, self-sufficient Indian culture in a Sendero-controlled Maoist state

dominated by drug traffickers and beset by unparalleled economic chaos. This null option exists only in theory -- Sendero's basic philosophy necessitates the demise of Perú's modern democracy.

"Experts" disagree about whether Sendero has real hope for success.<sup>240</sup> Such disagreement misses the real issue. The fundamental issue is under what conditions a democratic regime can succeed in Perú for "the long haul". Basically, the GOP must address the privation which provides a fertile ground for unrest.<sup>241</sup> The best mechanism to do this is combined domestic and international programs favoring a market economy, trade and growth.

Fujimori embarked on such a program during the first twenty months of his administration.<sup>242</sup> More progress is needed in the area of human rights and counterdrug operations. Even in these areas of international concern, the signs are not all bad, and, the GOP is not solely to blame for failures. Concerns should be viewed within the

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<sup>240</sup> For example, one study of many insurgencies said in the mid-80s that "the Sendero Luminoso no longer constituted a serious threat to the Peruvian polity." See, Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., Guerrilla Warfare, by Che Guevara, With an Introduction and Case Studies, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1986: 323. Within Perú, even the population seems uncertain as to who will win: a 1989 "poll showed that 15 percent of urban Peruvians believed that the insurgents might eventually win, compared with just 4 percent a year earlier." See, David Scott Palmer, "Peru's Persistent Problems," *Current History*, January 1990: 32.

<sup>241</sup> See, "A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could not Stamp Out," A16: which said simply, "Marxism the Seed, Poverty the Soil."

<sup>242</sup> Fujimori's autogolpe has chilled international participation and imperils both his earlier reforms and the country's future.

harsh reality which exists in Perú, and not from the sterile vantage point of a cozy desk in Washington.<sup>20</sup> In fact, President Bush's "Signing Statement" which accompanied his signing into law the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990,<sup>24</sup> distinguished between types of assistance vis-a-vis human rights. He said:

... I appreciate the concern expressed in the Act regarding the control of the governments of these [Andean] countries over police and military operations related to counternarcotics and counterinsurgency activities. ... I do not believe as a matter of principle that development and economic assistance should be necessarily conditioned on the same standards as military assistance, since its nature and purpose is considerably different.<sup>25</sup>

President Reagan's comment seems appropriate: "We will deal with the world as it is, rather than as we would like it to be."<sup>26</sup> Effective assistance will likely help bridge the two.

The only option which does this and is simultaneously feasible, acceptable and suitable<sup>27</sup> is one: a) where

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<sup>20</sup> For example, Congressman Robert G. Torricelli, who chairs the House sub-committee on the hemisphere, said that Fujimori's action was condemnable but that it needed to be viewed in light of the "rapidly deteriorating" conditions in Perú. See, Crossette.

<sup>24</sup> Pub.L. 101-623.

<sup>25</sup> US Code Congressional and Administrative News, Vol. 7, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 1990: 4655-4 to 5.

<sup>26</sup> Ronald W. Reagan, "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy Statement," 8 July 1981, complete text included in DISAM: 1-34 to 1-36.

<sup>27</sup> Feasible means that there are sufficient resources to implement the option; acceptable means that the public will support the option; suitable means that the option advances US interests.

international resources and cooperation are forthcoming, and, b) where Perú addresses long-standing domestic problems. Perú's resolve to do these things is not beyond dispute, but the country's leadership does seem headed in the right direction. The US and other nations should try to promote these successes and not endanger them by ill-advised emphasis on narrow interests. When important narrow interests serve US national security strategy in appropriate exclusion of other US interests, then the US should act without regard to those other interests which are at stake.

If democracy in Perú fails,<sup>24</sup> any alternative form of government (terrorist-led, a Pinochet-style dictatorship, a military junta, or whatever) is likely not to be in the best interests of the US. A two-part policy of international engagement to serve international interests and Peruvian government action to address Peruvian-peculiar problems offers the best chance of success.

The insurgent threat in Perú is real and likely to persist. The chance that Sendero can succeed in

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<sup>24</sup> Some have already declared Perú's democracy dead; Fujimori responds by saying that a functioning democracy never existed and that his extra-legal measures will help deliver such a responsive democracy. Some security assistance is explicitly contingent upon the continued existence of a democracy in Perú. See, e.g., The International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, Pub.L. 101-231, Title 22 Section 2291-3, Section 3(c), or, Title 22 Section 2321k, regarding Excess Defense Articles. See, Barbara Crossette, "U.S., Condemning Fujimori, Cuts Aid to Peru," *New York Times*, 7 April 1992, A16: "The Administration had requested \$275 million in economic and military aid for Peru for fiscal 1992, an increase of nearly \$40 million over the 1991 appropriation. ... [In response to Fujimori's self-coup,] Senator Edward Kennedy announced that he would introduce legislation Tuesday cutting off all nonhumanitarian aid."

establishing its agrarian society is, in my opinion, unlikely. The chance that Sendero can further weaken the government, destroy vital infrastructure, and further imperil the well-being of Peruvian society is doubtless. The GOP must redouble its efforts to balance military-style counterinsurgency operations with military and non-military efforts to provide for basic necessities and sound economic programs. This mix will be the only method of Sendero's undoing and Perú's emergence from the edge of the abyss on which it is so precariously perched.

Based upon Western experience in Vietnam, one might conclude that decades of Western involvement there produced little progress toward democracy. In the years since 1972, Vietnam has come to the brink of collapse and now shows signs of heading to where the US wanted it years ago. Perhaps, the analysis would continue, the US might be better off by demonstrating "tough love" -- that is, let Perú "implode" and then help pick up the pieces. This argument has numerous weaknesses.

Perú is multi-cultural: principally there are various Indian highland and selvatic cultures and a distinct western culture. This cultural makeup is similar to that of Perú's neighbors and not altogether dissimilar to US culture. Vietnam's culture is (and was during the Vietnam conflict) characteristically more fragmented. It was more an amalgamation than an integrated culture, and one having

little Western influence. While Perú's culture is not truly an integrated one, the Indian and Western cultures do not necessarily exclude each other -- they can co-exist.

Any trend in Perú could set a dangerous precedent for its neighbors.<sup>249</sup> The success of an insurgency, or of narco-traffickers in combination with insurgents, could cause long-term instability in the region. This region is not located across a wide ocean from the US, but rather, uncomfortably close and connected by land.

One should also note that in twelve years, Perú has already suffered a death toll almost half of that which the US experienced in a similar period in Vietnam. More important, the population of the US was roughly ten times that of Perú. An equivalent proportional US death toll would be over a quarter of a million dead.<sup>250</sup> Sanctions will mainly hurt the most defenseless and they will do little to bring Perú from the brink.<sup>251</sup> The horror in Perú lies not at some point in the future -- the horror is now.

*Sendero's* combined success in Perú and adherence to its ideology could mean: 1) cultural and/or physical

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<sup>249</sup> *The Economist* pondered, "Will coups spread through the Andes?" and noted that "The day after Peru's president shut down his country's Congress, President Jaime Paz Zamora of Bolivia warned the Bolivian legislature that it should start working properly unless it wanted to be 'eliminated.'" "Slippery Slope," *The Economist*, 25 April 1992: 48.

<sup>250</sup> Based on 25,000 dead, a Peruvian population of 22 million, and a US population of 260 million.

<sup>251</sup> "Getting away with it," *The Economist*, 18 April 1992: 44.



genocide<sup>232</sup> of non-Indians; 2) an end to the drug trade;<sup>233</sup> and, 3) the establishment of a Maoist state in Latin America. Regardless of the undesirability of a Maoist state and possible genocidal policies, the elimination of Peruvian participation in the drug trade arguably advances US interests. Such analysis ignores the fact that coca grows without regard to borders. As the US Attorneys and the Attorney General of the US reported to President Bush, drug cartels can tap alternate sources; that is, coca leaf or paste can be bought in Perú, Ecuador, Bolivia or even Colombia.<sup>234</sup>

Thus, there are several factors which argue against a "US-as-spectator" option: 1) the appearance of a Maoist state in Latin America would be inherently destabilizing and against the interests of democracy, 2) the fact that *Sendero* has established a convenient relationship with drug traffickers might mean that it may allow, if not promote,

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<sup>232</sup> See, "A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could not Stamp Out," A1, "By their own accounts, the rebels want to overwhelm Peruvian society like an Andean earthquake in order to build an orthodox Maoist state on the rubble. They have offered cold-blooded estimates that the process could cost one million lives. ... [A high ranking Shining Path member jailed in Lima] said Peruvians who did not embrace Maoism would face three choices: emigration, re-education camps, or ... popular justice."

<sup>233</sup> Possibly *Sendero's* ties to the *narcotraficantes* are so strong and its ideology so important that it would tolerate the continued existence of these ties and seek the spread of Maoist insurgency. General Huamán says that the insurgents' ability to self-finance their activities poses an ominous threat, worse than communism in Vietnam. *Excerpts*.

<sup>234</sup> *Drug Trafficking: A Report to the President of the United States*, compiled by the United States Attorneys and the Attorney General of the United States, August 3, 1989: 16-17.

the drug scourge, and 3) SL would likely desire to expand its *sendero luminoso* to others. These considerations urge engagement and not disengagement.

From the point of view of Peru's national leadership, two generalizations should be made. Those in power either enjoy their status, or, they share in the deep agony of the country (some do both). In the first group are a large number who seem determined to maintain the status quo of decline. In the latter are those at personal risk because of their quest for change and meaningful reform.

The few in power -- the rich, the privileged -- are nearly isolated from the harsh reality confronting the average Peruvian every minute of every day. Mostly they must have added security as much from terrorists as from criminals who will steal almost any unprotected property, anytime, anywhere. The elite of Perú see hardship, but they rarely, if ever, experience it. From their point of view, there is no pressing personal need (though there may be a desire) for broad economic change.

Things are different from the perspective of the "average" Peruvian. A generally fair characterization of Peruvians describes an individual who has endured incredible hardship.<sup>255</sup> Terrorism inconveniences large numbers via

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<sup>255</sup> See, "A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could not Stamp Out," A16, "... 12 [of an estimated 22] million Peruvians now live in extreme poverty, according to *Cuanto*, a Lima consulting group."

apagones, or power outages. Cholera<sup>256</sup> and inaccessible health care pose grave risks to individuals and families alike.

If Perú cannot find outside investment or provide an alternative to drug production, the economic advantages of allowing coca production are hard to deny. Considering the social ills wrought, one can make a case that cocaine will be its ultimate undoing. Still, the immediately poor of Perú and those who traffic in coca do not tend to look that far ahead. Estimates of terrorism's costs to the economy of Perú figure losses of about \$20 billion since 1980. Cocaine brings in from \$1 - \$1.5 billion per year<sup>257</sup> and Perú's foreign debt is about \$22 billion. The three numbers are roughly equal when measured since 1980. The economic result is a transfer of wealth from the nation of Perú to corrupt officials, insurgents, and drug traffickers. Whereas the

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<sup>256</sup> David A. Brandling-Bennett, "Return of a Great Plague: Cholera Rediscovered the Americas," North South, The Magazine of the Americas, vol. 1, no. 4 (December 1991-January 1992): 24-27. "After its initial appearance in January on the northern coast of Perú, cholera rapidly spread to other parts of the country, resulting in more than 238,000 cases and 2,300 deaths by the end of July. ... Since it is the deterioration in ... infrastructure that has permitted the introduction and spread of cholera, only correction of existing deficiencies will eliminate the disease and prevent its reintroduction. Water systems need to be restored and [expanded] ... Sanitation systems need to be put into place ... Basic health care needs to be provided ... All of this will cost a large amount of money [but] Perú has probably spent more money dealing with the cholera epidemic ... than it would have cost to have implemented all those measures within the country during the past 10 years."

<sup>257</sup> See, *Current History*: "... at least 70,000 small farmers and their families earn their living growing coca, and its sale nets from \$750 million to \$1.2 billion in foreign exchange each year.": 32. It is important to recognize that growers receive little; traffickers receive most.

nation is nearly bankrupt,<sup>258</sup> the traffickers and corrupt power-brokers are not. This situation is untenable.

The US is well-advised to look now at how a post-Fujimori Perú will take shape. Perú's constitution<sup>259</sup> prohibits Fujimori from immediately succeeding himself as president. Before the *golpe blanco*, ex-President García was considered by some to be Fujimori's likely successor.<sup>260</sup> García has been implicated in the BCCI scandal<sup>261</sup> and is believed widely to have skimmed millions during his corrupt presidency. Regardless of García's complicity in corruption, he has previously acknowledged the nature of the struggle facing his country:

If we want to combat subversion with the ... people, then we must expand and strengthen democratic institutions and methods. Indeed, the development of social and political democracy is the best tool for confronting terrorism. But this entails social changes that the privileged groups refuse to accept. They do not realize that if profound changes are not made, not only society and the democratic system, but they themselves are in danger.<sup>262</sup>

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<sup>258</sup> See, "A Lethal Army of Insurgents Lima Could not Stamp Out," *New York Times*: A16, "With the state virtually bankrupt, many Peruvians still believe that private initiative will save their nation from the Shining Path."

<sup>259</sup> The now-suspended Constitution provided that Fujimori's term would end 28 July 1995. While he has apparent popular support, flagging international support could imperil reforms and speed his departure, especially if his "promised" plebiscite fails.

<sup>260</sup> See, "Presidential Hopefuls," *FBIS-LAT-91-180*, 17 September 1991: 39, listing, in order, García, Vargas Llosa, Senator Máximo San Román, Juan Carlos Hurtado Miller, Javier Perez de Cuellar.

<sup>261</sup> "The BCCI and all that," *Lima Times*, 2 August 1991: 1.

<sup>262</sup> *FBIS-LAT-88-045*, 8 March 1988, n.p.

Complex social forces and economic pressures oppress the rural masses; solving Perú's problems and advancing US-Peruvian mutual interests must consider these aspects.

Despite the economic legacy of impoverishment which he left,<sup>263</sup> García did start reforms during his presidency to "regionalize" the country. Empowering local governments is consistent with the notion of democratization -- namely, giving the locals some control and stimulating regional development essential to economic progress. Peruvians might respond to this stimulus if they are given reason for economic hope and provided some security.

Both the *pitucos*, or rich elite, and the poor *campesinos* share a common perception about drugs. Drug use and its related social ills are problems, but not like they are in the US.<sup>264</sup> Certainly, as regards individual abuse, cocaine is mostly a problem for the US. Increasingly though, Perú's leaders recognize their diminished ability to rule effectively. They see the threat posed by a network of drug traffickers and those corrupted by them. More each day, Peruvians see the consequences for both governments.

Close scrutiny by US planners of US security strategy, objectives, and interests enables those planners to fashion

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<sup>263</sup> *Current History*: 6, "In sum, President García's economic policies are now generally considered to have been disastrous for Peru."

<sup>264</sup> *Narcotics Control Strategy*: 119, reports that Peruvian cocaine use is likely below two percent; the main significant drug-use threat seems to be inhalants among teens and pre-teens who sometimes abuse them conspicuously in parks around Lima.

programs and commitments which have the greatest chance of success. These programs and commitments will flow, in part, from a review of all relevant factors; various agencies with different missions will work to integrate and implement them in a real environment. In Perú, these programs will include nation assistance,<sup>265</sup> security assistance, and other assistance, as appropriate. Each of these pieces can advance important or vital US interests in an acceptable -- and, therefore, likely-to-be successful manner.

In summary, mutual US-Peruvian interests include: a stable nation of Perú; a healthy domestic and international Peruvian economy; and, functioning, responsive Peruvian democratic institutions. The biggest threats to mutual US-Peruvian interests are: continuing insurgency and drug trafficking; and, the attendant societal, political, and economic ills which they cause. The center of gravity<sup>266</sup> at

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<sup>265</sup> This term suggests foreign assistance in its general context. As will be seen, SA takes on specific legal meaning. Over time, the various aid and assistance programs have each developed unique characteristics, but they generally emerged from umbrella legislation which had an elegantly simple purpose: "The lesson of history is that a community of independent and prosperous nations is the best guarantee of a secure America in a peaceful world. This is the goal of the foreign aid program." See Herbert Goldhamer, The Foreign Powers in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 177, quoting President Johnson on his signing of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*.

<sup>266</sup> Clausewitz defined "center of gravity" as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything else depends." This applies equally to operations short of war, or conditions like those in Perú. See Appendix B, FM 100-5, Operations: 179. The United States Attorneys and the Attorney General of the United States, *Drug Trafficking: A Report to the President of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: US GPO, 3 August 1989): 16-17, identified money laundering as the Achilles heel and center of gravity of the drug trade. They concluded that cartels can tap alternate sources or countries. This suggests that a counter drug-trafficking program should attack money laundering while a counter drug-supply program should attack the absence of viable alternatives to coca cultivation.

democratic institutions. The biggest threats to mutual US-Peruvian interests are: continuing insurgency and drug trafficking; and, the attendant societal, political, and economic ills which they cause. The center of gravity<sup>266</sup> at which US efforts should focus in order to eliminate those threats is Perú's combined domestic privation, inadequate infrastructure, and partially ineffective democratic institutions.<sup>267</sup> The most efficient and effective way to attack that center of gravity is: 1) encourage, through international means, sound Peruvian domestic and international economic policies; 2) assist in infrastructure development (major and minor roads; well-drilling and irrigation; water- and sewage-treatment facilities, medical facilities, communications infrastructure, educational facilities, and other infrastructure);<sup>268</sup> and, 3) do these

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<sup>266</sup> Clausewitz defined "center of gravity" as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything else depends." This applies equally to operations short of war, or conditions like those in Perú. See Appendix B, *FM 100-5, Operations*: 179. The United States Attorneys and the Attorney General of the United States, *Drug Trafficking: A Report to the President of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: US GPO, 3 August 1989): 16-17, identified money laundering as the Achilles heel and center of gravity of the drug trade. They concluded that cartels can tap alternate sources or countries. This suggests that a counter drug-trafficking program should attack money laundering while a counter drug-supply program should attack the absence of viable alternatives to coca cultivation.

<sup>267</sup> I would characterize the ineffectiveness as: inadequate *de facto* adherence to internationally recognized human rights and civil liberties; near-unresponsiveness of government, especially the judiciary and the legislature; and, insufficient civilian control of military and police forces.

<sup>268</sup> I recommend this as the order of priority. Major Ken Savoula, of USSOUTHCOM recommends, in order, well-drilling and water distribution, small economic initiatives, farm to market roads, then bigger road projects. Telephonic interview, 26 March 1992.

things in steady,<sup>209</sup> close coordination with Peruvian national and local leadership in a manner which encourages mutual trust and effective host nation participation.

Hence, MEA should be considered where it might contribute to overall US national security strategy. Thereby, one may best address military engineering programs and commitments which might be appropriate. US experiences, present and past, should guide the US in deciding what support is appropriate. Finally, where experience elsewhere suggests capabilities which might contribute to solving the complex problems in Perú, the US Country Team should consider them. Specifically, other military engineering capabilities not previously used in Perú might significantly contribute to securing US interests there.

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<sup>209</sup> In the past, the US "plan seems to have been driven by resources available rather than a consideration of needs to support an overall strategy. It also seems to have been developed in a vacuum, ignoring Peruvian realities ... consistent with an overall national plan." Ground Plan for Peru (USMAAG-Lima, n.d.): 1.



## CHAPTER III

### US MILITARY ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE

If national armies can be persuaded to orient their force structures, their training programs, and their operations more strongly toward positive support for internal progress, they can contribute to political stability and reduce factors which excuse and contribute to unrest ...<sup>270</sup>

#### SECTION 1: Introduction

The US provides MEA in various ways. For purposes of this thesis, US MEA consists of those programs and commitments that are part of US nation assistance (NA) or security assistance (SA) efforts. They are employed within the authority and at the direction of 1) CINCSOUTH in his capacity as a unified commander,<sup>271</sup> and/or, 2) the US Ambassador to Perú and the various members of his US Country Team. Both means of providing MEA are important.

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<sup>270</sup> Harry F. Walterhouse, A Time to Build (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1964), 6.

<sup>271</sup> There are instances where CINCSOUTH must secure approval from other DOD officials for NA and MEA; these are discussed in section 2, below.

NA is an umbrella term lacking precise definition.<sup>272</sup> It includes a wide range of potential MEA applications, but it also includes other non-engineering capabilities. These MEA capabilities are important. As to the role of its engineers in NA, the Army recognizes that:

Military engineer units are capable of providing horizontal engineering construction<sup>273</sup> and maintenance and repair support to the HN. Small to large scale engineering operations can develop roads and bridges into remote areas to open up markets and improve HN economic or governmental access to isolated areas. Engineers can ... build schools, hospitals, government buildings, sewage and water treatment facilities and electrical systems. U.S. military engineers can transfer these skills to the HN's military through MTTs or combined training exercises. ... [The] Corps of Engineers ... [can] assist the HN in conducting feasibility studies on major public works projects; ... in establishing a HN engineering infrastructure; and [in] transfer[ing] technical and construction management skills. ... [The] Corps of Engineers provides an alternative to the use of traditional uniformed forces ... [When] a low profile is required. ... Corps of Engineers ... civilian employees ... can serve as a link between the Army and [HN] civilian institutions ... [in] all aspects of engineer operations ... .<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>272</sup> The draft *AirLand Operations Nation Assistance Enabling Concept*, Fort Leavenworth: USACAC (26 September 1991): 4, fails to provide a meaningful definition: "Nation Assistance Across The Operational Continuum ... A wide range of operations within a continuum of three general states: peacetime competition, conflict, and war. ... [NA] activities can occur in all three states. Some examples are disaster relief, security assistance, ... infrastructure development ... and major reconstruction during or after violent conflict or war.": 4. Similarly, TRADOC Pam 525-5B, *AirLand Operations* (Final Draft), 13 June 1991, 45, defines NA as "The program of military and civil assistance to other governments to create situations favorable to U.S. interest and avoid conflict or war." The term does not appear in the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub. 1-02, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 December 1989 (hereinafter Joint Pub. 1-02).

<sup>273</sup> The term means, mainly, roads and airfield work: anything to do with earthwork and pavements.

<sup>274</sup> *Nation Assistance*: 24-25.

Regarding NA and its applicability to US neighbors to the south, GEN George Joulwan, USCINCSOUTH, writes:

Central and South America are vital to U.S. national security. Long term regional stability, democracy and prosperity are possible if we recognize the need for a steady, consistent commitment on our part, and act to encourage it in our counterparts. ...[W]e are beginning to increase the non-traditional use of DoD assets. We are exploring the possibilities for taking advantage of unique and/or readily available DoD capabilities to support and develop democratic institutions and infrastructures for our SOUTHCOM neighbors. Dubbed 'Nation Assistance', it is a significant step towards prevention of conflict.<sup>275</sup>

Hence, US military strategy in Perú will likely include NA programs. And, MEA provides important capabilities in any comprehensive US strategy which seeks use DOD assets in a nation assistance role to help diffuse conditions that may lead to conflict.

SA, on the other hand, has a more precise and structured legal significance. SA encompasses assistance provided within a narrow set of legislated programs. Though sometimes erroneously used as a synonym for "nation assistance," for humanitarian aid, or for other terms, "security assistance" is defined in Section 502B of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961* as:

assistance under chapter 2 (military assistance) or chapter 4 (economic support fund) or chapter 5 (military education and training) or chapter 6 (peacekeeping operations) or chapter 8 (anti-terrorism) ... [or] sales ... [or] the export of defense articles or defense services to or for the

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<sup>275</sup> USSOUTHCOM, *Inter-American Cooperation: A Primer*, (Preliminary Draft Extract) [hereinafter *A Primer*], 31 July 1991, in the introduction by General George A. Joulwan, USCINCSOUTH: ii.

armed forces, police, intelligence, or other  
internal security forces of a country ...<sup>276,277</sup>

Though beyond the scope of this thesis, these chapters and related DOD regulations and implementing guidelines have created a very structured, detailed system of procedures and policies for their use.

SA, like NA, provides a range of programs and capabilities which can significantly advance mutual interests.

Security Assistance is a fundamental component of US defense and foreign policy. By contributing to a balanced country package of military aid, security assistance supports ... political development; promotes stability; encourages economic development and reform; contributes to ... access needed to bolster ... [US] projection capabilities [and a] ... collective security framework. Security assistance is also our principal instrument for combatting low-intensity conflict (LIC).<sup>278</sup>

Increasingly, and despite its legal significance, SA will likely be subsumed doctrinally into nation assistance, a broader approach to the similar problems.<sup>279</sup> SA and NA both advance US objectives. Both can promote stability through military training, equipment, and materiel provisioning; both can lead to infrastructure development;

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<sup>276</sup> DISAM, 2-2. See Title 22 Section 2291e(b) US Code Annotated "Security assistance" defined [for purposes of International Narcotics Control], and, see, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, JCS Pub. 1.

<sup>277</sup> Joint Pub. 1-02: 327, gives a similar definition.

<sup>278</sup> DISAM, quoting former Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, 18 February 1988: 1-1.

<sup>279</sup> *Nation Assistance*: 4.

and, most importantly, both can help bolster functioning, HN democratic institutions.

Earlier, this thesis identified US national security interests and Perú's national interests. In the short<sup>20</sup> Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Ambassador Quainton signed with Perú's Foreign Minister, the countries charted a new course in an area of paramount contemporary US interest, counterdrug efforts.<sup>21</sup> The MOU recognizes the failure of past policy, the parties recognize a common interest "in attacking the causes"<sup>22</sup> (emphasis added) of drug trafficking. Further, the countries agree that "policies of alternative development, security, interdiction, and prevention" have a role within "a structural adjustment that creates appropriate conditions for ... a market economy." Noting President Fujimori's discretion in committing Peruvian armed forces, the agreement says further that:

military units may conduct civic action operations ... including road improvement, well drilling and

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<sup>20</sup> The English version of the agreement is included at Appendix C. The original, with both English and Spanish translations, is less than 6 pages long.

<sup>21</sup> "Drug countries" sometimes receive special treatment under US law: [International Military Education and Training or] IMET for narcotics related law-enforcement training; waiver of the help-to-debtor snare of the "Brooke-Alexander Amendment"; a debt-for-drugs plan to forgive debt if CD progress is made; waiver of the Bumpers Amendment prohibiting foreign assistance to producers of competitor commodities if they are produced as alternatives to coca cultivation. See, US Congressional Code and Administrative News, 101st Cong, 1st Sess. (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1989), 1428-1435.

<sup>22</sup> Nation Assistance: 7, in speaking about Army support to counterdrug operations, emphasizes "nation assistance to help develop economic alternatives to [the] production/export/distribution of drugs as a livelihood." (underlining in original).

irrigation, construction and repair of civil facilities ...<sup>23</sup>

Finally, after restating its concern for human rights and in order to undertake the May 1991 agreement, the US:

proposes to make available \$34.9 million to finance the purchase of U.S.-origin defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services ...<sup>24</sup> (emphasis added)

SA's combination of capabilities will substantially contribute to compliance with the agreement. Effective MEA can help CD and CT efforts. A comprehensive approach includes efforts to educate, equip, train, and "democratize" those in the host nation's security forces. In addition, such efforts, integrated into an overall country plan can promote effective, synchronized efforts with a corresponding greater chance of success.

Weaning Perú off of coca cultivation or reducing Perú's deprivation involves the "carrots" of alternatives and development (in part, an MEA function) and the "stick" of effective security forces -- likely trained and equipped, in part, with US assistance.<sup>25</sup> MEA within SA can advance

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<sup>23</sup> See NOU at Appendix C.

<sup>24</sup> NOU.

<sup>25</sup> The International Narcotics Control Act of 1989, Pub.L. 101-231, US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2291-3, Section 3(c) was amended allowing the Executive to authorize Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP) and IMET funds for CD purposes. Under the change, DoD can deploy Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), at GOP request, to train law enforcement agencies "in military related individual and collective skills that will enhance that country's ability to conduct tactical operations in narcotics interdiction." The amendment permitted "the procurement of defense articles for use in narcotics control, eradication, and interdiction efforts by law enforcement agencies, or other units, that are organized

this objective through: equipment transfer, sale or financing; facilities construction; infrastructure development; IMET training for Peruvian military and/or civilians; support to Economic Support Fund (ESF) or civic action projects. These capabilities and programs will help advance important US interests in Perú.

MEA will likely play a bigger role within the military component of SA and NA to Perú even though that assistance is now interrupted. If the US remains engaged in Perú, MEA offers capabilities which may ameliorate some of Perú's complex problems. MEA takes on non-lethal forms and offers various methods through which Perú's interwoven problems may be addressed. Done correctly, MEA can bring development and security, and it can instill confidence in the government.

Effective management is essential to the success of MEA. It is requisite to effective project selection, planning, and execution. An important facet of MEA will involve equipping Peruvian engineer units that will perform, no doubt, some of the work. MEA can be an effective means of technical and managerial skill transfer. MEA offers capabilities which can substantially advance the US interests of stability, development, and democracy. In sum,

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for the specific purpose of narcotics enforcement," despite the general prohibition of support for police training under Section 660 of the FAA. See, US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2420. Steven Metz presents a thoughtful and useful analysis of managing the "carrot-stick" aspects of US assistance in "Victory and Compromise in Counterinsurgency", *Military Review*, April 1992, vol. LXXII, no. 4: 47-53.

MEA could factor significantly in a comprehensive US "attack on the causes" of trafficking and in creating conditions for peace, stability, democracy, and economic growth.

The Country Team in Perú has and will continue to use the SA and NA programs to serve US interests in Perú. MEA has, to date, comprised only a small part of that assistance. As will be shown, this appeared recently to be changing, but events threaten recent developments. The real issue regarding MEA is whether its use and integration by the Country Team has been sufficient and effective. Therein, one considers whether MEA use is appropriate, and, if so, how and where.

One may draw two conclusions from this introduction. First, CINCSOUTH and the Country Team can provide significant MEA capabilities and resources as part of SA or NA to Perú. An effective program of assistance is key to accomplishing important US objectives there. Second, program integration in a synchronized, complementary manner will provide the greatest gains at least effort and cost.<sup>286</sup>

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<sup>286</sup> The US Ambassador has a statutory responsibility to coordinate programs administered within Perú by the Country Team. See, US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2291(b): The President shall prescribe appropriate procedures to assure coordination among representatives of the [USG] ... under the leadership of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission [who] ... shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance (including civic action) and military education and training programs are coordinated with political and economic considerations ... And, Congress has not forgotten CINCSOUTH. See, US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2302: "Utilization of defense articles and defense services ... [should] be coordinated with and form part of the total economic and social development effort."



The nature of SA, NA, and MEA prevents separation of the programs, except to review their bases and contributions. In planning and execution, they should be integrated to maximize their effectiveness. The remainder of this thesis will address MEA capabilities within both NA and SA, and how these have been, are being, and should be coordinated effectively in support of US NMS and NSS.

While this chapter will "pigeon-hole" the programs, Chapter IV illustrates how to tie the programs together more effectively. One begins with a review of the MEA available under specific programs, the history of and lessons learned from MEA use in Perú, and planned US MEA to Perú.<sup>27</sup>

## SECTION 2: Categories and Methods of Providing MEA

Within the categories of MEA (nation assistance and security assistance), specific programs and policies are likely to change with time. This thesis looks at existing programs, but considers that organizational change may help the CINC or Ambassador and their respective staffs to employ MEA more effectively. In short, the thesis accepts that programs may change. Allowing for such change, it looks at

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<sup>27</sup> The information below presents MEA planned before Fujimori's *autogolpe*. Although nearly all assistance is presently suspended, US security interests identified in Chapter II discourage disengagement. *Univisión* reported on 13 April 1992 that even US counterdrug efforts have hardly been effected by the threatened "cut-off" of US aid. The filmed footage showed US helicopters, US radars, and the facilities at *Santa Lucia*, and, said that US participation continues. For purposes of the thesis, I assume that military and military engineering assistance will continue to play a role in Perú.

organizational ways to manage that change effectively and efficiently.

SA programs<sup>288</sup> constitute the principal means by which the US will assist Perú during peacetime engagement. Principally, statutory authority for SA derives from two Congressional Acts: the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA),<sup>289</sup> and, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).<sup>290</sup> Still, other NA efforts can complement these SA programs. Some capabilities rest within the inherent authority of the USCINCSOUTH.<sup>291</sup>

As noted, US MEA will most often occur within the scope of security or nation assistance, including general military operations. Possible exceptions include: US military tactical operations or exercises where there is mere incidental benefit to the host nation; and, other intermittent efforts which, though useful, do not provide a foundation for institution-building or skill transfer.

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<sup>288</sup> A comprehensive discussion of the origins and evolution of US security assistance may be found in DISAM, chapters 1-3.

<sup>289</sup> Pub.L. 87-195, enacted September 4, 1961; amended annually or biennially by security assistance authorization acts or other legislation. This umbrella legislation provides, most importantly, for Economic Support Fund (ESF) and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

<sup>290</sup> Pub.L. 94-329; full name is the *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976*, previously known as the *Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968*, Pub.L. 90-629; this law consolidates US arms and defense services sales (cash or credit) including FMS and FMFP, and, it establishes the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program separate from the now-unfunded Military Assistance Program (MAP) created by the *Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949*, Pub.L. 81-329.

<sup>291</sup> Some programs or projects require the approval of senior DOD officials. The most important of these are identified below.

SA basically consists of seven major programs:<sup>292</sup> four are funded and three are unfunded.<sup>293</sup> Funded programs include: the Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP), the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET),<sup>294</sup> Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), the Economic Support Fund (ESF).<sup>295</sup> The unfunded programs include: the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)<sup>296</sup> and Foreign Military Construction Sales program,<sup>297</sup> Commercial Sales licensed under the AECA, and, the Military Assistance Program.<sup>298</sup>

Of the four security assistance funded programs, the US Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Defense (DOD) each administer two. These SA funded programs provide a means of providing security assistance without

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<sup>292</sup> This tally includes the Military Assistance Program used effectively by the Kennedy Administration. This program has been unfunded for many years, being displaced by the other elements of Security Assistance. In Perú, among Peruvian army engineers, the MAP is still, perhaps, the most widely recognized program of assistance. FM 100-20 lists five programs and says that all are under the control of DOS. Besides the MAP, it excludes PKO: A13.

<sup>293</sup> DISAM, 2-8 to 2-14.

<sup>294</sup> US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2347.

<sup>295</sup> US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2346. ESF was formerly called *Security Supporting Assistance*. DISAM, 2-13.

<sup>296</sup> US Code Annotated, Title 22 Sections 2761-2768.

<sup>297</sup> US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2769.

<sup>298</sup> The appearance of Kennedy's MAP (as part of his larger *Alliance for Progress* program), its enthusiastic reception by Latin governments, and the unsteady (finally disappearing) support for the program are discussed in DISAM, 1-18 to 1-19. The most important vestige of the program, perhaps, is the *Excess Defense Articles* program, Section 644(g) of the *FAA*, which is now covered within the FMFP. DISAM, 2-11 to 2-12.

exacerbating the international indebtedness of recipient nations. DOS coordinates ESF initiatives and PKO;<sup>299</sup> DOD runs IMET and the FMFP through the USMAAG-Lima.<sup>300</sup>

The funded SA programs are fundamentally important to US efforts in Perú. First, through ESF, the US provides Perú developmental assistance.<sup>301</sup> This development assistance is key to stability and to providing economic alternatives for the *campesinos*. Second, IMET provides a means by which military personnel and certain civilians can receive human rights and military-related training.<sup>302</sup> Third, the FMFP provides funds with which the GOP can equip units, both police and military, with modern, functioning hardware and needed materials. In short, the funded SA programs serve as the foundation for all US efforts in Perú.

The unfunded SA programs are a sort-of "pay-as-you-go" plan. DOD administers the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and

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<sup>299</sup> PKO has no present role in Perú. One might speculate whether PKO might eventuate should Sendero and the GOP reach a negotiated "truce" -- this is beyond the scope of this thesis though a similar situation presently exists elsewhere in Latin America.

<sup>300</sup> DISAM, 2-7.

<sup>301</sup> Technically, the US Code Annotated, Title 22 places ESF under Sub-Chapter II - Military Assistance and Sales. International Development is under Sub-Chapter I. One might also note that beyond the specific appropriation for pre-planned ESF assistance to Perú, the US Code Annotated provides for up to \$75,000,000 for emergency ESF use "when the national interests of the United States urgently require economic support to promote economic or political stability." Title 22 Section 2346b.

<sup>302</sup> DISAM, 2-12, quoting a joint Defense Security Assistance Agency - DOS report to the Senate Appropriations committee: "IMET advances U.S. objectives ... at a relatively low cost. ... [H]aving a core group of well-trained, professional leaders with first hand knowledge of America will make a difference in winning access and influence for our diplomatic and military representatives."

Foreign Military Construction Sales Program, and, the Military Assistance Program.<sup>303</sup> Perú will not likely participate in the unfunded programs soon, but this could change with time or with international financial support.

Most likely and useful would be Perú's purchase of USACE design and construction services or specific technical services<sup>304</sup> through the Foreign Military Construction Sales Program. Particularly important are the technical and



Figure 10: A broken home in Perú: it's avoidable with technical help.

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<sup>303</sup> Id.

<sup>304</sup> USACE has specialized laboratory facilities like the Waterways Experiments Station and the Engineering and Topographic Laboratories which have internationally-recognized, state-of-the-art capabilities.

construction management services of the Corps of Engineers in its civil works or military construction capacity. The Corps is a full-service agency which works on a reimbursable basis. That means that someone has to pay the bills.

While other Latin countries have resident USACE engineers<sup>305</sup> as full time staff, Perú does not. There are various means by which these services could be provided: 1) the GOP could pay, 2) the US could finance payment, or 3) another agency could contract for the work. It is unlikely, with Perú's economic condition as it is, that the GOP will be the "payor" any time soon. Still, Perú might "pay" using international assistance or financed Foreign Military Construction Sales. Very possibly, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) might contract for these services under a memorandum of agreement (MOA) with USACE.<sup>306</sup> USACE could perform feasibility and planning studies; engineering design; construction contract preparation, award, and management; and, project turn-over.

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<sup>305</sup> In fact, neighboring Bolivia received the replacement US Army engineer who would have back-filled the PEP position at the Peruvian Army Engineer School but for suspension of the PEP program in Perú. *Daily Journal* note.

<sup>306</sup> A similar agency-to-agency agreement exists between USACE and USEPA for management of environmental clean-up projects under the Superfund legislation. USAID-USACE agreements can be found in Bolivia (\$400,000 to train Bolivian engineers in water resources modelling) and in Costa Rica (to provide technical assistance in earthquake relief efforts). A similar agreement for project planning and construction management might be useful in Perú. More broadly, an agency-to-agency agreement between USACE and USAID would prove useful in establishing the framework for agency cooperation mandated by law. The US Secretary of State should take special interest in a review of this matter.

Already, USAID is considering contracting out some construction work to Peruvian *Batallones de Apoya Cívica*,<sup>307</sup> or Civic Assistance Battalions.<sup>308</sup> Certainly, USAID might contract out some work to private Peruvian contractors.<sup>309</sup> This depends on whether there are local contractors available who are willing and capable of performing the work. In remote areas, they usually are not. Regardless of whether Peruvian units or contractors do the work, USACE could provide an experienced technical staff to assist or to manage and administer such contracts effectively.<sup>310,311</sup>

In such a case, the Corps normally brings in some USACE staff, but it also hires near a project to fill Corps' staff positions. In addition, USACE often contracts out engineering design and/or construction work to local firms. Managing these contracts, the Corps builds local expertise

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<sup>307</sup> Flor identifies "the first joint MAP-AID financing of civic action" as having occurred in 1962 in Ecuador: 78.

<sup>308</sup> Ground Plan for Peru: 4.


<sup>309</sup> US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2351(e) requires that the US Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency should use engineering and professional services of US firms and Section 2361(c) says that construction contracts should be awarded on a competitive basis.

<sup>310</sup> Mr. Kevin Cook, assistant to the Honorable Nancy Dorn, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, identified the above-mentioned agreement wherein USACE is providing technical training to Bolivian engineers. He also noted that USACE has agreements with DOS for state department construction. He remarked that "recent" efforts at arriving at an umbrella USACE-USAID agreement faltered. And, he concluded that USAID seems to prefer a country-by-country approach. Telephonic interview with author on 9 April 1992.

<sup>311</sup> Any military construction (MILCON) contracts in Perú would, by law, be administered by USACE unless the Secretary of Defense approved an exception. US Code Annotated, Title 10 Section 2851(a).

through skill transfer. With its unequalled experience, USACE has a proven record of its ability to transfer construction management expertise and technical skills to HN contractors and HN government agencies over time -- a potential way to build HN institutional infrastructure.

Another "unfunded" SA option involves Perú's purchase of excess US military engineering equipment (generally



**Figure 11:** This bridge, north of Puerto Maldonado, might be an EDA candidate. The road is the only link north.

called "excess defense articles" or EDA) as part of a larger effort to equip military engineer units or buy engineering equipment (like Bailey bridge components). Planners must simultaneously consider things like: maintenance training, spare parts, special tools, diagnostic equipment, special



lubricants, manuals, etc. Done right, this is a low-cost<sup>312</sup> way to equip HN units for construction missions. EDA purchases of US engineering equipment have enjoyed recent interest in Perú, under the funded FMFP.<sup>313</sup>

Hence while the unfunded programs of security assistance and nation assistance offer potential, this potential is likely only to be realized under one of three scenarios. First, USAID might take the lead in using USACE construction management expertise in Perú.<sup>314</sup> Second, Perú's economic condition might improve and make some parts of the unfunded programs desirable and within its means to employ. Third, Perú might cost-share some projects realizing that the US-borne costs are an immediate savings. Still, one will expect that it is the funded programs which have the greatest applicability and utility in Perú.

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<sup>312</sup> US EDA annual acquisition value is limited to \$250 million by Section 31(d) of the AECA. DISAM, 2-14. The person managing the EDA program in the USMAAG-Lima in 1991 was a Peruvian national whose main duties were secretarial. *Daily Journal* entry and message traffic to author from US Army Engineer School, in author's possession.

<sup>313</sup> Other possible statutory bases for accessing EDA include: US Code Annotated, Title 10 Section 2547 which empowers the Secretary of Defense to "make available for humanitarian relief purposes any nonlethal excess supplies of the Department of Defense"; Title 22 Section 2321k [for the] "modernization of military capabilities of certain major illicit drug producing countries [which gives a]uthority to transfer excess defense articles ... without cost to the recipient country"; and, Title 22 Section 2303 which states that "Excess defense articles shall be provided whenever possible rather than providing such articles by the procurement of new items."

<sup>314</sup> Mr. Cook of the ASA-CW's office observed that USAID presently contracts this work out to civilian contractors or that it believes that the work should be managed in-house. Telephonic interview 9 April 1992. The engineering staff of USAID in Perú had almost disappeared by 1991, *Daily Journal* note. Meanwhile, the Corps is a US federal agency with unparalleled construction management experience.

DOD programs within the scope of NA offer valuable MEA capabilities consistent with other NA and SA efforts. Some of the more important examples include: Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) authorized exercises, Deployments for Training (DFTs), Overseas Deployments for Training (ODTs), Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), Technical Assistance Teams (TATs) and Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEEs).

As a quick introduction, these programs involve DOD resources,<sup>315</sup> provided mostly under the authority of CINCSOUTH, the unified commander. Military units from the




Figure 12: Aerial approach to Angamos - this is the only major regional airfield east of Iquitos (see Fig. 13).

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<sup>315</sup> Including USSOUTHCOM and its active and reserve units when activated; and, USACE; the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA); US Army South (USARSO, the army component of USSOUTHCOM); and, the US Army Security Assistance and Liaison Agency (USASAALA).

reserve component (RC)<sup>316</sup> and/or active component (AC)<sup>317</sup> may, within certain limitations, participate in training exercises whose residual effects complement other SA and NA efforts.<sup>318</sup> Other agencies can provide technical expertise, course instruction, or, materiel/resources.

US Army training missions<sup>319</sup> like ODTs, DFTs, and




Figure 13: This is a ground level look at the same airfield. Air Force PRIME BEEF and Red Horse, or, Army engineers (Peruvian and/or American) could bring substantial benefit here.

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<sup>316</sup> RC units conduct DFTs.

<sup>317</sup> In general, AC units conduct ODTs with much the same purpose as an RC DFT.

<sup>318</sup> *Inter-American Cooperation: A Primer*: 3-2 to 3-4, 3-17. The primer presents useful matrices to relate "items and services" available under various programs (therein called resources).

<sup>319</sup> Authorized by US Code Annotated, Title 10.

joint exercises practice mobilization and deployment skills, and, they let units conduct construction missions as they would during contingency operations.<sup>320</sup> When the units



Figure 14: Started by Peruvian Army Engineers, this road (Moquegua to Puno) has inter-agency potential.

redeploy, they leave residual benefits.<sup>321</sup> These can include good will, infrastructure, and skill transfer.

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<sup>320</sup> John F. Fensterer reports that in the 1987 Ahuas Tara exercise, the 27th Engineer Battalion (Airborne) performed 206 of 289 Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) tasks. See, "Can U.S. Army Engineer Units Assist Host Nation Coca Eradication Efforts in the Andean-Amazon Region?" (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSOC, 1 June 1990): 61.

<sup>321</sup> 1992 marks the 50th anniversary of a like-type project completed by US Army engineering units. Army engineers built the 1500 mile trans-Canada "ALCAN" highway linking Alaska to the "lower 48," finishing it in 8 months on 29 October 1942. The project is significant for three reasons: 1) it is perhaps the first major project completed, in large measure, by units of black US engineer soldiers, 2) it still stands as the major land route between Alaska and the contiguous states, and 3) Army engineers mastered the "corduroy road" construction technique similar to that used extensively in the jungles of South America. *All Things Considered*, National Public Radio, 9 April 1992, 5:20PM CST. Fensterer discusses the palizada, or corduroy road construction technique: 55-60.

Perhaps best-known among these is the exercise series called *Fuertes Caminos*, or Strong Roads. In these projects, US Reserve Component units deploy in a series of two-week active duty for training stints.<sup>322</sup> The overall purpose is to provide mobilization, deployment, and mission-related training for designated units. But their connection to NA and SA is inescapable. Unit missions include road and infrastructure construction and they often include civic assistance in medical and other humanitarian forms.

Army units can also execute other unspecified minor construction projects<sup>323</sup> to advance US objectives.<sup>324</sup> One good example of such projects is a well-drilling deployment. Well-drilling units can provide significant relief<sup>325</sup> where drought burdens an already weak agricultural sector.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>322</sup> See generally, *EXPLAN FC 91-2, Fuertes Caminos (Panama)*, Fort Clayton, Panama, USARSO (SOEX-EN-O), n.d.

<sup>323</sup> Congress raised the US Code Annotated, Title 10 Section 2805(a)(1) unspecified minor construction cost ceiling from \$1,000,000 to \$1,500,000 and the O&M funded ceiling from \$200,000 to \$300,000 per project. *Pub.L. 102-190, Section 2807, 5 December 1991. Congressional & Administrative News*, No. 11 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., January 1992): 105 Stat. 1540.

<sup>324</sup> US Code Annotated, Title 10 Section 2806 provides that the Secretary of Defense "may not use more than \$5,000,000 for exercise-related unspecified minor military construction projects coordinated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff outside the United States during any fiscal year." Major Ken Savoula, SOUTHCOM CMO office, reported that this sum had been authorized for SOUTHCOM, telephone conversation 30 March 1992.

<sup>325</sup> SOUTHCOM estimates that a single well yields water sufficient to meet the needs of about 500 people. Telephone interview with Major Ken Savoula, 30 March 1992.

<sup>326</sup> *Daily Journal* notes. During 1990 and 1991, there were numerous messages between the US Ambassador and other parties about the severe drought in remote areas of Perú. A team from SOUTHCOM deployed to Perú in September 1990 to conduct a drought survey and assess the potential of a

This potential is significant as part of a comprehensive program to advance US objectives.

In addition, the HN may pay for material and equipment costs, thereby facilitating MEA where USSOUTHCOM training results in more than incidental benefits.<sup>327</sup> This possibility could be discussed between HN personnel and the



**Figure 15:** A Peruvian Army Engineer officer briefs site survey team members on projects in the Amazon region (September 1990).

USMAAG and further coordination might identify possible applications of this option.

There is a seam between security assistance and training that is inevitable. Training missions are just

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well-drilling deployment.

<sup>327</sup> Flor: 79.

that; they may not be a subterfuge for SA or NA.

Specifically, operating and training funds may not be used for an exercise that results in more than incidental benefit to the HN with four general exceptions: 1) the HN pays (above), 2) there is prior approval by the JCS, 3) the training occurs as part of activities authorized as part of humanitarian efforts during emergencies, or 4) units perform civic action to mitigate damage or adverse effects from training if the cost of civic action is insignificant.<sup>328</sup>

In the area of "skill transfer," the Army, generally, and military engineers, specifically, have means by which technical and administrative abilities can be shared. USACE can provide technical training under contract. The Personnel Exchange Program managed by the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (ODCSOPS) allows the nations' armies to exchange engineers between engineer schools.<sup>329</sup> Technical Assistance Teams might deploy regarding equipment utilization, inspection, maintenance and/or repair. Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) might conduct similar training, perhaps on a unit level. Subject matter experts might participate in exchanges to share lessons the

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<sup>328</sup> See, Flor: 79-80. See also, Fred F. Woerner, "The Strategic Imperatives for the United States in Latin America," *Military Review*, (Feb 1989): 27.

<sup>329</sup> See, Mark Nelson, "The Personnel Exchange Program," *Engineer Officer Bulletin*, No. 13, USA PERSCOM, July 1991: 29-30, "The aim of the program is to share experience, professional knowledge, and doctrine of the respective armies, while fostering mutual understanding and appreciation of the military policies and doctrines of each."

US has drawn from its experience in terrain or climates like those found in Perú: coast (the coastal US, regions in the



**Figure 16:** The main road linking Iquitos and Nauta: bad when dry, and worse when wet.

Middle East, Panamá and around USSOUTHCOM), highlands (Fort Carson), and jungle (southeast Asia, swamps of the US southeast). Similarly, subject matter expert exchanges offer an opportunity to address engineer roles against the backdrop of the many problems facing Perú. In summary, MEA programs provide a variety of options to support US NMS and NSS. Under Ambassadorial direction and with Host Nation participation, these programs will advance mutual interests. One might ask, "What about the past use of MEA in Perú?"



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Since 1990, USSOUTHCOM records indicate the completion of over 700 individual engineering MEA projects in its area of responsibility.<sup>334</sup> This number includes small projects (like shallow well excavation, foot-bridge erection, farm-to-market road construction, bridge repair, health clinic construction, and school rehabilitation). It also includes medium or large scale efforts (like major road projects, deep well excavation, a major sewer system installation, and new bridge construction for spans over 80 feet). What the list does not include is a single project in Perú.<sup>335</sup>

Further, when a fiscal year 1989 *Fuertes Caminos* exercise was canceled elsewhere in Latin America and offered to Perú, the US Country Team declined the opportunity.<sup>336</sup> Mostly, this seems to have resulted from bad timing: the Country Team declined mostly because Perú's municipal and presidential elections were pending. Heightened security considerations warranted careful planning and discouraged quick agreement to undertake such an effort.

Except for CD work, the most recent MEA construction in Perú appears to have occurred in a 1987 *Fuerzas Unidas* exercise. A US engineer squad helped a Peruvian engineer

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<sup>334</sup> The exact number was 737. These data were provided by Major Ken Savoula of the USARSO CMO office by telephone 30 March 1992.

<sup>335</sup> Recent MEA to Peruvian Army engineer units operating in the Huallaga valley probably has enabled some construction there, mostly related to CD facilities. Letter to author from Ambassador Quainton.

<sup>336</sup> Flor: 83.

platoon perform civic action at a school district near Pisco.<sup>337</sup> Despite this paucity of tangible work, MEA has resulted from country visits by the SOUTHCOM Engineer (SCEN) and reserve unit representatives, and by PEP officer engineer assistance at the Peruvian Army engineer school. Still, recent history reveals little MEA to Perú.

For 1991, the USMAAG reports<sup>338</sup> the following assistance to Perú: Civic Action Unit-related FMFP; a familiarization visit to the US for Peruvian Army school directors (including the Engineer School director); a civil affairs related conference, two light infantry DFTs and a *Fuerzas Unidas* (or United Forces -- a combined training exercise). There were no engineering unit deployments. There was no EDA transfer of engineering equipment. There were no engineering IMET initiatives. There were no engineer SMEEs.

While security concerns are heightened in Perú, there are candidate locations for MEA projects.<sup>339</sup> Given the considerable amount of work done throughout Latin America, including other Andean nations, it seems that MEA has not been effectively integrated as a component of US assistance.

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<sup>337</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>338</sup> Matrix of programmed assistance from FY91 to FY96 provided to author by LTC Ritchie, US Army Section Chief, USMAAG-Lima, not dated. In possession of author.

<sup>339</sup> Partly as a result of the September 1990 site survey, specific projects were reviewed and prioritized.

If over 700 projects have resulted from USSOUTHCOM efforts in the last three years, one would expect a representative fraction of these to have occurred in Perú. Instead, MEA has played, until recently, a minor role. Past initiatives have mostly included feasibility surveys and studies.<sup>340</sup> Projects have been few and not effectively integrated into an overall consistent or long-range strategy.<sup>341</sup>

Furthermore, while there is a bilateral agreement providing for a military Personnel Exchange Program between the US and Perú, there is no US Army engineer PEP in Perú. Perú has not had an exchange officer in the US for over two years. The visibility and possible influence of PEPs should not be underemphasized. Specifically, USSOUTHCOM recognizes the importance of the recently interrupted PEP program as a valuable "means to transfer democratic ideas and ... values within the military."<sup>342</sup> The benefits of PEPs can include:

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<sup>340</sup> In September 1990, the author escorted a visiting team from USSOUTHCOM (including representatives from USACE, the reserve component, the Air Force, and the US Army Engineering and Topographic Laboratory, USAETL) whose mission was to survey potential construction projects around Perú. As we prepared for that visit, General de División (Major General) Saldaña, then the head of Dirección Logística (the Peruvian equivalent of the US Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, DCSLOG) commented that the various surveys should lead to something -- not just paper. He said that, and, then he provided scarce resources (people, including a Colonel and a civilian engineer, and equipment) to assist in the visit.

<sup>341</sup> The US Country Plan had no project specific information in its engineering annex as recently as 1990. *Daily Journal* notes.

<sup>342</sup> SOUTHCOM: 12.

strengthened military-to-military ties, skill transfer,<sup>30</sup> and enhanced HN military professionalism.<sup>34</sup>

## SECTION 4: Planned MEA to Perú

Recalling that these programs are coordinated by the Country Team under the direction of the US Ambassador, one might look to both the USMAAG-Lima and the US Ambassador to Perú to determine the likely employment of US MEA resources and capabilities.

The USMAAG-Lima recently adopted a new tack in its strategy to support the country plan. This tack involved two components. First, the MAAG substituted engineering assistance for what previously focused primarily on combat force assistance. Second, the MAAG began using previously ignored mechanisms in its support to the host nation. LTC

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<sup>30</sup> Most relevant as representative MEA roles of an engineer PEP during the author's year in Perú were opportunities: to participate in a comprehensive review of important construction projects throughout Perú; to teach both tactical and technical engineering subjects at the Centros Academicos; to participate in Peruvian Combat Diver training; to participate in the development of a proposed organization for Perú's National Development Battalions; and, to interview and meet with very senior officers in the Peruvian Army. In addition, as one indicator of the visibility of US PEPs, the author was called, without prior notification, and requested by General Zegarra, the then-Commanding General of the Peruvian Army, to review and revise three speeches that the General would be making during a trip to the US. *Daily Journal* notes.

<sup>34</sup> "It is easier to package and export a weapon or bag of grain than it is to export a value. Similarly, it is easier to measure chemical seized, tons of cocaine base interdicted or illicit drug laboratories raided, than it is to gauge progress of a political process." This SOUTHCOM caution serves as a reminder that, though difficult to measure or quantify, military-to-military contacts like those realized daily by exchange officers are likely to advance important democratic interests. SOUTHCOM: 11.

Mike Ritchie, Chief, Army Section, USMAAG-Lima wrote:

We have seen a shift from the old Ground Plan based on FMFP for Infantry Battalions and lethal aid and a move to concentrate directly on Nation Development ... Engineer Battalions have replaced Infantry Battalions in the long-range plans for solving the problems of the UHVS coca production. This ... fits exactly with the CT goals and CINCSO priorities and stands a much greater chance of success working in conjunction with AID resources ... [This means] that the enlightened leadership looks to our assistance in a long range solution to the drug problem by assisting them in providing an alternative to coca while they use their own resources to attack the immediate concerns of the trafficking. ... We can best solve Peru's problems by providing the *campesino* in the UHV with both a positive alternative ... and a negative incentive to coca trafficking at the same time.<sup>345</sup>

Implicitly, the MAAG sees the combined need for development and security. The "carrot and stick" approach is essential, as development will not occur without security, nor vice-versa.

This approach has both counterdrug and counter-insurgency benefits.

Counterinsurgency doctrine tells us that the key to ... popular support in the UHV ... [is the ability] to address the legitimate needs of the *campesino* ... The number one priority of the [GOP] ... is to reestablish the agrarian economy in part through the repair of the 3000 km of roads that are 90 per cent destroyed. We feel that to tie the Army programs to the national priorities as well as the USAID projects to repair 1000 km of UHV roads is the key to addressing those legitimate needs.<sup>346</sup>

Hence, MEA ties to HN priorities and USAID efforts will help.


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<sup>345</sup> Memorandum, Chief, USMAAG-Lima, Subject: "Civic Action - Roads to Success in Peru" (Undated original provided to author by LTC Michael Ritchie, Chief Army Section, USMAAG-Lima): 1.

<sup>346</sup> *Id.*



**Figure 17:** Project briefing on road from Brasilea (Brazil) west to Iñapari; south to Iberia, Puerto Maldonado & Puno; southwest to Moquegua and Ilo -- excellent Country Team and host nation potential.



**Figure 18:** Enlarged and retouched; clear message: security and development.

An integrated strategy requires that the USMAAG tie its efforts in the UHV to those programs of other members of the Country Team. In addition, HN efforts and capabilities should be considered -- including HN efforts outside the UHV that have a spill-over CD or CT effect.

Peruvians think this way. Their Army lacks resources, but not desire: it has comprehensive, inter-regional plans which address the security-development duality described earlier. Figure 19, of construction details briefed near Ilo, matches perfectly the plan presented at Puerto Maldonado, hundreds of miles away (see Figures 17 and 18).




Figure 19: Peruvians briefed this many miles from Puerto Maldonado but it is nonetheless integrated.

Just as the Peruvian Army appears to have a plan to "build" a future through infrastructure, so too the USMAAG-Lima says



a "coherent Army program of civic action, DFTs, IMET, SMEES and Professional Development is the clear intention of this MAAG."<sup>347</sup> Availing itself of a broader range of MEA, the USMAAG-Lima intends to link these programs together.

Planned US support includes examples of nearly all types of MEA available. From equipment transfers,<sup>348</sup> to US sponsored training or US deployments, to joint and combined exercises: it appears that the USMAAG has begun to avail itself of the gamut of MEA capabilities. This mix of MEA capabilities offers great potential; it reflects substantial work by the USMAAG and USSOUTHCOM in the recent past. Without considering other aspects of the Perú Country Plan, one can see that MEA, for the first time in recent memory, forms a significant part of the assistance planned for Perú. Before looking at how MEA is integrated into an overall US strategy in Perú, one may first review the planned MEA as the basis for analyzing the means of integrating MEA effectively. That integration is discussed in Chapter IV.

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<sup>347</sup> *Ibid.*: 2.

<sup>348</sup> The USMAAG identified equipment type in order of priority: well drilling rigs; backhoes or small emplacement excavator tractors; dump trucks; rock crushers; earth compactors; water trailers; fuel pods; road graders; rock drills; front loaders; bulldozers; and, concrete mixers. See, Memorandum from Chief, USMAAG-Lima to CINC SOUTHCOM, Subject: 506(a)(2) Program Equipment Request Recommendation (Undated original provided to author by LTC Michael Ritchie, Chief Army Section, USMAAG-Lima): 1-2. In a like message from the Chief, USMAAG-Lima to DSAA and the US Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and CINCSOUTH, well-drilling rigs did not appear. See, Memorandum from Chief, USMAAG-Lima to DSAA, et. al. Subject: Request for Nonlethal Support to Peru (Undated original provided to author by LTC Michael Ritchie, Chief Army Section, USMAAG-Lima): 1.

The following table lists selected assistance which the USMAAG-Lima is planning for Perú:<sup>349</sup>

Table 2: Planned MEA to Perú Through FY96

PROGRAMS	FY92	FY93	FY94	FY95	FY96
FMFP	ENGR BN	ENGR BN	CIV AFF (X3)	ENGR BN	
DFT	WELL DRILLING	ENGR/MEDICAL (X 3)	ENGR/MEDICAL (X 3) FUERTES CAMINOS	ENGR/MEDICAL (X 3) FUERTES CAMINOS	ENGR/MEDICAL (X 3) FUERTES CAMINOS
EDA	See note <sup>350</sup>	ENGR EQPT	ENGR EQPT	ENGR EQPT	
IMET	EOBC COUNTERDRUG	EOBC SJA/IG CD CGSOC	EOBC SJA/IG CD CGSOC	EOBC SJA/IG CD CGSOC	EOBC CD CGSOC
SNEE	LOGISTICS PSYOPS	HUM.RTS./SJA LEADERSHIP	ENGR/CA PUBLIC REL. HUM.RTS./CI	TBD	TBD
EXERCISES	FUERZAS UNIDAS	FUERZAS UNIDAS (X 2)	FUERZAS UNIDAS (X 2)	FUERZAS UNIDAS (X 2)	FUERZAS UNIDAS (X 2)
FAMILIARIZATION VISITS	SCHOOL DIRECTORS	ENGR/CA HUM RTS	CIVIC ACTION SCHOOL DIR.	TBD	TBD
CONFERENCES	CIV AFF (X 2)	CA & CMO	CA (X 2)	CA (X 2)	TBD
OTHER	ENGR EQPT	ENGR EQPT	ENGR EQPT	ENGR EQPT	

This table shows that, starting 1992, emphasis shifted from focusing on conventional combat forces to equipping engineers to promote stability, to enhance governmental legitimacy, and to build a lasting peace. "Enlightened leadership" has recognized the synergistic effect of

<sup>349</sup> The table includes items selected from information which the USMAAG-Lima provided to the author. Other support is planned. All of the indicated support is jeopardized by Senator Kennedy's proposed Democracy in Peru Act of 1992. See, Rhonda Chriss Lokeman, "Chaos comes from the top in Peru," *Kansas City Star*, 12 April 1992: J1.

<sup>350</sup> The US Country Team has sent official correspondence regarding road graders for 1992 to Secretary of the Army Michael P. Stone; these are likely reflected in the row marked "OTHER" in the matrix provided to the author. Copies of correspondence maintained by author.

construction projects.<sup>351</sup> Long-lead times and sound engineering practice require planning now for activities years hence; the table shows that such efforts are on the horizon.

Noted earlier, this planning is on hold as a result of the April self-coup and other events. Still, one might expect that the trend toward non-lethal MEA might continue. MEA could, and likely will, form an increasing portion of the military component of SA and NA to Perú. With that changing emphasis, one must query whether the change is managed as effectively and efficiently as it should be. Chapter IV analyzes these issues in depth.

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<sup>351</sup> Several groups criticize this reasoning. One group says that more roads will mean more access to remote areas, hence, more coca production or access by abusive security forces. See, "Peru's Persistent Problems": 32. There are no data to support these conclusions. The second group argues that the assistance provided through the PAM had no long-term effect (witness the present situation) and this will be more money thrown after bad. One reply is that most projects were not finished or they lacked comprehensive plans to maintain them; and, there weren't enough projects to benefit the country macro-economically. See, Flor: 79. A third group suggests that NA and SA take work away from the private sector and give government workers a leg-up on private contractors. This is discussed below. See also, US Code Congressional and Administrative News, 94th Congress, 2d Sess., vol. 3 (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1976), 1387.

# **CHAPTER IV**

## **DOING THINGS RIGHT -**

### **AN INTEGRATED APPROACH**

#### **SECTION 1: Introduction**

Increasingly, the American military presence in foreign societies will be guided by the need to initiate and facilitate the process of social change, in order to build stable nations with stable institutions which can withstand the complex military-political thrust of ... subversion.<sup>32</sup>

This chapter addresses the second part of the two-part undertaking identified in chapter III: integrating MEA programs in a synchronized, complementary manner to realize the greatest gain at least effort and cost.

[T]he U.S. Army ... [may] deter and defend against ... [LIC], [but] the underlying causes must also be addressed[:] ... nations have to be helped to help themselves. ... [T]he Army is recognizing that the most effective strategy for blocking and defeating insurgency ... is ... in building the social bases for institutions ... not only to stem revolutionary insurgency but also to maintain a viable, independent national life ... [The] American Army will ... collaborate with host civilians, government officials, and military counterparts in initiating

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<sup>32</sup> See, John W. DePauw and George A. Luz, "Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action," US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 30 September 1990: 167-8.

and managing ... change which can build the institutional base for viable nationhood.<sup>333</sup>

The military engineer can be a catalyst for change in Latin America generally and in Perú specifically. In remote areas and where civilian contractors are not likely to be found except at inordinate cost, military engineers offer real solutions to real problems. Inherently more secure than civilian counterparts,<sup>334</sup> military engineers can accomplish tough, but needed work. Thereby, they promote a positive image of the military (host nation and US) and they generate, among the local population, good will for both governments and for their militaries as an institution of those governments. Efforts should result in: development, individual and institutional skill transfer, and increased support for a legitimate and responsive government.

Key is integrating the gamut of MEA capabilities sensibly. The need to include all relevant actors, when and as appropriate, and the utilization of a wide, but steady, array of programs affords the best chance of success which simultaneously results in the institutionalization of the processes -- that is, institutional level skill transfer.

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<sup>333</sup> *Id.*

<sup>334</sup> While military engineers are, by reason of equipment, training, and organization, more likely to discourage and better prepared to repel or respond to attack, one must consider the possibility that military engineers might more likely be considered the object of attack than their civilian counterparts. In Perú, terrorists or insurgents have attacked both military and non-military targets. They attack military targets, but with great caution - one should note the incident need to prepare for, organize, and execute such an operation increases the likelihood of its prevention or avoidance.

In the past, U.S. military assistance has focused on assisting host nation military institutions with notable successes. ... [Now though], DOD resources must be viewed in their broader capacity to assist ... institutions, and to focus on institutions in both the public and private sector. ... DOD's capability to respond to the medical and infrastructure needs of a country offer the most relevant opportunities for a U.S. contribution. ... The goal ... must be to use scarce DOD resources to cooperate with [HN] counterparts to assist them in developing their own solutions. The projects themselves become the opportunity for assisting the appropriate host nation institutions. The U.S. participation becomes one of cooperation and coordination, not ... providing the service ...<sup>355</sup>



**Figure 20:** This group from the Sep 1990 Site Survey team includes Americans and Peruvians, military and civilians.

Integration, by necessity, means involving the host nation and multiple agencies. USSOUTHCOM, USACE, USMAAG, USAID, HN agencies all have a useful role and a stake in the outcome.

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<sup>355</sup> *Inter-American Cooperation: A Primer*, USSOUTHCOM, 31 July 1991 (Preliminary Draft Extract): 1-4 to 1-5.

MEA in Perú is not some sort of abstract notion. Work has been done and more is planned. US and Peruvian national interests are at stake. Program decisions are influenced by infinite external factors, but planning and employing MEA capabilities in Perú is the charge of CINCSOUTH and, especially, the US Country Team in Lima. These people know that their decisions must reflect, not a sterile first-world vantage point, but rather, the harsh reality of Perú.

## SECTION 2: Should the US Provide MEA?

Our Army has been our nation's general military servant for more than 200 years. We were the nation builders that led the expansion of our great country. Among numerous feats, we surveyed the West, opened frontiers, made inland navigation possible and built the Panama Canal. We have proved over many years that our value to our nation far transcends defending it against foreign aggression - nation assistance is simply an extension to this historical role.<sup>356</sup>

Whether or not the US should provide MEA is a question which troubles many. Basically, there are two aspects to the issue. First, "whether" depends, in part, on US national security interests and US employment of elements of national power to secure those interests. If US MEA results in enhanced US security, some would conclude that it should be applied if cost-effective to do so. Chapter II supports the conclusion that the US has important national security interests in Perú -- MEA likely has a role there.

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<sup>356</sup> Colonel Terry L. Rice, "Forging Security Through Peace," *Military Review* (April 1992): 14-26, 19.

Second, one might assert that "whether" depends on a correlation between MEA and measurable positive effects.<sup>357</sup> In other words, some argue that the US should provide MEA where will produce net benefits (like increased stability, regional development, democratic responsiveness, economic improvement, or, decreased insurgency, terrorism, etc.). Furthermore, this argument presumes that these things, or some of them, may be quantified or measured and that projects may have long-term effects.<sup>358</sup>

The US Country Team will employ MEA where it will likely contribute to stability, security, and development; and/or, where it will likely diminish support for insurgency and drug cultivation or trafficking. Naturally, one would conclude that with these objectives in mind, US strategy would seek out opportunities and areas to use MEA in combination with other "tools" for these ends. Logically,

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<sup>357</sup> A direct link between development, stability, security, democracy, etc. and assistance is difficult to establish. One notably successful application of SA and NA was the Marshall Plan following World War II. MEA has contributed to "success" (in places like Oman or Malaya) as part of an integrated strategy. For an excellent summary of the successful integration of MEA with other means in Oman, see *Revolutionary War in Oman*, in Bard E. O'Neill, William R. Heaton and Donald J. Alberts, eds., Insurgency in the Modern World, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 212-233. For a comprehensive study of the Malaya insurgency see, D. M. Condit and others, Challenged Response on Internal Conflict, Volume I: The Experience in Asia, (Washington, D.C.: American University, Center for Research and Social Systems, February 1968).

<sup>358</sup> The US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2361(e) requires, for some type projects, a determination of the host country's ability to operate and maintain a project beforehand: "... no assistance ... shall be furnished with respect to any capital assistance project estimated to cost in excess of \$1,000,000 until ... there is a certification ... as to the capability of the country (both financial and human resources) to effectively maintain and utilize the project taking into account among other things the maintenance and utilization of projects in such country previously financed or assisted by the United States."



one would expect some effort to determine, from experience, how this might best be done. These things and their connection to MEA require careful study and analysis.

Most people recognize that these correlations are hard to establish and likely to be inaccurate. Establishing a relationship between a project and local, regional, or especially, national change is elusive. Nevertheless, with the significant amounts of project funding to date, and given anticipated efforts, the query merits attention.

The fact is, little effort is made to measure long-range program effectiveness. Few can empirically answer questions like: What were attitudes and conditions before project/program implementation; what are they simultaneous with project/program execution; what are they one, two, or five years afterwards; what correlation can be established to relate any change to the project or program?

In a recent initiative, USSOUTHCOM has undertaken an ambitious effort to track the data which may help answer these questions.<sup>399</sup> The Civil Affairs Infrastructure Development Project Data Base tracks project condition and population attitudes. In both pre- and post-construction surveys, US Army Civil Affairs and PSYOPS experts interview local inhabitants about general living conditions and attitudes. In addition, US Army engineers conduct technical

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<sup>399</sup> Information provided by Major McDill, USSOUTHCOM J3 (Civil Affairs) by telephone, 3 April 1992.

inspections of the projects and they accompany the "attitude assessors" from time to time.

USSOUTHCOM is recording the data and is gradually building the data base over time. This way, the data base can serve to facilitate some analysis of the relationship between work performed and the conditions and attitudes of those thereby affected. It may prove useful to validating or refuting widely held beliefs and could provide insights regarding conditions for success or failure. The effort is new and its utility is not yet determined, but it looks to be the only<sup>360</sup> earnest effort upon which one might quantifiably affirm or deny the relationship between MEA and the alleged effects.<sup>361</sup>

Even without data-supported correlations, one may draw conclusions about MEA from other experiences.<sup>362</sup> Almost without doubt, when MEA is coordinated and integrated into an overall plan, it can promote development and promote

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
<sup>360</sup> Mr. Kevin Cook stated that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations (ODCSOPS) has or will start an effort to measure project effectiveness using a "measures of effectiveness" contractor. No further information was available at the time of this writing. Cook interview.

<sup>361</sup> US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2394 requires an annual report to the Congress including an assessment of the impact and the expenditures for assistance in programs. It does not prescribe a specific means by which those making the assessment should accomplish the task. It applies to international development and ESF projects but does not apply to MEA projects.

<sup>362</sup> The risk of drawing lessons from other efforts in other places is that the same results may not be achieved in a different setting - especially one like Perú. Still, reasoned analysis and consideration of the unique aspects posed by circumstances in Perú provides some basis for drawing general conclusions.

stability. USAID, international organizations, DOD, the HN, and others -- working together -- can maximize results.

Development can enhance stability and provide economic alternatives by lowering transaction costs. Farmers and



**Figure 21:** At Puerto Maldonado, cedar awaits transport; this place could use a 180m bridge.

merchants can get crops/goods to market without damaging them in transit. That means the product gets to market at lower cost. Besides, security forces have greater access to regions and can respond more effectively to security threats. Water-related systems (wells, irrigation and use-distribution) and sewage systems (personal and limited industrial) can enhance quality of life and agricultural productivity, and can reduce disease.

Clearly then, the development of local or regional infrastructure can provide a higher standard of living and greater economic prosperity to increasing numbers of people.

These people will likely gain political power commensurate with their improved economic status. This empowerment further strengthens democracy, since those who benefit will likely support a government and institutions which better their condition. Given these expected consequences, the short answer to the "whether" question is "yes." The long answer is, "yes, but with some degree of circumspection."

The development-stability duality discussed earlier<sup>363</sup> creates some problems. The US Army looks at host nation Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)<sup>364</sup> and at SA and NA as ways to "join forces" in promoting mutual interests. In theory, training and equipping engineer units to perform such work takes it from civilian enterprises or government agencies. The fact that the work has not been done and will not get done without international assistance seems a sufficient response to such theoretical criticism.

General Huamán notes that in some areas civilian alternatives are insufficient to provide the basis of security and initial development on which all else depends.<sup>365</sup> In addition, he points out that HN forces are

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<sup>363</sup> Chapter II, Section 5 above.

<sup>364</sup> Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989, defines 1) internal defense and 2) internal development, respectively, as follow: 1) the full range of measures taken by a government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; and, 2) actions taken by a nation to promote its growth by building viable institutions (political, military, economic, and social) that respond to the needs of its society.

<sup>365</sup> See Huamán interview excerpts, Appendix B.

not adequately trained in some matters and US military assistance is necessary. In most of Perú, therefore, the debate is mostly an academic exercise whereas the need for help is real. Even so, Perú's present environment of reform and privatization suggests that the GOP would likely work to prevent any such bureaucracy. Alternately, the GOP would facilitate free-market forces at the earliest opportunity.

The GOP already has an Army bureaucracy to coordinate its Army-related engineering -- SINGE, *Servicio de Ingeniería del Ejército*, or Army Engineering Service.<sup>366</sup> SINGE performs the necessary coordination between Peruvian Army efforts and various GOP ministries. Speculation as to whether this or any other GOP construction organization would gain and keep an unfair advantage ignores the pressing present lack of developmental alternatives and is not supported by current trends toward privatization.

Using Perú's Army engineers has precedent and is not very controversial in Perú. About using Army engineers to resolve Perú's problems, General Huamán speaks directly:

The role of military engineers is very important. This is because they know how to construct roads which serve many uses for all parts of the population ... they know how to build facilities ... [and] improve lines of communication: all of which works to improve the situation faced by the majority of the population. There is a tremendous horizon [of opportunity], if they build [facilities and] improve roads ... [or] bridges [that] haven't been

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<sup>366</sup> Daily Journal note.

rebuilt: this work is something which will help tremendously to solve [Perú's] problems.<sup>367</sup>

Noting the almost unimaginable isolation of much of Perú, the high operating cost, and the risk to "development" forces, MEA seems an essential component of any practical effort to "address underlying causes" and "build an institutional base." In much of Perú, MEA, as General Huamán knows from experience, is not only a superior solution, it is often the only near-term solution.<sup>368</sup>

Hence, despite the present unavailability of empirical data in theater or in Perú specifically, it appears that MEA should be employed in Perú. Efforts like the Civil Affairs Infrastructure Development Project Data Base may provide a basis for employing these capabilities more effectively -- they should be pursued. The absence of numerical or precise relational data does not negate the obvious: MEA can be an effective component of an overall US strategy in Perú. This conclusion stems from a review of US NSS and the historical role of the Army generally and Army engineers specifically. Thus, MEA can be employed as part of a comprehensive approach to advance important US interests and objectives.

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<sup>367</sup> See, Appendix B.

<sup>368</sup> "Local contractors avoid rural areas threatened with political violence, so that often where a government needs engineering support the most, it has none." From the report *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*, prepared for the Commission in Integrated Long-Term Strategy by the Regional Conflict Working Group, Washington, D.C., June 1988, included in C4000 Advance Book, Contingency Force Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, n.d.): 213.

Under any analysis, it seems that MEA will likely advance important US and Peruvian national interests -- the so-called win-win situation. Still, Perú's commitment to human rights, to democracy, and to international counterdrug efforts are political issues which encourage careful scrutiny of any assistance to Perú. In addition, the security of US personnel participating in such efforts is a paramount consideration. Last, the cost-benefit of using these resources and capabilities will influence their coming to fruition.

### **SECTION 3: How to Intertwine MEA into the Country Plan**

In peacetime, SA and NA programs are coordinated among the Country Team member agencies under the direction of the US Ambassador. A Security Assistance Organization (SAO) administers DOD programs. The SAO coordinates these programs with the Country Team and HN:

It is the SAO's responsibility to ensure that needs and capabilities assessments are an interagency and international process. Needs and capabilities assessment is conducted in cooperation and coordination with DoS and other non-DoD agencies. A needs and capabilities assessment is also conducted in partnership with the HN.<sup>369</sup>

Principally then, the USMAAG-Lima coordinates, plans, and/or executes MEA<sup>370</sup> as part of the overall plan of assistance to

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<sup>369</sup> Nation Assistance: 23.

<sup>370</sup> USSOUTHCOM support and JCS-directed exercises happen with the approval of the US Ambassador.

Perú. One may review planned efforts to see how the US will likely use these military capabilities as part of the comprehensive effort to implement US national security strategy in Perú.

The US has (and has had) military personnel in Perú permanently assigned to or attached to one of two military components of the Country Team -- namely, the Security Assistance Office (SAO), or, the Defense Attaché Office (DAO).<sup>371</sup> The SAO in Perú presently goes by the name of the US Military Assistance and Advisory Group (USMAAG). The USMAAG-Lima has a Chief, USMAAG and separate sections for the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The MAAG may not, without an exception, have more than six military members on its staff.<sup>372</sup> Its internal organization is based on local need and emphasis.<sup>373</sup>

The permanent military staff is supplanted by USG or

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<sup>371</sup> In fact, "by the 1960s, the U.S. military mission in Peru had 66 officers and enlisted men." Flor: 40.

<sup>372</sup> US Code Annotated, Title 22 Section 2321i(c)(1) imposes the six-person limitation. The President may waive this ceiling; requested waivers are rarely, if ever, denied. "DSAA notes that the Congress has never opposed a request to exceed the six person limit." See, *Reforging the Instrument: A Plan of Action And Leadership for Integrated Long Term Strategy*, in Paul F. Gorman, et. al., *Commitment to Freedom, Security Assistance As a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World* (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army Institute of Land Warfare, May 1986): 34.

<sup>373</sup> See, PL 97-113, *International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981*, 29 December 1981; Section 515 of the *Foreign Assistance Act of 1961*, as amended; *DOD Directive 5132.3*; and *DOD Manual 5105.38*, which define the roles, responsibilities and organization of SAOs generally. The USMAAG, distinct from the USDAO-Perú, in fact, has six active-duty servicemen permanently assigned. See also, *DISAM*, 23-2 and *FM 100-20*, Appendix A.



local-national civilians, and/or by USG temporary duty augmentees. It may be supplemented, by coordination, with foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Forces (FIDAF). One possible member of such an augmentation force might be an engineer or engineer staff to provide short-duration support or, with repeated deployments, support for long-range programs.<sup>374</sup>

Regardless of supplementation, in the MEA integration process, the SAO (in Perú, the USMAAG) is key.

The [USMAAG or] MILGROUP Commander is the CINC's representative on the country team. ... The MILGROUP is not the lead agency on the country team ... [but] DOD support to State, DEA, and increasingly AID, is essential to their success.<sup>375</sup>

To coordinate requests for support, the USMAAG will identify and submit "requirements/training opportunities" to the SOUTHCOM J3 and SOUTHCOM Engineer (SCEN). The J3 and SCEN screen and send projects to the USARSO Exercise Support Group which coordinates active unit support. The SCEN also sends information copies to USARSO Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineering and to the FORSCOM Engineer. If a project is accepted, the lead-time for getting forces in country is normally two years from project recommendation.

These are key aspects: lead-time and project identification. The best way to handle long lead-times is to state their existence up front to those on the Country

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<sup>374</sup> See generally Appendix A, FM 100-20, and especially, A-8 and A-9.

<sup>375</sup> A Primer: 1-2 to 1-3.

Team and in the GOP. This way, all parties can plan for them. Ambassadors and their staffs are more likely to be enthusiastic about and supportive of work done during their "watch" than they will be about work which is planned by their staffs for accomplishment by others. A mix of long lead time and short range efforts will bring results as other efforts are planned and resourced.

The best way to handle "project identification" is to employ a mechanism within the Country Team which selects projects that cross agency lines and which serve bilateral interests. In this manner, various agencies and both governments participate in the projects (providing expertise, resources, coordination) and they share in the successes. Equally, problems are more effectively resolved with broader participation.

Within his inherent authority as a unified commander, CINCSOUTH has capabilities which may be applied in Perú within specific legal or administrative limitations. In peacetime, CINCSOUTH will always, practically speaking, use his MEA capabilities to promote mutual interests he shares with the Country Team. Thus, barring exigency, the CINC will synchronize his contributions to NA and SA by integrating his efforts into the overall Perú Country Plan.

MEA is coordinated principally within the USMAAG at the direction of the US Ambassador to Perú. As mentioned, the USMAAG should integrate this work with the efforts of

other members of the Country Team. "The opportunity for [DOD] support requires a willing host nation, a solid assessment by the country team, and approval from the Ambassador."<sup>376</sup>

As for a willing host nation, Perú seems positively inclined to MEA. It has embraced the notion of well-equipped engineer units helping the people, especially in remote areas. The May 1991 agreement indicates Perú's acceptance of some military participation in CD efforts in near-inaccessible areas. Perú has organized engineer battalions to perform this work and has identified specific engineer equipment which it needs. Perú also recognizes from past experience that MEA can bring results.

Demonstrated earlier, Perú is receptive to help but not without negotiation of terms: the strings attached.<sup>377</sup> These negotiations are between both governments, with international scrutiny and influence. The importance of US interests in Perú suggests that both nations will continue efforts to work for mutually acceptable solutions.

As to the "solid assessment" and "approval from the US Ambassador," one may look to the structure of the Country Team and work of the USMAAG-Lima, and, to the statements and

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<sup>376</sup> A Primer: 1-6.

<sup>377</sup> At the February 1992 Drug Summit in San Antonio, for example, Fujimori refused to agree to quotas, even though Congressional language preconditions some assistance on meeting numerical drug targets. "Peru could be hindrance to effective drug summit," *Kansas City Star*, 27 February 1992: A3.

agreements signed by the US Ambassador. The USMAAG has made significant headway in planning for MEA.<sup>378</sup> Conversely, the Ambassador notes that help to Perú's military and MEA are generally and presently of low import from his vantage point.<sup>379</sup> Part of this divergence may be priorities and the perception of the capabilities and consequences MEA offers. Hence, while the bilateral agreement embodies MEA in principle, Ambassador Quainton sees only a limited role for traditional MEA in the near-future, and, his stated views predated critical events in April 1992.<sup>380</sup>

The Ambassador likely sees military forms of security assistance as mainly intended to facilitate CD operations. Partly, this is because there are no recent MEA successes upon which he might reasonably expect "development" or non-lethal MEA results through military channels. Country Team members are generally uninformed about the different forms of MEA and program capabilities. Perú's only historical successes from MEA resulted under the PAM, decades ago. For

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<sup>378</sup> Ground Plan: 2, "A SHIFT FROM THE OLD GROUND PLAN BASED ON FMFP FOR INFANTRY BATTALIONS AND LETHAL AID AND A MOVE TO CONCENTRATE DIRECTLY ON NATION DEVELOPMENT is seen to be such a program ... leading to the creation of APOYA CIVICA (CIVIC ASSISTANCE) Units ... ADDITIONALLY, ENGINEER BATTALIONS HAVE REPLACED INFANTRY BATTALIONS IN THE LONG RANGE PLANS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF THE UHVS COCA PRODUCTION ..." (Uppercase in original).

<sup>379</sup> Letter to author. The letter predated the autogolpe and would likely be written more forcefully now.

<sup>380</sup> Besides the autogolpe, problems have arisen as a result of Perú's air force engaging a C-130 which strayed off course on a CD surveillance mission on 24 April and reportedly failed to respond to Peruvian warnings. One US serviceman died and others were wounded. "Peruvian jet fires at American plane," *Kansas City Star*, 25 April 1992: A1.

most members of the US Country Team, the work done by those Peruvian engineer units is not well known. In addition, beyond that assistance, US MEA capabilities have not produced a single significant project in Perú.<sup>31</sup> Instead, the Ambassador looks principally to USAID for development initiatives.

The USMAAG, in some cases, has failed to educate Country Team members of MEA capabilities and considerations (including lead times, costs, etc.) In fact, Ambassador Quainton recently noted that the *Fuertes Caminos* deployments "were exercises of which I have never heard."<sup>32</sup> MEA's under-utilization has resulted, in combination, from DOD's failure to complete MEA projects tied to work done by other agencies, and, the general failure by the USMAAG to educate other Country Team members and HN officials of the various MEA programs available.

Principally, the USMAAG has coordinated FMFP sales and training assistance. US officials have employed military programs to provide "lethal" assistance in the form of both military training and equipment. In addition, military contacts, IMET and other forms of assistance have provided some non-lethal military aid. The recent trend shows a switch to more non-lethal aid including MEA.

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<sup>31</sup> Recent CD site construction might be considered a success, but not in the sense that it promotes development, drug alternatives or stability.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*

This MEA planning and execution responsibility for DOD-related efforts in Perú lies with the USMAAG. Its six-member military staff will likely do without an engineer. Engineering planning support is provided, generally, through the periodic visits and "plan reviews" conducted by USSOUTHCOM personnel and other supporting agencies. Regardless of who does the planning, MEA will likely be phased. In its report to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, the Regional Conflict Working Group said:

How U.S. military engineers might be used in a given country would, of course, be dependent on both U.S. strategy for the region and the needs and desires of the host country. The United States Country Team preferably would plan military engineers commitments in two phases as part of a long-range national plan developed with the host nation. The first phase would be to help provide a security shield to allow the government breathing space and to implant or revive democracy in conflicted areas. The second phase would be to develop self-sufficiency. Engineer contributions for either phase could be tailored, ranging from the actual use of U.S. military engineers, to providing training, or furnishing technical and engineering management assistance.<sup>33</sup>

It then identified phase one tasks including "developing [an HN] ... engineer force structure ... to conduct civic action and other nation building tasks" and it mentioned FMFP "sales" of engineer equipment and construction of military facilities and infrastructure.<sup>34</sup> In phase two, developing self-sufficiency, the study concluded that effective MEA:

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<sup>33</sup> From the report *Supporting U.S. Strategy for Third World Conflict*, in C4000 Advance Book, USACGSOC, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1991: 211.

<sup>34</sup> *Id.*

centers on technical assistance for nation building. This can include both joint-venture funding of projects using U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) money, Economic Support Funds, and security assistance, together with host country funds to procure needed engineer materiel, construction equipment, and repair parts.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to SA support, CINCSOUTH can employ in-theater or assigned resources, within certain limits to advance US security interests. Such activities must, of necessity, be integrated into the overall country plan to promote unity of effort, eliminate redundancy, and avoid discord in planning and execution. Examples of these activities include SMEEs, combined exercises, conferences. DFTs, ODTs, and familiarization visits. Either to coordinate work or to complete projects, CINCSOUTH can assist the Country Team significantly.

Further, within the planning process, there should be an adequate mechanism to include HN representatives. Non-binding meetings could occur, or, information briefings and exchanges could take place to synchronize efforts. The simplest mechanism would likely be a regularly scheduled In-Progress Review headed up by the Chief, Army Section with participation by USAID, HN representatives, and others as desired. USACE Districts routinely hold these meetings to discuss plans, construction, problems, and items of concern. They serve a useful function for both the "doer" and the "customer," and they are especially useful for integrating

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<sup>35</sup> *Id.*

components into an overall strategy. In this manner, projects become consistently better-linked. They get regular scrutiny and problems can be resolved in a timely manner. Success in an IPR approach hinges on a commitment to group effort and broad participation. While nothing assures flawless coordination, such an approach has a proven track record in construction and project management.<sup>306</sup>

Introduced earlier, the notions of feasibility, suitability and acceptability should factor in project selection and identification. Feasibility, despite demand for resources, seems clear for several MEA options. Suitability exists especially where private funded or unfunded alternatives are lacking and the work promotes national (Peruvian and/or US) interests. Acceptability depends on coordination within overall efforts in the country -- especially with local and regional governments.

Effective MEA can provide the necessary conditions for development and stability. Improved infrastructure, conditions for real economic alternatives, strengthened democratic institutions, successful technology transfer, resulting confidence and stability: these can result from properly integrated MEA. Hence, MEA can also exhibit a further characteristic -- desirability.

If MEA can be provided at reasonable cost, one might

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<sup>306</sup> The Country Team has routine meetings which might serve the purpose of in-house coordination, but the notion here is an expanded forum which involves host nation representatives.



consider MEA's potential benefits against its perceived risks before "turning off" assistance. Low cost of implementation will enhance political acceptability. The narrow question remains as to whether MEA can be integrated into an overall strategy to advance important US national security interests. Put simply, how should the US Country Team integrate MEA to realize its potential?

USSOUTHCOM has undertaken an initiative to better-educate Country Team members of military support and MEA programs. Called the Theater Training Opportunity Group, or TTOG,<sup>387</sup> a USSOUTHCOM team travels to each country in its AOR and spends a week reviewing the Country Plan, meeting with the Country Team, and mapping the five-year assistance program.<sup>388</sup> This coordinated review and on-site planning will foment a comprehensive approach to MEA integration.

Whether the Country Team uses this method or another mechanism like the IPR process, some points are important. The mechanism should provide a periodic review of the status of the various programs over time. It should provide feedback on prior efforts (problems, successes, failures, lessons learned). It should be used to solicit ways to incorporate these into future efforts. It should ensure that projects serve cross-agency purposes, where possible.

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<sup>387</sup> Telephone interview with Major McDill, USSOUTHCOM J3 (CA).

<sup>388</sup> The team travelled to Perú in April 1992. Telephonic interview, LTC Mike Ritchie, 20 April 1992.

It should elicit and promote participation by Country Team agencies, HN agencies, international relief organizations, private sector parties, and others as appropriate.

## **SECTION 4: Removing the Barriers to Success**

Obstacles to success exist in four major areas: legislative, political, organizational and environmental. Some barriers serve as a check-and-balance mechanism, but often at the expense of efficiency and effectiveness. Barriers, by type, receive cursory analysis below with a brief suggestion for possible remedies.

**Legislative barriers include, most significantly:**

**1. Single-year appropriations<sup>389</sup>**

Congress, by providing multi-year funding, especially for third-world or developing nations where the US has important or vital interests, could help advance US strategic security interests. Multi-year appropriations allow and provide for consistency and flexibility, "the *sine qua non* for integrated strategy."<sup>390</sup> Multi-year funding for some forms of nation assistance and security assistance would likely pass Constitutional muster despite the language of Article I, Section 8, "The Congress shall have Power ... To raise

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<sup>389</sup> Paul F. Gorman et. al., *Association of the United States Army, Institute of Land Warfare, "Reforging the Instrument: A Plan of Action And Leadership for Integrated Long-Term Strategy, in Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a Policy Instrument in the Third World* (Arlington, VA, May 1988): 29-59.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." More likely, such NA and SA falls within the Article I, Section 8 Congressional power to "provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." Congressional action and treaty agreements would create a strong basis for constitutionality. Regardless, Congress could provide for multi-year authorizations as a step in the right direction.

2. "Earmarking" SA funds and "lumping" countries

The present system of SA funding provides for a few "haves" and many "have nots." By grouping countries together and then ear-marking large portions of funds, NSS suffers because important interests are not given their due. Funds should not be earmarked and countries should not be lumped unless the intent is to achieve consistent, balanced, and prudent assistance which advances a range of US security interests. In this manner, SA and NA programs could be administered more consistently and without the ebb and flow of funding.

3. Structure, organization and funding of the SAO

As explained earlier, the six-person USMAAG staff will likely not include an engineer. As with most SAOs, staff members spend valuable time on peripheral functions (escorting, coordinating joint/combined operations, VIP visits) when their intended function is to work with host-nation officials to advance US interests through SA. The

USMAAG should redouble its effort to coordinate SA and NA with the host country, though it appears this has improved. It should look at new and innovative ways to expand HN participation. Funded by an FMS surcharge, the SAO is subject to two variables: overall budget forces and SA appropriations or "sales." The SAO in Perú should include a full-time engineer. Important US security interests in Perú and the complexities of properly planning, integrating and coordinating MEA there make this a wise decision worthy of waiver to the six-person limit, FIDAF augmentation, interagency agreement with USACE, or civilian hire.

Political barriers include, most significantly:

1. Human rights and concerns

Perú's record on human rights drains support in Congress for appropriations needed to honor agreements. If the US Country Team concludes that Fujimori and his administration are not making progress in reducing government sponsored human rights abuses, then sanctions are in order. But, those sanctions should not necessarily imperil all of the progress Fujimori has made; rather, they should be imposed gradually -- commensurate with US dissatisfaction.

Sanctions should allow for Perú's sovereignty (flawed as it has been for some time); Draconian international measures will further exacerbate a near-hopeless situation in Perú.

2. Counterdrug performance

Some US officials question Perú's sincerity and commitment

to the CD effort. Efforts underway in support of the 14 May 1991 agreement are now at risk. Negotiations which produced that agreement surmounted significant and previously insurmountable hurdles. Now the USG must either make headway (including progress toward legally mandated quantified targets) or the US should eliminate or waive onerous and unproductive prerequisites upon which some assistance is conditioned. In addition, the US might seriously consider a comprehensive test case to demonstrate the success or failure of a program which focuses on principally on development and economic alternatives.

3. Democracy in Perú and Fujimori's extra-legal actions

Fujimori's dissolution of the Congress and his suspension of Perú's Constitution raise concerns that democratic reform has given way to authoritarian rule. His extra-legal actions spurred Senator Kennedy to introduce the Democracy in Perú Act of 1992; almost all US aid except humanitarian aid has been terminated. The US Country Team must fully assess whether Fujimori's actions threaten a functioning, responsive democracy or whether they reflect the popular will of the Peruvian people. Blocking foreign aid imperils progress which Fujimori seems to have made; the US must consider the long-term ramifications of Fujimori's failure.

4. Tensions between domestic and foreign programs

Beyond isolationist and trade protectionist pressures, there is an additional subtle feeling that charity should start at

home. Where the US identifies important or vital US security interests, the US should 1) develop a requisite national strategy and 2) put into place the needed national policies, programs, and commitments to achieve that strategy. This thesis concludes that engagement, including MEA, is in the best interests of the US. The message which should be communicated is that while charity starts at home, US security, in large measure, starts abroad.

#### 5. Election-year politicking

Politicians and citizenry raise the "America First" banner which touts self-advancement through disengagement but which promises likely US decline. Where US security is at issue, the Executive must aggressively communicate the "engagement" message to the American public. Leaders must reinforce awareness that America's greatness came from a policy of economic and political engagement.

#### 6. Agency coordination and interests

This barrier has at least four aspects to it.

*First*, different agencies likely have different agendas and motives may be suspect. Some perceive the "new" interest in nation assistance and security assistance a feint by DOD to avoid force reductions. DOD should demonstrate that these missions will not "create" new manpower billets nor will they substantiate the retention of personnel which would otherwise have been lost through force reductions. The people doing these jobs count against an

overall Congressionally authorized manpower ceiling; if the position is worthwhile, it will be staffed.

*Second* is the color of money. Cost-sharing becomes an issue on certain projects. Some projects have very specific funding caps. Whether the funds are "Title 10" or "Title 22" money also relates to which Congressional committee (DOD/Armed Services or Foreign Affairs) is involved. USAID, in some cases, would rather hire a private contractor than another federal agency (USACE or, possibly, DOD). From this morass of parochialism, a single important notion emerges. Irrespective of funding source and limitation, agencies can more effectively spend their money if they find mutually acceptable projects.

*Third*, the Corps and USAID have no umbrella inter-agency agreement. Still, Corps-AID agreements exist in other countries (like Bolivia and Costa Rica); these are negotiated on a case-by-case basis. This approach likely results in some inefficiency. The Chief of Engineers should continue efforts with the Director of USAID to reach an inter-agency agreement.

*Fourth*, getting all members of the Country Team together to decide on and implement a common strategy proves difficult. The US Code says the Ambassador calls the shots, but Country Team members report to and receive support from distinct channels. By educating other Country Team members on the gamut of DOD programs available and by working to

find areas where common effort may be desirable, substantial progress can be made toward promoting *de facto* inter-agency cooperation.

**Organizational barriers include, most significantly:**

1. The absence of dedicated engineering staff in the SAO  
Mentioned above as part legislative barrier, it is also part organizational barrier. As indicated, USSOUTHCOM could provide a FIDAF engineer or the USMAAG-Lima might make the commitment to substituting an engineer for one of the other SAO positions (likely a senior Army engineer NCO for one of the enlisted billets). Several means exist to remedy this situation.
2. A diminished in-house engineering capability in USAID  
USAID-Lima has limited in-house engineering expertise. Such experience, which disappeared long ago, is requisite to sound project selection, planning, integration, execution and turn-over. USAID-Lima should consider those areas where USACE might provide technical skills or design/construction services. USAID-Lima, minimally, might request a USACE orientation briefing through the SOUTHCOM Engineer (SCEN), or, it might request that a USACE representative accompany the TTOG on some scheduled visit.
3. A complex web of programs and procedures  
These are not easily explained and they are not widely understood by decision-makers. Army engineers use one set of procedures for USACE construction planning and execution,



and another for USSOUTHCOM tactical unit construction. There are so many possible sources of MEA, SA and NA that integration is difficult. Efforts to educate those charged with employing these programs must continue. A full-time resident "expert," engineer or non-engineer, should be readily available in the USMAAG-Lima and to the other members of the US Country Team. Properly, done, this is full-time work.

#### 4. Immature Army Doctrine

Whereas military leadership has begun to address an emerging post-Cold War role for the Army specifically and for DOD generally, Army doctrine has still not adequately addressed related operations and capabilities. First, the Army's main mission is to "deter and if deterrence fails, to fight and win on favorable terms." Second, military deterrence encompasses activities which: 1) counsel against enemy aggression through US strength, or, 2) diffuse the conditions leading to insurgency and instability (mostly, in Perú, these stem from nefarious drug-trafficking activities and political violence). Especially in this part of the deterrence role, MEA should factor significantly as part of a comprehensive strategy.<sup>391</sup> Army doctrine has inadequately provided for or thought through this role. These are not

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<sup>391</sup> On 23 April 1992, General (ret) Maxwell Thurman, former CINCSOUTH, said that the ongoing revision of the Army's keystone manual for doctrine, FM 100-5 Operations, should more effectively encompass this role. Bradley Lecture series, *Leadership - A Look to the Future of the Army*, Fort Leavenworth, KS, USACGSC.

conventional contingency operations, but rather, something much more subtle and requiring careful integration with overall US strategy implemented by the US Country Team.

**Environmental barriers include, most significantly:<sup>392</sup>**

**1. Drugs and Related Violence and Corruption**

Projects must be judiciously selected and carefully integrated to maximize the positive effects and reduce the threat of failure. Efforts to limit corruption and influence peddling are imperative. Given the low salaries of Peruvian government personnel and the predominant minimum wage, graft and influence-peddling pose great hazards. General Huamán's rejoinder, "DON'T SEND MONEY!" carries special significance. The tools are needed to create conditions for success. Money alone will not solve the problems.

Relief for the average Peruvian really means a reasonable economic alternative and some hope for security and protection. The current cross-fire between insurgents, traffickers, and security forces suggests that development will not come without security: the US must continue to help train and equip Perú's security forces. The US should press for improved salaries for security forces regardless of the official minimum wage. This would likely make a difference by reducing the temptation or "need" to engage in graft and corruption. On all fronts, US efforts should

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<sup>392</sup> A Primer: 1-3.

reduce the incentive and need for corruption while simultaneously assisting in training and equipping security forces engaged in CD activities.

## 2. Governmental Debt

Debt-for-nature and debt-for-drugs are methods to increase Peruvian activities in areas consistent with US interests. Still, Fujimori has demonstrated a desire to pay interest on the debt and has set the goal of restoring Perú to its place in the world financial community. The US can assist Fujimori's efforts by helping provide the infrastructure and assistance which will contribute to stability, development, and growth and thereby enable Perú to achieve that goal. Joint efforts in debt forgiveness, debt negotiation, and debt repayment all merit attention.

## 3. Lack of Markets

The US is a substantial Peruvian trading partner (both raw materials and finished goods). Perú's agricultural industry is suffering from the cholera epidemic.<sup>393</sup> Terrorist caused

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<sup>393</sup> See, *The Economist Intelligence Unit - Perú, Bolivia: Country Report No 2, 1991* (London: Business International Limited, July 1991): 11, "Experts believe that \$700 mn. or almost one-fifth of total exports, could be lost this year as a result of the [cholera] epidemic." See also, A. David Brandling-Bennett, "Return of a Great Plague: Cholera Rediscovered the Americas", North South, The Magazine of the Americas vol. 1, no. 4 (December 1991- January 1992): 24-27. There were "238,000 [cholera] cases and 2,300 deaths by the end of July [1991]." It "is the deterioration in ... infrastructure that has permitted the introduction and spread of cholera, only correction of existing deficiencies will eliminate the disease and prevent its reintroduction. Water systems need to be restored and [expanded] ... Sanitation systems need to be put into place ... All of this will cost a large amount of money ... Perú has probably spent more money dealing with the cholera epidemic ... than it would have cost to have implemented all those measures within the country during the past 10 years."

power outages, security considerations, faulty or non-existent infrastructure, corruption, and onerous government regulations (which are now being dismantled by Fujimori) have all combined to hinder expansion of the Peruvian economy by raising transaction costs.

#### 4. Ethnic Conflicts or Mistrust

After almost two centuries since gaining independence, the government (typically non-Indian) has never provided adequately for the poor majority. Racism is, in many sectors of Peruvian society, palpable. *Quechua*, language of the *Incas*, has only recently regained favor in Cuzco -- it was long considered the tongue of the underclass. Still, the word *cholo*, which refers to the typically poor highlander, is used mainly in the pejorative sense. Only economic empowerment (which will lead, over time, to political empowerment) is likely to change this.

#### 5. Natural disasters

Perú has suffered from notable natural disasters since the 1980: *El Niño* brought devastating rains in 1983 which caused over \$1 billion in damages.<sup>394</sup> Drought devastated agricultural areas in Puno, Piura, and elsewhere in the country.<sup>395</sup> Earthquakes and tremors have taken their toll. In a fragile economy with tenuous roots, these calamities

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<sup>394</sup> Raul P. Saba, Political Development and Crisis in Peru: Continuity in Change and Crisis (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 71.

<sup>395</sup> *Daily Journal*.

have significantly hurt an already severely impoverished Perú.

#### 6. Deteriorating Human Environment

Demographics and census figures may be inaccurate, but even casual observation reveals that Perú is increasingly urban, crowded, and impoverished. Existing infrastructure is wholly inadequate to support the urban swell. Cholera spread like fire in 1991 and health care was unavailable for huge numbers of Peruvians. Strikes, unemployment (or underemployment), and terror increasingly confront the average resident of Lima. The toll over time is immeasurable. Relief must address fundamental privation for democracy to succeed: government must respond to the needs of the people or it will not likely be perceived as legitimate.

#### 7. Ineffective Public/Private Institutions

With rare exception, health care, police, and educational systems do not serve the average Peruvian. Institutions have been unresponsive and reforms have been hindered by corruption and Perú's layered bureaucracy. Developed nations can provide technical assistance, but Peruvian governmental reform is needed to remove the impediments. The *Fujigolpe*<sup>30</sup> on 5 April 1992 stemmed, in large part, from Fujimori's intention to speed such reforms.

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<sup>30</sup> This term was reported by *Univisión* on 14 April 1992 to be a popular term among Peruvians for Fujimori's self-coup; some call it a *golpe blanco*.

## SECTION 5: What Should be Changed and How

The Country Team must transition to focusing on assisting the host nation develop an institutional infrastructure which can sustain programs and progress. This necessitates ever-increasing participation of Peruvians.<sup>397</sup> Within the USMAAG, evidence shows the beginnings of such a transition. Simply put, the focus of assistance efforts should emphasize Peruvian capabilities to expand and continue the successes initiated by US assistance in combined efforts.

The USMAAG can better integrate projects with HN efforts and with those of other agencies (mainly USAID) and the USMAAG can push for HN participation as a priority in all aspects of planning (project survey, planning, design, construction, operation, maintenance) and integration. Simply put, the USMAAG should know, as a minimum, Peruvian priorities, USAID priorities, and the programs and planned efforts of these other groups.

The MEA community must better educate other members of the US Country Team of available MEA support and how it might be integrated into complementary efforts by those Country Team members. The Ambassador should emphasize the

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<sup>397</sup> *A Primer*: The primer stresses an "institution building" versus "project" approach to nation assistance: that host nation organizations and capabilities will have been strengthened and that they will have developed the ability to operate and maintain completed projects as a part of the process: 2-4.

TTOG and alternative mechanisms to familiarize agency members on sister agency of HN programs. And, the Ambassador or his Deputy should be out-briefed following the week-long TTOG effort. This out-brief should include a review of the five-year (or long-term) plan for employing military assistance. Similarly, USAID should familiarize military planners on its efforts and seek ways in which USMAAG and USSOUTHCOM efforts can assist in achieving mutual goals.

The USMAAG-Lima needs a mechanism to review all SA, NA, and especially MEA programs jointly with other agency representatives and HN personnel. Whereas the TTOG is intended to be an educational and planning tool, the tool envisioned herein is one to manage MEA effectively and efficiently. An IPR-type forum would suffice. It should be regularly convened (quarterly) and it should yield produce some common understanding of: 1) what has been done since the last review, 2) problems encountered in the recent period, 3) successes achieved, 4) planned activities during the upcoming period, 5) desired activities and resource identification for activities coming within the two-year planning horizon, 6) some periodic review of past projects (maintenance status, long-term utility, benefits and costs, attitudes, etc.).

The Country Team should have full-time engineering staff support. The MAAG might request a FIDAF augmentee, or

work out an MOA with USACE to pay for these services as a part of its ESF program. The job is full-time and promises great return; this should be a high priority. Minimally, such an initiative merits strong consideration, if only on a trial basis. Within the six-person military cap, the SAO needs a Chief USMAAG; Chiefs for the Army, Air Force, and Navy sections; an administrative non-commissioned officer (NCO); and an engineer NCO or officer.

The USMAAG should maintain more-than-regular contact with HN agencies. This appears to have improved but it still appears that there is no clear understanding of what is most important to the HN. USG and GOP plans should be wholly complementary, with rare exception. US planners should know what programs and projects are of priority interest to the HN and what capabilities the HN can provide as a means of: 1) developing a stake in the outcome, and 2) diminishing the cost to the US or enhancing the benefits of US efforts. The IPR initiative suggested above might provide a basis for improving US-HN ties and cooperation.

The Department of Defense and the US Army can ensure that MEA, NA and SA roles receive close scrutiny. Fundamental to these roles is institutional acceptance of a doctrinal non-lethal, deterrence role. The mission is "deter, and if deterrence fails, fight and win on favorable terms." In addition to the "stick" that discourages aggression, deterrence includes diffusing conditions which



lead to conflict. The distinction between these roles in conventional contingency operations and during routine peacetime cooperation is important. Fundamental Army doctrine must more effectively address this non-contingency operations role.

Consistent with the President's NSS, State Department and DOD executive leadership should address difficult interagency and inter-departmental issues: do the agencies (mainly USAID-USACE and DOD-DOS) need umbrella agreements; how can interagency cooperation be enhanced; who will take the lead in resolving barriers identified; and, how can the US promote multi-agency efforts that benefit both countries? Until leadership within the Executive branch resolves these fundamental issues which define roles and responsibilities, confusion and inefficiency will continue.

## **SECTION 6: The Expected Consequences**

The transition to SA and NA which emphasizes MEA will go a long way in attacking the causes of Perú's problems. By integrating Peruvians in the process, by working with HN counterparts in the planning and execution of MEA, and by employing MEA in an integrated fashion with other members of the US Country Team, the USMAAG-Lima and CINCSOUTH can effectively contribute to the US and Peruvian national interests. Valuable skills will be transferred and these can form the basis for institutional strength and democratic

stability. The resulting efforts and capabilities will have far-reaching consequences in alleviating privation, in promoting individual and collective prosperity, and in achieving a lasting peace.

Many of the barriers identified above will persist and they will diminish the effectiveness of efforts in Perú. Others may further analyze these barriers (and those which may have been overlooked) in order to recommend other actions which may increase the effectiveness of SA and NA. Continued pressure could bring some of these barriers down.

Though Perú is at a crossroads as this manuscript is published, one might expect that the GOP will shortly find a way to "restore democracy." Regardless, US planners must consider continued US security interests in developing and implementing programs which promote those interests. Under almost any reasoned analysis, disengagement seems to be ill-advised although that action has some Congressional and public support. More likely, only an integrated and comprehensive program of assistance will allow the USMAAG-Lima and CINCSOUTH to fulfill their obligations to the US Ambassador and to promote the security needs of the US. In sum, stability in Perú does not mean the status quo.

# CHAPTER V

## FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Findings:

Opinions differ on the degree and extent of US strategic interest in Perú but the President makes it clear that important US interests are presently at stake there. US strategy to date has failed to advance significantly either US CD objectives or the mutual goal of a stable Peruvian democracy with a vibrant economy. The May 1991 US-Perú bilateral agreement recognizes the failure of past CD policy and allows for alternative development and MEA as part of the necessary solution. Still, the current state of affairs under Fujimori's extra-legal government threatens the near-term use of MEA in its many forms.

The US, especially the US Department of Defense, has employed MEA as part of its efforts in operations short of war -- as part of security and nation assistance. MEA finds support in bilateral agreements, in doctrine, and among most analysts; its appropriateness is established as follows:

- 1) the US has important national security interests in Perú;

2) the US uses its elements of national power to protect and promote those interests;

3) one of those elements of national power, the US military, has the mission "deter conflict and, where deterrence fails, fight and win on terms favorable to the US and its allies;"

4) deterrence involves discouraging military aggression hostile to US interests and it involves diffusing conditions which lead to conflict;

5) among the conditions which lead to conflict are privation, instability, insurgency, and a range of other factors which weave a complex web generally characterized by the combined absence of security and development;

6) US MEA can play a substantial role, especially with other efforts, to promote simultaneously security and development; and,

7) US MEA capabilities should be effectively integrated towards this end.

There are no inter-departmental agreements between DOS and DOD for integrating military and non-military efforts. Furthermore, there are no "umbrella" agreements between DA or USACE and other executive agencies to provide the framework for coordinating and integrating MEA capabilities with the capabilities of other government agencies. Such agreements would be particularly useful in countries best-characterized as lacking both development and security.

There are inadequate long-range or comprehensive MEA planning and execution mechanisms in effect in Perú to serve properly US national security interests there. As recently as 1991, the engineer annex to the Country Plan had no project-specific information.

The USMAAG-Lima has begun to correct this -- the current USMAAG leadership has made notable progress toward developing a coherent, complete plan. However, planning still has not adequately involved the Peruvians. Further, while USAID-Lima has shown a willingness to discuss MEA efforts, work between AID and DOD on the Country Team has not been well-integrated. MEA has been in the periphery in a country where the US has important national interests. Thus, the absence of development and security suggest that MEA, in its milieu forms, could and should play a significant role in advancing those US interests.

#### Conclusions:

The US has important, but non-vital national security interests in Perú. US National Military Strategy encourages military efforts that advance those interests but the 1992 NMS does not spell out a coherent military strategy for advancing them -- the military role in deterrence is incompletely addressed. Nevertheless, the USMAAG currently views MEA as a valuable and under-utilized set of programs to advance significantly important US national security interests.

This thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the US interests and objectives in Perú, of the circumstances which exist there, and of the available MEA programs in light of US NSS and NMS. Its approach may prove helpful to others who review the topic later. As the situation in Perú is presently one of near-daily change, this analytical framework should prove useful.

The US should provide technical engineering expertise, it should encourage more and not fewer exchanges, it should use all available training vehicles including IMET, technical assistance teams, DFTs, ODTs, MTTs, combined exercises; the US should plan nation assistance construction exercises; the US should continue to emphasize MEA and to integrate it into the overall Country Plan. For this purpose, the US should make an engineer available as part of the SAO in Perú, if desired by the US mission.

The over-arching tenets US military engineering assistance should be: institutional skill transfer; inter-agency cooperation and coordination; and, integration with HN efforts and resources to ensure the HN has a stake in the outcome. MEA should be applied especially where security and development are absent.

The US still needs a comprehensive means of reviewing and coordinating the available forms of MEA -- I have proposed one means to do this, namely the IPR. USSOUTHCOM has implemented both the TTOG and the Civil Affairs

Infrastructure Development Project Data Base. The first of these will improve planning and education of Country Team members on DOD capabilities. The second offers some means of evaluating "success" and "failure" and its use should be incorporated into overall MEA management. They offer valuable potential and merit continued development.

Recommendations:

The USMAAG-Lima should request an exception permitting it to maintain a full-time US Army Corps of Engineers officer or experienced non-commissioned officer on the SAO staff. Alternately, the USMAAG should investigate the possibility of 1) coordinating an agreement between USACE and USAID-Lima to program ESF monies to pay for a USACE resident engineer office in Perú, or 2) using foreign military construction sales grant money to pay for this assistance. As an alternative, the US Country Team should request and USSOUTHCOM should favorably consider a request to provide a trained, experienced engineer (officer, NCO or DA civilian<sup>38</sup>) as a FIDAF augmentee.

USSOUTHCOM should continue to pursue the TTOG concept and to develop the Civil Affairs Infrastructure Development Project Data Base. This data base should include some

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<sup>38</sup> Army policy concerning similar directed assignments of DA civilians to Southwest Asia (a hazard duty/hostile fire area, during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm) suggests that DA Civilian could be directed to relocate to Perú. See, Message from Department of the Army (DAPE-CPP/DAMO-OD-AOC), Subject: Desert Shield Policy Message No. 38 - Guidelines for Assignment, Utilization and Protection of Army Civilians in Southwest Asia, 042200Z Jan 91.

analysis of individual project integration into multi-agency and long-range planning. Technical and attitudinal assessments should occur about six months before and one, two, and five years after project completion. This effort could prove invaluable in clarifying how to plan and execute MEA effectively. It should also help the US avoid failure.

USSOUTHCOM should continue to increase emphasis on MEA mechanisms as this provides great potential for empowering key institutions with the efficacy to accomplish fundamental change. "Building a solution" to economic problems is important economically and politically; these programs imbue the government and military as legitimately meeting the needs of the people. Thus, MEA has a significant role in establishing a tolerable peace and responsive institutions.

The USMAAG-Lima should establish some periodic review mechanism to assess and prioritize Peruvian MEA programs and commitments within Perú consistent with the US Country Plan. Regular IPRs provide for these periodic assessments of specific projects, of changing conditions, and of MEA utilization, integration, and coordination. Where possible, this review mechanism should involve GOP representatives, both military and civilian. Other Country Team agencies should be invited to participate as well. If this is done, it will be critical that all participants conclude: 1) that they can effectively participate in "the process," and 2) that said participation could lead to more effective



integration of multi-agency and HN programs. Besides being mandated by law, integrating and coordinating efforts makes plain good sense.

The Country Team should promote US capabilities actively and not await requests for support or assistance. Low cost methods should be fully exploited: EDA should be expanded. The US should encourage Peruvian participation in the planning and execution of MEA, except where US security considerations warrant their exclusion. In Perú, such an exception should be a rare.

IMET and other training (DFTs, ODTs, MTTs) should take place in Perú where capabilities produced by said training will occur, except where law or prudence requires otherwise. The US Ambassador and his Regional Security Officer, with HN security advice, can best determine where trainers might go and when they might do so. MEA complementary training should also emphasize: human rights; MEA program familiarization; MEA request and coordination; and, training for civilian leaders who control or administer security forces or who manage technical (non-combat) military engineering activities and resources.

Given the present conditions in Perú (extensive privation, widespread corruption, violence), US MEA should focus near-term on equipping Peruvian units (both National

Development Battalions and Civic Assistance Battalions).<sup>399</sup> Equipment priority should go first to road construction, then to well-drilling equipment, then to facilities construction. The US should help equip Peruvian units -- those units should do most of the work, especially where underdevelopment is paired with low security. The US should ease disposition documentation requirements once equipment has passed its normal utilization expectancy in miles or hours of use. This will help the US avoid "equipment parks" of unrepairable and non-functioning US-origin hardware. The long-term, simultaneous focus of MEA should be institutional skill transfer, development, and security.

The US Ambassador should investigate USAID-Lima's ability to measure AID project effectiveness. An analysis by USAID-Lima like that sought through the Civil Affairs Infrastructure Development Project Data Base could lead to more effective project planning and execution as part of the Perú Country Plan. As a spin-off, such analyses are likely to encourage the interagency coordination mandated by law, and, as well, HN participation.

The US should provide, as part of its security assistance, USACE standard facilities designs and Theater of Operation design plans for lodgement facilities, medical facilities, training facilities, communications facilities,

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<sup>399</sup> These may have become the same organization, according to Comandante Celso Salazar, *Escuela de Guerra* (Peruvian War College), telephone conversation, 14 April 1992.

irrigation systems and similar subjects/designs. The SOEN and SCEN should coordinate this information sharing, especially where Spanish-language plans are available.

The Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Chief of Engineers; the Director, USAID; and, the US Secretary of State should consider the advisability of both inter-departmental and/or inter-agency umbrella agreements. These could link USAID and USACE work and executive agency efforts. At the highest levels such coordination can provide the structural framework and efficiency needed to energize multiple agencies toward greater teamwork. Alternately, USACE should offer USAID-Lima an orientation from time to time on USACE capabilities as part of the TTOG or some similar forum.

## Epilogue

Perú faces the formidable task of clawing its way out of an inward spiral of economic disintegration, political instability, violence, corruption, and drug trafficking. The challenge parallels an historical event recalled in the highlands of Perú.

Hernán Sánchez de Badajoz inspired his fellow Cusqueños with his heroism during the siege of Cuzco in 1536. Legend holds that, although pelted by a shower of stones that he deflected with his shield, Sánchez was able to scale a ladder and squeeze through a window into a tower

which rose above Cuzco. Once inside, he thwarted several defenders and then climbed a rope, despite a second cascade of stones, to hoist himself higher still. Here, at a point atop the tower, he directed and inspired his comrades to victory. His success then, true or mythical, serves as a reminder that inspired Peruvian leadership now can make the difference.

What US and Peruvians alike are now referring to as "enlightenment" -- namely, an effort to provide nation assistance, security assistance and, especially, military engineering assistance -- will illuminate the path by which Perú can grow as a stable, successful democracy.

*Essayons! - ¡déjanos intentarlo!*

## APPENDIX A: RESEARCH DESIGN & LITERATURE REVIEW

Research Design. I broke my research into three areas: original or first-hand sources; governmental publications; and, non-government, analytical works. The first group provides some insight from those who are now or who have been there - especially people who have worked in some related area to the problem or who have spent a considerable period of time in the country. The benefit of first-hand information is obvious. I also try to view first-hand information in context of generally available information: does the observation confirm or refute widely accepted thought?

The second group reflects governmental information analysis, planning, and prioritization. Here I include information from governmental sources whether provided to me in a professional or personal capacity. My sources of government information were both US and Peruvian.

The third group often offers critical and often objective feedback on disconnects in US involvement. It is the most widely abundant source of information. I also consider "expert" accounts in light of my personal experiences and observations, or in view of the first-hand observations of others.

I performed most institutional research in or through the Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas. There, I used computerized and manual searches of:

- CARL Public Access Module
- Congressional Information Service
- Dissertation Abstracts
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service
- InfoTrac
- National Technical Information Service
- Public Access Information Service
- US Code Annotated

Literature Review: State of Existing Research and Gaps

Two trends appear in the literature. First, many authors do not fully assess whether US interests are at stake in Perú before passing judgment on how the US employs or should employ the military there. Second, writers usually fail to characterize these interests, even if they find them. Third, writers usually do not consider military engineering assistance in its milieu forms. Either they recommend less military aid and more economic assistance, or, if they recommend military help at all, they fail to specify its use in a comprehensive manner. One usually comes away holding a puzzle piece where the piece is of unknown relative importance and the puzzle of unknown complexity.

This thesis puts the many pieces together and identifies where problem areas exist. Where there are problems, the thesis roots out the causes and recommends solutions. The thesis' goal is to reduce uncertainty in MEA planning and execution in Perú through comprehensive analysis and by proposing mechanisms and changes for planning and employing MEA more effectively.

## **APPENDIX B: SELECTED EXCERPTS: GENERAL HUAMAN CENTENO INTERVIEW**

On 13 March 1992, with the help of a Peruvian friend, I was able to interview *General de Brigada* Adrián Huamán Centeno by telephone concerning his comments from 1984 and his feelings now, 8 years later. We spoke about his experiences as Commanding General of the Emergency Zone and difficult issues like: bringing Perú from the brink; corruption in government, including Perú's security forces; alleged human rights violations by the armed forces; and, most important to this thesis, MEA and its role in Perú. The following represents a translation of the important points covered by General Huamán during the interview. [Questions or clarifications by me are included in brackets.] One last introductory note: after Fujimori's autogolpe, I called General Huamán Centeno again (May 4, 1991) and asked him to comment on the changes since 13 March: he echoed that there is widespread popular support for Fujimori and what he is doing, and, Huamán Centeno said he felt that Fujimori would succeed. The following are his comments from 13 March 1992:

In Ayacucho, I want to tell you, the uneducated, illiterate peasants of the countryside, who don't understand policies or militarization or narco-trafficking, that during thirty years of subjugation, they have been taught and trained to rebel against the government.

But in order that these people rebel against the government there is, clearly, immorality in the government and of the authorities. Therefore, on the one hand, for these humble people, there has been the motive of "abuse" from the narco-communists, and then the government arrives and abuses them all over again. For that reason I said one need not shoot these people; with respect to these people, one needs to protect them.

You all [in the US] are interested greatly in human rights. I protested the declaration of a state of emergency, because, here in Perú, when [the government] declares a state of emergency, it means that if you live in the Emergency Zone, you no longer have liberty. You can be placed in pretrial confinement without a judicial warrant. [The authorities] can enter your house, break down the doors, accuse the occupants of being terrorists, and arrest them. One doesn't have the right to travel; or, your right of free travel is worthless - they detain you. People can't meet others in their homes with tranquility because the government prohibits that precisely in the instant that it declares a state of emergency.

Against that I said instead of attacking the population [or] confusing the population with narco-insurgents, what must be done is protect the population.

Currently in Perú, having just generalized the situation in Ayacucho, almost 80% of the territory of Perú, right now, is dominated by narco-insurgency. And it's certain, I said, that if we continue at this pace and if we don't do anything, that we will follow the path of Nicaragua. And so far we are ... with an additional disadvantage. Nicaragua subsisted because there was communist support that arrived in large quantity. Here, [the insurgents] don't need outside support. Narco-insurgents can finance themselves with billions of dollars produced in that same zone of the Upper Huallaga. Therefore, it is much more difficult to control. In summary, I affirm completely what I said in Ayacucho; and moreover, everything is happening - no one can blame me - I said it would.

It's not that Perú totally is [bad], but rather those in government who are dominated by immorality. Thus, interests cross between those who manage the drugs and those who govern. What happens is that the major part of Peruvians don't understand these policy problems, or, they have been convinced of the belief that they are fighting for a better Perú, or, if they help now to kill people or attack the military, it is because they think that they are making things better for Perú, because they are going to destroy all that which impedes their progress. What these ignorant people don't understand is that they are digging their graves, creating a worse situation.

What we have to do, regarding the military, is, in the first place, we need a total restructuring because we are not trained for a war to protect the population. We are trained in conventional operations, as you know. The "tools" in our [military] schools are for conventional war. Therefore, we need to change that mentality in order that we protect the innocent people, protect human rights, that we don't have to kill people, but rather, that we confront militarily that which is essentially narco-trafficking. This is a military question that we can resolve, focus on, or isolate in its military aspects. But that, finally, they will not do: it requires a total restructuring and, as we say, a moralization.

Now, among the population, as regards political matters, if the politicians ... what they are doing is coexisting with narco-trafficking ... they have crossed interests, and the government institutions in the country are useless and don't function for anyone. You have to restructure everything from the level of the population - from that great majority



of people among whom we must create a level of consciousness.

That is to say, tell them, "On the present path, we are headed in the wrong direction." Thus, there has to be a political campaign because the others, the narco-insurgents, is mounting a political campaign to seize power. These matters are political for the rest of the population, and lamentably, the armed forces are prohibited by the Constitution from participating in politics.

[In response to a query whether Peruvian politicians understand the insidious nature of drug trafficking as regards institutions, Huamán Centeno said:] This is something which can happen in countries of the "first world," like the United States. Here, our politicians aren't interested in the nation. What interests a politician [in Perú] is himself, his family, his political party, nothing else. He is absolutely not interested in 22 million Peruvians around the nation. For this reason, we find ourselves in the present situation.

[About the effect of low pay and conditions which may contribute to corruption and the issue of whether Perú should have fewer better-paid soldiers, Huamán Centeno said:]

This is a matter for government leaders who don't want to reduce force strength because of the fear of a coup ... there is always some fear. Now, the armed forces of my country, particularly the Army, have a group of people who know to work, especially the enlisted soldiers. They know how to make everything: they know how to grow crops, raise cattle, coffee, coca, potatoes ... all of the products that are grown in Perú. Therefore, they are perfectly able to help in sustaining themselves.

[In response to the suggestion that the role of the military is defense against internal and external threats to national security and not the activities above, Huamán Centeno responded:]

The limited role of security forces [like you outline], in an extraordinary situation, is inadequate. For extraordinary situations, there are extraordinary remedies. And, the situation in Perú is not described in any Constitution or book. Therefore, we have to depart from the ill-advised roles previously established and we have to react to the situation as it exists. ...

[As to the role of military engineers in Perú, Huamán said:] The role of military engineers in this case is very important. This is because they know how to construct roads which serve many uses for all parts of the population to

transport necessities for everything, they know how to build facilities, they know how to improve routes/lines of communication: all of which works to improve the situation faced by the majority of the population. There is a tremendous horizon of opportunity: if they build silos, if they improve roads, the roads in Perú particularly in the *zona de la Huallaga* are in terrible condition, bridges haven't been rebuilt: this work is something which will help tremendously to solve these problems.

[I read him portions from the 14 May 1991 pertaining to military engineering and said that, from the point of view of the US mission, that military engineering was likely "on the fringe" of our program of support, especially when the Peruvians had not asked for much MEA. Huamán Centeno said:] If you analyze a little bit my government's situation - not only this one, but those before it - everything they ask for is money. Giving more money is, for me, the same as increasing corruption. The money, in large part, goes into pockets or towards other ends, with a little left for military engineering and other things. ... For me, the central aspect is, in the agreement, we need control. If [for example] Perú needs a tractor - the tractor costs so much, but, I am going to see what the tractor does when taken to another location. If Perú needs well-drilling equipment, great - here's the equipment; not in money, but in equipment. That is how you control the use. I know from my experience in Ayacucho, that when money was sent, it disappeared.

[About allegations of military and police involvement in human rights violations, Huamán Centeno said:] Here in Perú, the problem originates with the government. When the government declares a state of emergency in a region, it is putting aside the human rights who live therein. It is a fact. Thus, the police arrive, knock at the door and break it down. But more important, neither the police nor the military are prepared for this political campaign. We are prepared for war, but this isn't conventional war - one has to distinguish between those who need protection and drug traffickers against whom we can apply a military strategy. Therefore, the bottom line is that we lack preparation. If [the United States] can help prepare us, it would be a great service. Because for us to prepare ourselves, it will be too difficult. I see the role of Americans as preparing us Peruvians physically, mentally, morally to make us excellent combatants and protectors of the population. Thus, it is not that a policeman is thinking about violating human rights, but rather, that the government has set him free to do so.

[Regarding training, Huamán Centeno said:]

For me, training doesn't have to be in the US. It doesn't have to be in a school there. It would be too untimely. Now, training has to be in the areas in which they are to be employed, in view of their role as previously envisioned. That is the only way to advance. ... For me, what we need to do is have the training happen where the forces will be employed.

[With respect to related security considerations:]

Training will only be effective for Perú, in my criterion, when the things happen here, earlier rather than later. Remember Nicaragua - I don't think that came as a surprise - here it will be terrible if that happens with billions of dollars available. I want to remind you of this.

[End of 13 March 1992 interview.]

## **APPENDIX C: US-PERU MOU, 14 MAY 1991**

### **MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PERU CONCERNING COOPERATION IN COUNTERNARCOTICS ACTIVITIES**

On May 14, 1991, the Government of Peru and the Government of the United States of America signed an Agreement on Drug Control and Alternative Development Policy, in which both countries agreed to implement a joint venture. The structure of this joint venture shall be constituted within six months of the date of signing. It is charged with the design and implementation of a new drug control policy, given that the previous policy in force to date, has not produced expected results, as agreed by both countries in the referenced May 14 Agreement.

Furthermore, during the six months foreseen for establishing the joint venture, both governments must continue adopting measures to enhance law enforcement and other actions against narcotics trafficking, as stated in paragraph 48 of the May 14, 1991 Agreement, within the principles of the Cartagena Declaration of February 15, 1990.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Peru (hereinafter "the Parties"):

Recognizing that the Parties have a common interest in attacking the causes of trafficking in narcotics by providing the necessary instruments to achieve a substantial reduction in or total elimination of the illegal cultivation of coca-leaf and the marketing of the basic paste of cocaine in Peru;

Considering that cooperation between the Parties to attack the causes of such trafficking is based on policies of alternative development, security, interdiction, and prevention within the context of a structural adjustment that creates appropriate conditions for the efficient functioning of a market economy in the Peruvian coca belt, with special emphasis on preservation of the ecology;

Recognizing that in certain areas, counternarcotics activities are threatened by subversive groups whose activities impede effective government action to combat narcotics trafficking, and whose activities are inextricably intertwined with those of the narcotics traffickers, and that, in those instances, counter-insurgency actions are a justifiable component of counter-narcotics activities;

Noting the authority of the President of the Republic of

Peru to decide on the manner and timing of participation of the Peruvian armed forces in support of counter narcotics activities, in conformity with the principles contained in the Cartagena Agreement dated February 15, 1990;

Considering that as part of alternative development, police and military units may conduct civic action operations in narcotics affected areas, including road improvement, well drilling and irrigation, construction and repair of civil facilities, the provision of humanitarian medical and dental assistance, and counter-narcotics information campaigns; and

Attaching great importance to implementing the objectives of this Agreement in a manner that is in accordance with internationally recognized standards of human rights behavior by respecting, inter alia, prohibitions against extra-judicial executions, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, and that require proper care for the sick and wounded;

Have reached the following understanding which the Parties intent to guide their cooperation:

#### ARTICLE I

1. The Government of Peru proposes, with the effective cooperation of the Government of the United States of America, to dismantle the clandestine laboratory infrastructure and transportation system used by narco-traffickers; reduce the amount of precursors and chemical substances reaching narco-traffickers; and identify, disable and dismantle major cocaine production or distribution organizations through targeting and sustained investigations of major traffickers.

2. The Parties agree that in order to effectively support the attack on the narcotics threat and defend the sovereignty of Peru, the capabilities of the Peruvian Armed Forces must be enhanced and training intensified. The Peruvian Armed Forces must be able to assure and reinforce civilian government control over the most important coca growing and trans-shipment areas, provide protection to police forces on counter-narcotics operations from the guerrilla insurgents, and develop the capability to strike at drug trafficking organizations.

3. The Government of the United States of America proposes to provide training and equipment to enhance the ground, air and riverine counter-narcotics abilities and effectiveness of Government of Peru police and military units assigned to support counter-narcotics activities. Monitoring of training and equipment provided by the Government of the

United States of America for counter-narcotics purposes will be undertaken in accordance with existing agreements and practices.

4. The Parties understand that any funds provided through this memorandum for police and military counter-narcotics operations will be used exclusively to train, equip and deploy specialized counter-narcotics units and counter-narcotics support units, with the Upper Huallaga Valley of Peru as the principal area of focus.

5. The Parties will ensure that all those in command of military personnel, police or trainees will be held accountable for the conduct of those under their command and promptly investigate reports of human rights abuses.

6. The Parties recognize the importance of adhering to internationally recognized standards of human rights, to include providing access to detention facilities throughout Peru to appropriate international organizations.

#### ARTICLE II

1. The Government of the United States of America proposes to make available to the Government of Peru up to \$34.9 million to finance the purchase of U.S.-origin defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services under U.S. Government letters of offer and acceptance to support those counter-narcotics activities in Peru which are delineated in article I, paragraph 4 of this agreement.

2. The parties agree that all the funds referred to above in this Agreement to be provided by the United States to this effort will be subject to an annual evaluation requiring reduction of drug production and trafficking, sustained economic policy performance and respect for human rights, and the availability of funds appropriated by the Congress of the United States, as disposed by the laws of the United States, and to the mutual agreement of the parties to proceed at the time of such availability.

#### ARTICLE III

The Parties intend to act in accordance with the aforementioned understandings. The Parties may agree on such legal undertakings as are necessary in order to achieve the goals and objectives set forth herein.

#### ARTICLE IV

This memorandum of understanding will become effective upon signature and shall remain in effect for one year. It may be amended by written agreement of the Parties.

In WITNESS HEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding.

Done this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ 1991, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU: Carlos Torres y Torres Lara,  
Minister of Foreign Relations

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Anthony  
C. E. Quainton, Ambassador

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX D: QUESTIONNAIRES AND FEEDBACK

I sent questionnaires to various military and state department leaders who have significant roles in issues related to this thesis. Recipients included: US Ambassador Anthony Quainton, US Chief of Mission in Perú; COL Fred Valenzuela, Chief USMAAG-Lima; LTC Michael Ritchie, Chief, Army Section, USMAAG-Lima; LTG Henry Hatch, Chief of Engineers, USACE; MG Loeffke, Chairman, Inter-American Defense Board. Each addressee responded personally; LTC Capka, Special Assistant for International Affairs, responded on behalf of LTG Hatch. All responses were received before the autogolpe and before the death of airman Master Sergeant Joseph Beard, Jr. in the shooting over Perú's coastal waters. The complete questionnaires and responses are maintained by the author. A summary of important points by respondent is included below.

Ambassador Quainton: President Fujimori has placed great emphasis on civic action in which military engineering plays a significant role. The principal US interest is CD efforts. US MEA is essentially peripheral to the main US role. Human rights concerns result in Congressional pressure to limit US involvement and assistance. US MEA will likely focus on things like human rights rather than civic action, engineering and construction.

COL Valenzuela: US MEA holds great potential and we are beginning and planning efforts to tap that potential. Equipment, training, and deployments all provide mechanisms whereby the US can contribute to successful implementation of the US Country Plan in Perú.

LTC Ritchie: The military portion of security and nation assistance to Perú has experienced a change in emphasis from training and equipping combat units to equipping engineer units and looking at other MEA forms to advance primary US interests and objectives in Perú. This new tack evidences an "enlightened leadership" which seeks to address problem causes, not symptoms. The USMAAG is considering a balanced program of assistance which includes training, equipment, and military-to-military contacts. Besides providing me key information on program specific planning, LTC Ritchie also included examples of the message traffic between US and HN representatives and between the US Country Team and the USG in SOUTHCOM or Washington. The information shows that within the military programs, there has been extensive recent effort to identify MEA opportunities and to initiate action to plan and execute that assistance, both near-term and long-term.



[In a subsequent 23 March 1992 pre-golpe follow-up, LTC Ritchie added:]

Fujimori has stated that Sendero will cease to be a threat before Fujimori's administration ends in 1995. Last year's Peruvian commander of the Huallaga Front wrote the Chief-USMAAG, "Keep the Infantry Battalions. I have Infantry. Send me Civic Action Units. With Civic Action I can win the war in the UHV." Ritchie also opined that, were it possible, the Army Section should have two additional members, an engineer and a special forces staff officer.

[Author note: perhaps a special forces engineer, proficient in Spanish and knowledgeable about project management, might fit the bill.] Last, he summarized that five-year program shows that plans are to fund six Civic Assistance units and three Construction Engineer battalions.

LTG Hatch (information provided by LTC Capka): US MEA has wide potential. The Corps' history of success in nation assistance and stability operations is well documented. MEA must focus on skill transfer at an individual and, more importantly, institutional level. The US military component can be better utilized as part of an integrated strategy to promote stability, transfer skills, provide the infrastructure upon which development rests, and to lend legitimacy to HN institutions: in short, the Army engineer (military or civilian) can play an important role in peacetime operations in support of HN programs. Interagency cooperation and coordination are key to MEA's success.

LTG Loeffke: The US should use FMFP to promote development. EDA programs are especially useful for transferring engineer equipment and items like Bailey Bridge components. The PEP program is an "excellent" way to provide MEA. MEA trainers are useful but must be based on Peruvian requests. JCS-directed, nation-assistance, *Fuertes Caminos*, and other exercises are valuable means to provide MEA. The present engineer planning mechanism is "out of touch with US effort."

## APPENDIX E: GLOSSARY

**Democratic Institutions** - Those organizations and activities which are fundamentally essential to a properly functioning and responsive democracy. My test as to whether or not something is an essential "democratic institution" is "Can a democracy function responsively and properly in the modern world without them?" They include: free, fair and regular elections; a professional military under civilian control; an effective legislature; a functioning, independent judiciary; functioning police forces; an independent press and uncensored media; a free-market economy; the free exercise of religion; and, respect for the fundamental human rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These are the things that unleash what John F. Kennedy called "the dynamic of democracy," namely, the power and purpose of the individual.<sup>1</sup>

**Emergency Zone (EZ)** - The area in Perú, designated by Presidential decree, in which emergency powers are exercised by the military, and in which the GOP places limitations on individual rights for reasons of security. The boundary of the EZ changes frequently and it has included the capital Lima on occasions.

**Low Intensity Conflict** - "Political military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states." FM 100-20: 1-1. I believe that "peacetime engagement," "peaceful co-existence," or "peaceful cooperation" are more appropriate than "peaceful competition," which suggests friction that need not exist.

**Military Engineering Assistance (MEA)** - Applying any military engineering resource (human, equipment, training, material, or informational) normally under the control of the US Department of Defense to plan or construct facilities; to train people in technical or military engineering skills; or, to equip or sustain combat engineering or construction engineering operations. It includes not only traditional "green-suit" units and capabilities, but also those capabilities and assets of the US Army Corps of Engineers in its civil works function.

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<sup>1</sup> Cited in The Constitution: A Resource Guide, Supplement II, Office of the Special Consultant to the Secretary of the Army for the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, Washington, D.C. 20310-0107 (1989): 43.

Nation Assistance - An umbrella term, encompassing all forms of international assistance from the US to its allies. Within nation assistance, security assistance and humanitarian assistance have specific legal implications. Other nation assistance programs, both military and non-military, offer additional suitable means, capabilities, and resources which can be and are incorporated into an overall US strategy to advance US strategic interests throughout the world.

National Security Interests - those interests articulated by the President which form the basis for US national security strategy.

Operational Continuum - A continuum of which includes three general states: peace, conflict and war. In this continuum, the US employs military resources, capabilities and units in operations to secure military objectives or to advance national strategic objectives or to protect or promote national strategic interests.

## APPENDIX F: ACRONYMS

AOR - Area of Responsibility  
ARTEP - Army Training and Evaluation Plan  
ASA-CW - Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works  
AT - Antiterrorism  
BCCI - Bank of Commerce and Credit International  
CA - Civil Affairs  
CARL - Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS  
CD - Counterdrug  
COE - Chief of Engineers  
CGSC - Command and General Staff College, FT Leavenworth, KS  
CGSOC - Command and General Staff Officer Course  
CI - Counter-insurgency  
CINC - Commander-in-Chief  
CINCSOUTH - CINC Southern Command, also CINCSO  
CJCS - Commander, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
CMO - Civil Military Operations  
CT - Counterterrorism  
DAO - Defense Attaché Offices, also USDAO  
DEA - US Drug Enforcement Agency, also USDEA  
DFT - Deployment for Training (for Reserve Component units)  
*DILOG* - *Dirección Logística*, Peruvian Army Logistics Directorate  
DISAM - Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management  
DJCO - Department of Joint and Combined Arms, CGSC  
DOD - Department of Defense, also DoD  
DOS - Department of State  
DTIC - Defense Technical Information Center  
EDA - Excess Defense Articles  
EIU - *The Economist* Intelligence Unit  
EOBC - US Army Engineer Officer Basic Course  
EZ - Emergency Zone  
FBIS - Foreign Broadcast Information Service  
FID - Foreign Internal Defense  
FIDAF - Foreign Internal Defense Augmentation Forces  
FMFP - Foreign Military Financing Program  
FMS - Foreign Military Sales  
FORSCOM - US Forces Command  
GOP - Government of Perú  
HA - Humanitarian Assistance  
HCA - Humanitarian and Civic Assistance  
HN - Host Nation  
IDAD - Internal Defense and Development  
IG - Inspector General  
IMET - International Military Education and Training  
IPR - In-Progress Review  
IRC - International Red Cross  
IRS - Internal Revenue Service  
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff  
JSCP - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

LAWR - Latin American Weekly Report  
 LIC - Low Intensity Conflict  
 MAAG - Military Assistance & Advisory Group, usually USMAAG  
 MAP - Military Assistance Program (PAM, to Peruvians)  
 ME - Military Engineering  
 MEA - Military Engineering Assistance  
 MILCON - Military Construction  
 MOA - Memorandum of Agreement  
 MOU - Memorandum of Understanding  
 MRTA - Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru  
 MTT - Mobile Training Team  
 NA - Nation Assistance  
 NCO - Non-Commissioned Officer  
 NSS - National Security Strategy  
 OAS - Organization of American States  
 ODCSOPS - Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations  
 ODT - Overseas Deployment for Training (Active Army units)  
 PAM - Programa de Apoyo Militar (MAP, to US officials)  
 PEP - Personnel Exchange Program  
 PSYOPS - Psychological Operations  
 RC - Reserve Components  
 SA - Security Assistance  
 SAO - Security Assistance Organization  
 SCEN - SOUTHCOM Engineer  
 SINGE - Servicio de Ingeniería del Ejército (Perú's Army Engineering Service)  
 SL - Sendero Luminoso, also Sendero or Shining Path  
 SJA - Staff Judge Advocate  
 SMEE - Subject Matter Expert Exchange  
 SOEN - US Army South, Engineer  
 SOUTHCOM - Southern Command  
 TAT - Technical Assistance Team  
 TRADOC - US Army Training and Doctrine Command  
 TTOG - Theater Training Opportunities Group  
 UHV - Upper Huallaga Valley  
 USACE - US Army Corps of Engineers  
 USAETL - US Army Engineering and Topographic Laboratories  
 USAID - US Agency for International Development, also, AID  
 USARSO - US Army South, the Army component of USSOUTHCOM  
 USASAALA - US Army Security Assistance and Liaison Agency  
 USEPA - US Environmental Protection Agency, also EPA  
 USG - US Government  
 USMAAG - US Military Assistance & Advisory Group, also, MAAG  
 USSOUTHCOM - US Army Southern Command, also, SOUTHCOM

## APPENDIX G: AUTHOR BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

A biographical note about me is warranted for two reasons. First, my training and assignments lend themselves to researching and formulating an answer to the problem of employing MEA in Perú. Second, in some respects, my experience and training might shape a particular bias which is not intended.

I am an Army engineer, commissioned in 1979 from the United States Military Academy. I am also a registered professional engineer (NY, 1989) and attorney-at-law (VA, 1988) with experience in combat engineering, in construction management, and as an attorney for the US Army Corps of Engineers. From 1988-1989, I served as Deputy District Engineer (Military Projects) in the New York District, US Army Corps of Engineers. And, though I am not a Foreign Area Officer, I was the US Army's exchange engineer to Perú for one year, from 8 July 1990 to 8 July 1991.

Most significant from the experience in Perú are the following: I worked day-to-day with members of the Peruvian Army, at all levels up to and including the Peruvian Army *Dirección Logística* or US Army DCSLOG equivalent; I worked on the concept and organizational design of proposed "Batallones de Desarrollo Nacional" (National Development Battalions) for the Peruvian Army at the *Escuela de Ingeniería*, its Engineer School; I participated in a multi-agency inspection team which travelled around the country looking at numerous past and prospective construction projects; I lived, worked and trained daily as a "member" of the Peruvian Army and with members of the US Country Team; and, I personally reviewed the US Country Plan and its Engineer Annex while I was in Perú. These personal experiences are germane to aspects of the thesis.

With respect to all material, I have labored to represent various points of view equally and fairly.

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